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Cover
Caption: U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Kiska
(WPB 1336) in waters off Hawaii. In
March 2002, Coast Guard officers from
Kiska and FBI agents took PRC national
Shi Lei off the Seychelles-registered, Taiwan-owned fishing vessel Full Means II
in international waters and arrested him
for murder. Shi was tried, convicted, and
sentenced to prison in the United States.
This remains the only instance of U.S.
assertion of jurisdiction and prosecution
under the implementing legislation for
the 1988 SUA Convention, subsequently
updated. In “Effective Implementation of
the 2005 Convention on the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation,” James Kraska explains that many states have not acceded
to the 2005 treaty, and most of those that
have done so have not taken the steps
required to implement it effectively, even
though the need to do so is perhaps even
greater today. USCG photo by CPO Sara
Mooers.
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FROM THE EDITORS
It is well to be reminded that the global maritime domain is a vast, largely ungoverned realm where good order particularly requires effective international
coordination under well-understood legal regimes. In “Effective Implementation
of the 2005 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation,” James Kraska uses the opportunity of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the SUA Convention (as it is generally called) to review the
status of this important international agreement, which was designed to combat
both maritime terrorism and transnational criminal activity. He concludes that
the international community has been remiss in developing appropriate procedures to implement the agreement, and suggests a way forward for remedying this (surprising and dismaying) state of affairs. James Kraska is Howard S.
Levie Professor in the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the
Naval War College. Rick Button, in “International Law and Search and Rescue,”
provides a comparable overview of the current status of international maritime
law relating to search and rescue of vessels and persons in distress. Here again,
considerable progress has been made in codifying the legal parameters and best
practices that apply in this area, but much additional work remains to be done,
particularly in clarifying the very difficult issues involving the handling of large
numbers of seaborne migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.
Rick Button is a senior official in U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington,
DC.
As John Hanley reminds us, war gaming has been a hallmark of the Naval War
College since the late nineteenth century, and played a particularly important
role during the interwar years in preparing senior officers of the U.S. Navy to
prosecute the Pacific War to its successful conclusion. In “Changing DoD’s Analysis Paradigm: The Science of War Gaming and Combat/Campaign Simulation,”
Hanley provides an authoritative account of the evolution of military operations
analysis in the American defense community over the last half-century. He argues that recent advances in chaos and complexity theory call for a rethinking
of the now-dominant “analysis paradigm” that relies on large-scale computer
modeling, in favor of a return to a more traditional approach to operations research and gaming. John Hanley is a former U.S. naval officer who has served
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in a number of capacities in the U.S. government, most recently as director for
strategy in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
In “A Himalayan Challenge: India’s Conventional Deterrent and the Role
of Special Operations Forces along the Sino-Indian Border,” Iskander Rehman
offers an authoritative and timely account of the Indian government’s growing
appreciation of the potential importance of special operations forces (SOFs) in
strengthening the deterrent value of its regular armed forces in the face of the
continuing modernization and expansion of the Chinese military presence along
the two countries’ vast and inhospitable shared frontier. The situation on the
China-India border has been overshadowed completely in recent years by China’s
aggressive actions in the South and East China Seas, but it is well to remember
that this land border never has been demarcated to the satisfaction of the parties
(and indeed occasioned a short war between them in 1962); and China’s so-farsuccessful recourse to so-called gray-zone tactics on its maritime frontier may
embolden it under certain circumstances to undertake a similar campaign in
the Himalayas. As Rehman also notes, India’s very recent use of SOFs in surgical
cross-border operations against Pakistan in Kashmir seems to reflect a significant
reevaluation of the utility of such forces in the (historically very conventionally
minded) Indian military. Iskander Rehman is a senior fellow at the Pell Center for
International Relations and Public Policy at Salve Regina University.
Finally, Shang-su Wu, in “The Development of Vietnam’s Sea-Denial Strategy,”
provides important insight into the reaction of another neighbor to China’s rise
as a major regional military power. Vietnam, like India, has been the victim of a
Chinese border incursion in the not-very-distant past, and also has clashed with
China in a shooting incident in the South China Sea (see Toshi Yoshihara, “The
1974 Paracels Sea Battle: A Campaign Appraisal,” in our Spring 2016 issue). The
author concludes that the Vietnamese have made intelligent use of their limited
resources to build a maritime force that poses a credible sea-denial threat to the
People’s Republic, should current frictions in that area escalate again to open
military operations. Shang-su Wu is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School
of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334,
335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401841-2236).
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Meeting Operational Needs

in the Autumn 2016 issue of the Review I highlighted a three-pronged agenda for the coming years, designed
to focus our collective efforts to operationalize, navalize, and futurize the College’s endeavors. In the paragraphs that follow, I’d like to address several initiatives that are helping us to be of more value to the operating forces.
The Naval War College (NWC) plays a key role in helping our military and
civilian leaders make informed decisions about issues of global importance.
Since good decisions must be based on accurate knowledge and reasonable assumptions, we have expanded and reenergized the important work of our highly
regarded China Maritime Studies Institute, and launched a new academic and
research center with a focus on Russia’s ongoing advances in its maritime forces.
In the late summer of 2015, as civil war raged in Syria and President Bashar
al-Assad’s government crumbled, Russian military forces began arriving in the
region in an effort to stabilize the regime and roll back the opposition. Among
the combat platforms sent to Syria were warships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet,
which took up station in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and have remained there
since. That October, Russian Buyan-M missile corvettes from the Caspian Flotilla
fired advanced Kalibr cruise missiles to strike targets in Syria from over nine
hundred miles away. Since then, Russian navy vessels have been key enablers of
Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war. These are dramatic advances for a
navy that, fifteen years earlier, could muster barely a week of at-sea duty time for
its individual surface ships.
The Syria deployment is emblematic of Russia’s return to the sea. The last
decade has seen Russia surmount many of its post–Cold War challenges and
reassert itself in regions it considers strategically vital, including the Black Sea,
IN MY FORUM
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the Baltic Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Arctic. To better understand
and evaluate the implications of Russia’s return to the sea, NWC established the
Russia Maritime Studies Institute (RMSI) in August 2016.
RMSI’s mission is to conduct research into a range of Russian maritime issues.
These include Russian naval developments, but RMSI’s analytical scope also
encompasses shipbuilding, maritime law, energy issues, and technological development, among other topics. It is a truly collaborative enterprise, drawing on
expertise from across the College to execute a research agenda that is responsive
to the needs of our Navy.
RMSI’s faculty members have been very busy in the institute’s short existence.
In addition to initiating a handful of research projects, they have traveled to U.S.
Naval Forces Europe and Sixth Fleet headquarters, where they met with fleet
leadership, supported staff planning efforts, and provided a series of educational
briefings to the staff. RMSI faculty also traveled to the headquarters of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet, where they provided leadership with an overview of Russian maritime issues and consulted with planners.
There is still much to be done as RMSI gets its sea legs. In the next year, there
will be staff to hire, research to complete, and relationships to build. While the
institute’s operating bandwidth is currently limited, my intention is to grow RMSI
into a world-class research institute that puts the best traditions of scholarly research at the service of the Navy.
As another way we can deliver value to the fleet, we are taking steps to ensure
that we are providing the best possible gaming and analysis support to our operating forces. In his “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” the Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO) charged the Navy with testing and refining naval
power concepts “through focused wargaming, modeling, and simulations” that
will connect directly to fleet exercises and training. Implicit in this charge is the
challenge that operations research and analysis across the Navy enterprise must
be conducted in a cohesive or holistic manner that is sufficient for USN leadership to make fully informed decisions. To that end, the College is committed to
increasing the connections among experimentation, campaign analysis, and war
gaming.
In November 2016, we hosted a Navy Operations Research and Analysis
Workshop in Newport as a forum for leaders from across the Navy enterprise to
share existing gaming, experimentation, and analytical processes so as to identify
beneficial connections and opportunities to provide better analytical products
for Navy decision makers. Representatives from OPNAV N3/5, N81, U.S. Fleet
Forces Command, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Navy Warfare Development Command, and the Naval War College participated in the two-day event.
Attendees presented their current processes for conducting, integrating, and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/11
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disseminating research results. This was followed by a structured discussion to
capture the key elements, both formal and informal, that connect those processes
and results across the spectrum of Navy operations and research. We expect that
the postworkshop report will be a comprehensive integration map that includes
recommendations for ways in which the Navy enterprise can be linked more effectively to provide innovative support for the CNO’s goal of strengthening naval
power at and from the sea. We anticipate that this event will be just the first step
in helping all our institutions and organizations keep connected, with the result
being increased impact from research, gaming, and experimentation that will
keep our maritime forces ahead of the curve.
The Naval War College remains committed to aggressively delivering products
and concepts that will help ensure the nation’s continued maritime superiority.
Watch this space for future updates!

JEFFREY A. HARLEY

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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EFFEC TIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2005
CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF
UNL AWFUL AC TS AGAINST THE SAFET Y
OF MARITIME NAVIGATION
James Kraska

I

n 2005, the 167 member states of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
adopted the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA). The resulting 2005 SUA
Convention is a comprehensive treaty on maritime security that streamlines and
integrates efforts to prevent and disrupt maritime terrorism. In the decade since
its adoption, however, many states have not acceded to the new treaty, and most
of those that have done so have not taken the steps the treaty requires to implement it effectively, even though the need to do so is perhaps even greater today.
This article provides a road map for implementation of the 2005 SUA Convention
to realize the vision for an effective global regime to combat maritime terrorism.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the fear was palpable that there would be
follow-on catastrophic attacks in the maritime domain. Suddenly states worried
about the global marine transportation system, especially its vulnerability to terrorism. Ships could be used to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or persons,
conduct attacks on port infrastructure or bridges to paralyze commerce, or attack
oil and liquefied natural gas tankers to attempt to produce large secondary explosions. The most recent manifestation of this heightened risk is from the Islamic
State, which has examined the feasibility of mass-casualty attacks against cruise
ships.1
In response, the member states and secretariat of the IMO developed a slate
of initiatives to counter these threats, including amendments to the International
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) that emerged as the 2002 International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.2 The ISPS Code attempted
to develop a culture of threat-based security throughout the maritime cargo supply chain on which the global economy depends.3
The ISPS Code is a government-industry partnership designed to make the
commercial shipping industry a less attractive, or at least a more difficult, target
for maritime crime. The code entered into force in 2004. Simultaneously, states
took action to facilitate prevention or disruption of terrorist attacks against
ships and fixed platforms on the continental shelf. In November 2001, the IMO
Assembly adopted Resolution A.924(22) as a response to UN Security Council
Resolution 1373 (2001), which decided that states shall take the necessary steps
to prevent the commission of terrorist acts.4
Resolution A.924(22) called for a review of maritime security architecture
and prevention of maritime terrorism.5 The resolution requested that the IMO
Legal Committee undertake a study to determine appropriate updates to the
IMO Circular on Passenger Ferry Security as well as the SUA and its Protocol for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf.6 Thereafter, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1540 (2004), which recognized the urgent need to take more effective measures to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their
means of delivery.7
The IMO study mandated by A.924(22) unfolded over six sessions plus several
intersessional meetings from 2002 to 2005, and culminated in two draft protocols
that were adopted at a diplomatic conference at IMO in October 2005. The 2005
Protocol built a comprehensive regime for counterterrorism at sea and maritime
security, and the new instrument that includes the 1988 Convention as amended
by the 2005 Protocol is referred to as the 2005 SUA Convention.
The 2005 SUA Convention entered into force in 2010. Now that more than ten
years have passed since its adoption and more than five years since its entry into
force, it may be beneficial to assess how far we have come and, more importantly,
to consider how emerging threats stack up against the existing regimes. In particular, implementation of the 2005 SUA Convention has been lackadaisical, and
it is unclear how well the treaty will contend with current trends and emerging
threats, which include unmanned systems, lasers, and maritime cyber attacks.
The remainder of this article assesses these issues and provides a way forward
for states.
This article first looks at how threats from unmanned aerial, surface, and
subsurface systems fall within the scope of the 2005 SUA Convention. The
convention was crafted with the realization that the shipping industry would be
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confronted with a proliferation of unmanned systems and a profusion of commercial, off-the-shelf technologies that could be used to endanger vessels and
life at sea.
Second, the convention covers dual-use materials: those that may have civilian
or commercial applications, but also may be misdirected for unlawful purposes.
Third, the convention covers asymmetric criminal activities, such as seizure of
a ship by force or the use or attempted use of ships as weapons. States party to the
convention will have to examine and adjust their national laws to ensure they are
committed to criminal prosecution of these almost unique offenses.
Fourth, the convention requires states party to designate a “competent authority” to receive and respond to requests for decisions or assistance from other
states. So far, however, most states party have not done so—leaving a gaping hole
in implementation. There already exists a similar contact list for senior officials
who coordinate law-enforcement counterdrug operations. This article concludes
that states party to the 2005 SUA Convention should develop and publish a similar list that will facilitate implementation of their treaty obligations.
UNMANNED SYSTEMS—ARTICLE 1(1)
It has become commonplace for civil aircraft to encounter unmanned drones, especially near airports. We may expect that the regularity of drone flights and the
controversy over issues of safety, privacy, and security will expand from airspace
to the water. The barrier to entry for making unmanned systems has fallen, and
terrorist groups and criminal organizations can develop and employ unmanned
systems using commercial, off-the-shelf components.8 Underwater and surface
vehicles provide ample standoff distance from the target, may be used to sequence
attacks over time, and can be operated in swarms to overwhelm ship defenses.9
One of the most interesting features of the 2005 Protocol is that article 1(1) of
the SUA, as revised, defines a ship as “a vessel of any type whatsoever not permanently attached to the sea-bed.” The definition includes “dynamically supported
craft, submersibles, or any other floating craft.” This definition appears to include
an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) or unmanned surface vehicle (USV)
under “a vessel of any type whatsoever.” Similarly, the U.S. Rules of Construction
Act, which dates to 1873, defines a “vessel” as any “description of water-craft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on the water.”10 In the case of Charles Barnes Co. v. One Dredge Boat, the
U.S. federal court for the Eastern District of Kentucky held that a vessel is defined
as a “navigable structure, capable of being used for transportation, regardless of
intent or actual use.”11 Thus, the use of either a UUV or a USV in the commission
of an offense, as well as acts committed against them, would be covered under
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the 2005 SUA Convention. In this respect, the 2005 SUA Convention is well positioned to address threats to or posed by unmanned vessels.
DUAL-USE ITEMS AND MATERIALS—ARTICLE 3BIS
The structure of the 2005 SUA Convention criminalizes acts that by their nature
or purpose are conducted to intimidate a population or to compel a government
or an international organization with high explosives or biological, chemical, or
nuclear devices; the discharge of natural gas or other hazardous substances; or the
use of a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage. The legal
standard for “serious injury or damage” includes not only serious bodily injury or
death but “extensive destruction” of a public place that
[I]mplementation of the 2005 SUA Convenresults in “major economic
tion has been lackadaisical, and it is unclear
loss,” and “substantial damage
how well the treaty will contend with . . .
to the environment.”12
unmanned systems, lasers, and maritime cyThe 2005 SUA Protocol is
ber attacks.
unique among counterterrorism conventions in that it covers the misuse of dual-use materials—the transport
on board a ship of legitimate items, products, and materials intended to cause or
in a threat to cause death, serious injury, or damage.13 The proscription includes
explosive and radioactive materials and equipment designed to process special
fissionable material, when intended for use in a nuclear explosive activity that is
not part of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards agreement. Finally, the 2005 Protocol covers “any equipment, materials or
software or related technology that significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN [biological, chemical, and nuclear] weapon, with the
intention that it will be used for such purpose.”14 This provision is exceptional
because it provides a means to criminalize civilian, commercial, off-the-shelf and
dual-use items on the basis of their intended use and purpose.
As noted, BCN weapons are those that include biological, chemical, or nuclear
devices. Biological weapons are “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins.”
Chemical weapons are “toxic chemicals and their precursors,” excluding those
intended for “(A) industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical
or other peaceful purposes; (B) or protective purposes, namely those purposes
directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against
chemical weapons.” Law-enforcement chemicals, such as riot-control agents,
and those used for military purposes are not included within the definition of
chemical weapons.15
The treaty is integrated with other international security regimes in several
ways. First, the list of proscribed items includes toxic chemicals and precursor
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chemicals, as those terms are defined in the Biological Weapons Convention
and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The SUA also covers nuclear
weapons and nuclear explosive devices, although radiological weapons are not
mentioned specifically. Radiological “dirty bombs” are a more likely threat than
nuclear bombs. Furthermore, amended article 1 also covers toxic chemical and
precursor by adopting the definitions contained in the CWC. Toxic chemical
means a substance that through “chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.” A
precursor chemical reacts at any stage in the production of a toxic chemical.16
The terms place of public use, state or government facility, infrastructure facility,
and public transportation system are drawn from the Terrorist Bombing Convention.17 Similarly, the terms source material and special fissionable material have
the same meanings in article 1(2)(b) of the SUA as they have in the statute of the
IAEA (1956).18
In its construction of criminal offenses, the 2005 Protocol also leverages the
offenses in the major multilateral terrorism conventions.19 This approach attempts to weave a tighter, more-integrated legal structure to counter terrorism
vertically throughout the spectrum of land, sea, and air, as well as horizontally
along the continuum of crime and violence from planning and conspiracy to carrying out a violent attack.
ASYMMETRIC MARITIME CRIME—ARTICLE 3BIS
The 2005 SUA Convention avoids the thorny issue of defining “terrorism,” instead simply creating three separate groups of offenses. The first category comprises unlawful and intentional acts of violence against ships or persons on board
ships. This category includes seizure of a ship or exercise of control over a ship
by force or threat of force, acts of violence that endanger the safe navigation of a
ship, destruction of a ship or its cargo, emplacement of a weapon on board a ship,
destruction of navigational facilities, or communication of false information that
endangers a ship.20
The second category encompasses acts of transport of certain dangerous materials or weapons on board a ship for the purpose of intimidating a population,
government, or international organization.21 This category includes transporting
aboard a ship explosive devices or radioactive material, with the intent to cause
death or serious injury or damage; a BCN weapon; fissionable material; or dualuse material.22
The third category includes acts of commission through a conspiracy, acts as an
accomplice, or attempts to commit crimes included in the prior two categories.23
The stable of new offenses offers a flexible definition focused on the intention
of the act or the conduct of violence, rather than murky political motivations. The
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offenses were designed broadly to cover emerging and new threats, and it bears
consideration whether the use of a laser against a ship imperils the vessel or its
crew to the extent that it falls under articles 3, 3bis, and 3quater. However, it is
unclear where the line is drawn for certain new or emerging acts of intimidation
such as a cyber attack against a ship’s navigation or communications systems or
the aforementioned direct action against a vessel using a laser.
In the case of a cyber attack, article 3(1)(e) proscribes any unlawful and intentional act that “seriously interferes with” maritime “navigational facilities”
and that is “likely to endanger the safe navigation” of a ship. Consequently, cyber
crimes that endanger a ship are included within the scope of criminal conduct in
the 2005 SUA Convention.
It is less certain, however, whether other asymmetric attacks are included in
the definition. In particular, does the use of a laser against the pilothouse of a vessel constitute an “act of violence” against a person on board a ship that is “likely
to endanger the safe navigation” of the ship?24 This issue turns on the definition
of what constitutes an “act of violence.” Violence in the law generally is considered to be “moving, acting, or [conduct] characterized by physical force, especially by extreme and sudden or by unjust and improper force.”25 This focus on
“reproaches produced or effected by physical force” raises the question whether
use of a laser against a ship constitutes an “act of violence.” The Israeli Penal Act
of 1977 is more circumspect; it defines an “act of violence or terror” as “a crime
that causes harm to a person’s body or that endangers him for death or for severe
injury.”26 The use of lasers opens a lacuna in the definition of what constitutes
an “act of violence” that states should address in implementing legislation. The
IMO may serve as a fusion point for governments’ views on this issue to facilitate
uniformity.
COMPETENT AUTHORITY—ARTICLE 8BIS
Article 8bis of the 2005 SUA includes a comprehensive framework to facilitate
boarding of suspect vessels at sea. In particular, the new provision seeks to ensure better coordination during incidents at sea between a warship attempting to
board a suspicious vessel and the flag state that exercises jurisdiction over that
vessel. Generally, the flag state has exclusive authority to authorize boarding of
one of its ships, but in the past states have not always responded to such requests
in a timely fashion. Article 8bis requires states party to “co-operate to the fullest
extent possible to prevent and suppress unlawful acts covered by this Convention . . . and . . . respond to [boarding] requests . . . as expeditiously as possible.”27
The boarding regime does not change the existing international law of the sea
or infringe on exclusive flag-state control or traditional rights and freedoms of
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navigation. The boarding regime provides a framework for expedited decision
making that states party may adopt to facilitate coordination.
The 2005 SUA Convention sets forth a process for cooperation and procedures
for boarding a ship flying the flag of another state party when the requesting
party has “reasonable grounds” to suspect that the ship or a person on board the
ship is, has been, or is about to be involved in the commission of an offense under
the convention.
States have a general obligation to cooperate “to the fullest extent possible”
among the states party and to respond to requests from other states party “as
expeditiously as possible.” 28
The provision is exceptional because it proRequests for boarding should
vides a means to criminalize civilian, combe accompanied by, inter alia,
mercial, off-the-shelf and dual-use items on
the name of the vessel, its
the basis of their intended use and purpose.
IMO ship identification number, and its port of registry.29
Article 8bis(3) is a reminder that it is often impossible to conduct a thorough
inspection of either a small craft or a large commercial vessel at sea, and often
the best course of action is to bring the ship into port to facilitate the inspection.
This provision requires the boarding state to consider the particular “dangers and
difficulties” involved in boarding a ship under way.
Article 8bis(4) provides a mechanism whereby a state party with reasonable
grounds to suspect that an offense delineated in article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater has
been, is being, or is about to be committed “involving a ship flying its flag” may
request the assistance of other states party.30 The requesting party that encounters
beyond the territorial sea a ship of another country that is suspected of an offense
under article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater must follow the steps set forth in the new
article. The flag state should confirm the nationality of the vessel, and if nationality is confirmed the flag state has four options: (1) it may authorize the requesting
state authority to board; (2) it may conduct a boarding and search with its own
forces; (3) it may conduct a boarding with its forces working in tandem with the
boarding forces of the requesting state; or (4) it may decline the requesting state
permission to board.31
When the requesting party boards a foreign-flagged ship and finds evidence
of offenses under article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater, the flag state may authorize the
requesting party temporarily to detain the ship, cargo, and persons on board,
pending receipt of further instructions from the flag state. In any case, the requesting party must inform the flag state of the results of the boarding, search,
and detention, including discovery of evidence of a violation of article 3, 3bis,
3ter, or 3quater or illegal conduct that is not a subject of the convention.32
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These interactions between the flag state and the requesting state are facilitated through the designated “competent authority” of the flag state, and the success of cooperation hinges on responsive and iterative engagement. States party
agree to designate within one month of becoming a party an official authority (or
authorities) to serve as a liaison with other nations on time-sensitive issues arising under the treaty, such as receiving and responding to requests for assistance,
confirmation of vessel nationality, and seeking authorization to take appropriate
law-enforcement measures.33
Each state is to make the designation to the IMO secretary-general, who promulgates it among member states.34 However, out of forty states, such notification
has been made by only four: Latvia, San Marino, Sweden, and the United States.
Latvia has designated the Naval Forces Coast Guard Service as the appropriate
authority to receive requests for assistance, and the Security Police and Prosecutor General’s Office as the points of contact for confirmation of nationality and
authorization to take appropriate measures. Similarly, Sweden has designated the
Swedish Coastguard Regional Command as the authority to receive and respond
to requests for confirmation of ship nationality, and the Ministry of Justice as authority for requests to take measures against Swedish vessels. San Marino and the
United States have a single point of contact each, the Civil Aviation and Maritime
Navigation Authority and the U.S. Coast Guard Liaison Office to the U.S. State
Department, respectively. This low rate of compliance for designation of a competent authority risks atrophy of the 2005 SUA Convention, and remedial action
by states party is required.35
The Vienna Drug Convention offers a clear model for effective coordination
of maritime interdiction and boarding at sea or in port. Under article 17 of the
convention, states party are obligated to cooperate to suppress illicit drug trafficking by sea. States party that have reasonable grounds to suspect a vessel flying a foreign flag is engaged in illicit traffic may notify the flag state and request
confirmation of registry and authorization to take appropriate measures against
the suspect ship. In such a case, the flag state may authorize boarding, search, and
seizure of evidence in accordance with agreements or arrangements between the
two states. States party “shall respond expeditiously” to inquiries, and states that
take action against a foreign-flag ship shall “promptly inform the flag State.”36
To facilitate these interactions and ensure efficient and effective communications and decision making, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) has produced a Directory of Competent National Authorities.37 The
directory provides points of contact and decision-making authorities for requests
for extradition, mutual legal assistance, and cooperation against illicit traffic by
sea, including the smuggling of migrants and firearms.38 The IMO and member
states should develop a similar directory of competent authorities to facilitate
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requests made pursuant to the 2005 SUA Convention, with the goal of perhaps
combining the points of contact for maritime interdiction under article 17 of the
UNODC directory with the IMO directory to render a comprehensive volume on
government points of contact and decision making for maritime matters.
After the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 2005
SUA Convention has the potential to become one of the most important instruments for maritime security,
The 2005 Protocol attempts to weave a tighter, on the order of SOLAS. However, there is no question that,
more-integrated legal structure to counter
for now, it is woefully underterrorism vertically throughout the spectrum
subscribed and underutilized.
of land, sea, and air, as well as horizontally
The slow implementation of
along the continuum of crime and violence
from planning and conspiracy to carrying out the 2005 SUA Convention is
reminiscent of that for the
a violent attack.
1988 Convention, which,
while widely accepted (with some 150 states party), has been used only once (as
far as I know) to assert jurisdiction over a suspected criminal.
In that case, United States v. Shi, the U.S. government asserted jurisdiction over
the defendant, whom U.S. Coast Guard officers picked up sixty nautical miles off
the coast of Hilo, Hawaii, from the F/V Full Means No. 2, a Taiwan ship registered
in the Seychelles.39 Shi was a Chinese crew member who killed the captain and
first mate of the ship after they beat him severely and demoted him from cook
to deckhand. Subsequently, Shi was overpowered by the crew and held captive
until turned over to the Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Shi’s conviction by the federal district court in Hawaii was upheld by the U.S.
Ninth Circuit.40
The United States asserted jurisdiction over Shi under 18 U.S.C. § 2280(b)(1)
(C), the U.S. implementing legislation for the 1988 SUA Convention.41 That legislation was adopted to assert U.S. jurisdiction in accordance with the convention,
which requires states party to extradite or prosecute offenders regardless of where
the offenders’ acts occurred. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2280 authorizes federal jurisdiction
over any offender “later found” in the United States, and the district court found
that it had jurisdiction over Shi.42 Congress’s authority to establish jurisdiction
by statute is granted in the “offense clause” of the Constitution, which empowers Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.”43
The Shi case is remarkable and important today for two reasons. First, the
United States used its implementing legislation for the 1988 SUA Convention
to establish jurisdiction over Shi, and this action did not require any liaison or
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correspondence with other nations involved: neither the flag state of the ship nor
the authorities of Shi’s nationality (China) nor those of the nationalities of his
two victims (Taiwan and Chinese). The successful prosecution underscores the
successful operation of implementing legislation to prosecute crimes committed
under the 1988 Convention. Second, the Shi case is the only known example of a
criminal prosecution under the 1988 Convention, underscoring the gulf that lies
between what legal realists might say is “law on the books” and “law in action.”44
In crafting and adopting the 2005 SUA Convention, the member states of the
IMO and the IMO secretariat have advanced the program of the rule of law in
the oceans and furthered the goal of greater maritime security. The convention is
a cornerstone instrument for bringing the rule of law to the oceans, but it is only
a first step. As with much of international law, the success of the 2005 convention lies in its implementation, not merely its adoption at the international level.
States must integrate their IMO commitments into effective national action that
includes domestic rules, interagency resources and authorities, and mechanisms
for real-time collaboration. Toward this end, states might explore how to approach new threats and define new crimes based on unmanned systems, dual-use
materials, and asymmetric attacks on ships, as well as ensure they have built out
“backroom” procedural and logistical mechanisms, such as designation of competent authorities to facilitate international collaboration to enforce maritime
security measures.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SEARCH AND RESCUE
Rick Button

Treasury Department
Office of the Secretary
Washington, D.C.
November 15, 1897
Sir: The best information obtainable gives the assurance of truth to the reports
that a fleet of eight whaling vessels are icebound in the Arctic Ocean, somewhere
in the vicinity of Point Barrow, and that the 265 persons who were, at last accounts, on board these vessels are in all probability in dire distress. These conditions call for prompt and energetic action, looking to the relief of the imprisoned
whalemen. It therefore has been determined to send an expedition to the rescue.
Believing that your long experience in arctic work, your familiarity with the region
of Arctic Alaska from Point Barrow, south, and the coast line washed by the Bering Sea, from which you but recently returned, your known ability and reputation
as an able and competent officer, all especially fit you for the trust, you have been
selected to command the relief expedition. Your ship, the Bear, will be officered by
a competent body of men and manned by a crew of your own selection. The ship
will be fully equipped, fitted, and provisioned for the perilous work in view, for
such it must be under the most favorable conditions. . . .
You are hereby given full authority and the largest possible latitude to act in every
emergency that may arise, and while impossibilities are not expected, it is expected that you, with your gallant officers and crew, will leave no avenue of possible
success untried to render successful the expedition which you command. . . .
Mindful of the arduous and perilous expedition upon which you are about to
enter, I bid you, your officers and men, Godspeed upon your errand of mercy, and
wish you a successful voyage and safe return.1

T

he search for and rescue of persons in distress is a centuries-old, timehonored tradition. The above instructions provided to Captain Francis Tuttle of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service over a century ago, as he prepared his crew
to rescue whalers trapped in ice in the Arctic Ocean, epitomize the dedicated
efforts of mariners and coastal states in saving lives at sea.
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This lifesaving tradition continues unabated today, albeit with new challenges.
The long-standing challenges provided by harsh weather and sea conditions,
long distances, and limited available search-and-rescue (SAR) resources remain
the same. However, since Captain Tuttle’s successful rescue, international and
national SAR organizations, practices, procedures, capabilities, and technologies
have continued to improve. There is now a greater commitment and resolve by
the international community to work together to save lives at sea.
Owing to the unique hazards encountered by ships as they ply the world’s
oceans and by aircraft on transoceanic flights, as well as the challenges to coordinating and conducting maritime lifesaving operations, coastal states implemented national SAR systems and SAR organizations to search for and rescue those
in distress at sea. However, prior to the 1970s there was no standardized system
globally for organization, coordination, and conduct of SAR operations. Seeking
to harmonize these organizations and procedures, the international community,
through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), established in 1979 the
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention).
The SAR Convention provides an internationally standardized foundation and
framework for coastal states to work together in implementing a global maritime
SAR system.2 The IMO describes how the SAR Convention was developed to
provide a plan for and implementation of a system to save the lives of persons in
distress at sea more effectively:
The 1979 Convention . . . was aimed at developing an international SAR plan, so that,
no matter where an accident occurs, the rescue of persons in distress at sea will be
co-ordinated by a SAR organization and, when necessary, by co-operation between
neighbouring SAR organizations.
Although the obligation of ships to go to the assistance of vessels in distress was
enshrined both in tradition and in international treaties . . . there was, until the
adoption of the SAR Convention, no international system covering search and rescue
operations. In some areas there was a well-established organization able to provide
assistance promptly and efficiently, in others there was nothing at all.3

Under the internationally recognized foundation provided through the SAR
Convention, each coastal state organizes its maritime SAR authorities and organization on the basis of its available SAR resources, unique geographic challenges,
political considerations, cultural influences, available funding, and domestic SAR
legal framework. Each country’s national and agency-specific SAR organizations then develop policies, procedures, tactics, and training to implement their
respective national SAR system, which then becomes an integral component of
the global SAR system. Through this internationally standardized and organized
framework, coastal states work together in responding to and rescuing those
imperiled at sea.
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This article pursues several objectives. First, it seeks to provide a broad overview of the global SAR system’s international framework and organization as set
forth in the annex to the SAR Convention and implemented by coastal states.
Despite that implementation over the past forty-five years, many people remain
unaware of the existence of a standardized, global, maritime SAR system. While
not perfect, the global SAR system provides an important basis on which coastal
states can build cooperative relationships to enable them to conduct this important lifesaving mission more effectively.
Second, the article focuses on the specific SAR responsibilities and international legal requirements placed on shipmasters and coastal states as they work
together in coordinating and conducting maritime SAR operations; both are important lifesaving partners. Passenger ships, cargo ships, and warships of all types
transit across the world’s oceans every day. In many instances, one of these ships
may be the only available SAR resource in the vicinity of a person in distress, and
could make the difference between life and death. The coastal state is responsible
for coordinating the SAR operation and supporting the responding shipmaster.
The article discusses several international conventions that form the legal basis
for this important lifesaving relationship. The responsibilities of a warship in
rendering assistance to persons in distress also are considered.
This section also will discuss the tragic issue of mixed migration by sea from
a SAR perspective. The question that needs to be considered is whether these
mixed-migration incidents—in which thousands of persons are taking to the
sea, in many instances fleeing for their lives—and the ensuing response actions
should even be considered SAR operations conducted under the SAR Convention, or instead law-enforcement / national border security incidents.
Third, this article will address two additional situations that SAR legal advisers
and policy makers should consider and for which they should develop policy and
prepare SAR responders.
First, under international law the responsibilities and requirements of a ship or
aircraft when conducting a rescue operation within another coastal state’s territorial sea will be considered. The shipmaster’s duty to render assistance to persons
in distress does not stop at a coastal state’s territorial sea boundary. When such a
situation occurs, can a ship at sea, on being notified of persons in distress, enter
a coastal state’s territorial sea to render assistance? Can an aircraft enter into a
coastal state’s airspace over its territorial sea to assist in a rescue operation? Seven
different scenarios will be presented to highlight the distinctions and limitations
of rescue operations within a coastal state’s territorial sea.
Second, this article will address the issue of forcibly evacuating a person from
a vessel when doing so is, in the judgment of the SAR responders on scene, the
only way to save the person’s life. May the SAR responder use force to compel a
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person to abandon his vessel? What type of force should be considered? SAR authorities should develop policies and procedures in preparation for the day when
a person in distress does not want to leave his vessel even in a life-threatening
situation.
This article does not provide exhaustive legal analyses of these various issues.
Its purposes are to provide a synopsis of the international law addressing these
subjects, and to address questions that SAR authorities and responders should
consider in developing future SAR policies and procedures. It is my hope that this
article will provide the reader with a better understanding of the legal framework
for the global SAR system and serve as an impetus for further discussion of these
important topics.
OVERVIEW: GLOBAL SEARCH-AND-RESCUE SYSTEM
The thing I constantly think about—we were so, so very lucky. The
difference between our ship and the Titanic is we weren’t caught in
the middle of the ocean. . . . If we had been caught in the middle of the
ocean, most of these people wouldn’t have survived.
MIKE KAJIAN, PASSENGER ON BOARD COSTA CONCORDIA

The world’s oceans constitute a dangerous environment that covers approximately 70 percent of the earth’s surface.4 The centuries-old duty of the mariner
transiting the world’s oceans to render assistance to those in distress at sea was
implemented formally through several international conventions.5 However,
large-scale disasters at sea in the early twentieth century, many involving significant loss of life, continued to plague the shipping community. The continued loss
of life made it apparent that, alone, this duty to render assistance was insufficient;
an international SAR system for organizing, coordinating, and conducting rescues at sea was required.
Before the adoption of the SAR Convention, there was no overarching international plan for coordinating the conduct of maritime lifesaving operations.
Some maritime regions did have coastal states that implemented robust, effective, national SAR systems, while others had very limited or no SAR resources
or coordinating structures to render assistance to persons in distress. There was
no internationally recognized system to coordinate and conduct SAR operations, because there was no governing international regime to standardize SAR
processes and procedures.
The adoption of the SAR Convention filled this gap by instituting a framework under which coastal states could implement their respective national SAR
systems,6 including the establishment of rescue coordination centers (RCCs) and
rescue sub-centers (RSCs) to coordinate operations within a coastal state’s SAR
region.7
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Soon after the IMO’s SAR Convention came into force in 1985, it became apparent that additional guidance was required. To assist states in meeting their
SAR obligations under the SAR Convention, as well as the comparable requirements the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) mandated in the
Convention on International Civil Aviation (“Chicago Convention”),8 both
organizations jointly developed the three-volume International Aeronautical
and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR manual).9 This reference
provides guidelines and procedures to assist states in developing and harmonizing their respective aeronautical and maritime SAR organizations, planning, and
operations, as well as providing the basis for coordinating and conducting SAR
operations among states.
Developed for the SAR manager, the IAMSAR manual, volume 1 (Organization and Management), “attempts to ensure that managers understand the basic
concepts and principles involved in SAR, and to provide practical information
and guidance to help managers establish and support SAR services.”10 Volume 2
(Mission Co-ordination) provides guidance and information to personnel who
plan and coordinate SAR operations.11 Volume 3 (Mobile Facilities) was developed for carriage on board vessels and aircraft that may be called on to assist in
a SAR operation.
Volume 1 explains the IMO and ICAO’s purpose for developing the IAMSAR
manual:
ICAO and IMO jointly developed this Manual to foster co-operation between themselves, between neighbouring States, and between aeronautical and maritime authorities. The goal of the Manual is to assist State authorities to economically establish
effective SAR services, to promote harmonization of aeronautical and maritime SAR
services, and to ensure that persons in distress will be assisted without regard to their
locations, nationality, or circumstances. State authorities are encouraged to promote,
where possible[,] harmonization of aeronautical and maritime SAR services.12

Within the global SAR system, roles and responsibilities also have been developed to provide for the efficient organization and implementation of a coastal
state’s national SAR system. There are three primary levels of coordination: (1)
the SAR coordinator (SC) is that person or agency with the responsibility for the
management and oversight of a coastal state’s SAR organization;13 (2) the SAR
mission coordinator (SMC) is the official temporarily assigned to coordinate,
direct, and supervise a SAR operation;14 and (3) an on-scene coordinator (OSC)
may be assigned by the SMC to coordinate SAR operations on scene when multiple resources are working together within a specified area.15 Additionally, an
aircraft coordinator (ACO) can be assigned by the SMC or OSC in a SAR operation if the response involves multiple aircraft. The ACO would be responsible for
flight safety and for ensuring effective use of the aircraft in the conduct of the
operation.16
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Search-and-Rescue Regions
Implementation of the international SAR framework mandated by the SAR
Convention necessitated the division of the world’s oceans into a patchwork quilt
of maritime SAR regions in which each coastal state assumed responsibility for
coordinating and conducting SAR operations.17 It is commonly assumed that
coastal states establish their SAR regions unilaterally. However, SAR region lines
of delimitation are only provisional; the SAR Convention mandates that coastal
states with adjacent SAR regions enter into cooperative agreements to establish
their respective SAR regions formally.18 These SAR agreements not only delimit
the SAR regions but ideally serve as the basis for cooperation and coordination
between coastal states in the conduct of SAR operations.19
One practical benefit in developing a global SAR system is that with the worldwide assignment of maritime SAR regions, states are not required to provide SAR
services for their own citizens wherever they travel. Coastal states provide SAR
services to anyone in distress within a SAR region, without regard to the person’s
nationality, status, or circumstances.20
Two other important factors need to be understood regarding coastal states’
implementation of SAR services within their maritime SAR regions.21 First, a
maritime SAR region is not an extension of a coastal state’s national “boundaries”
but rather a geographic area in which the coastal state accepts responsibility to
coordinate SAR operations.22 This is an especially important concept to understand, since a coastal state may extend a large portion of its maritime SAR region
into the high seas.23 Second, the SAR Convention does not mandate that a coastal
state must have all the SAR resources necessary to respond to a distress within
its entire maritime SAR region. As previously stated, SAR regions only define a
geographic area in which a coastal state is responsible for “coordinating” SAR operations.24 The requirements of the SAR Convention build on the time-honored
tradition of shared responsibility for coordinating and conducting lifesaving operations at sea. All available resources should be used to save lives: local, regional,
national, and international; volunteer; commercial and shipping; aircraft; etc.25
The circumstances of a particular distress incident should dictate what available
resources can and should be used most effectively.
Rescue Coordination Center / Rescue Sub-center
The coastal state’s RCCs and RSCs are the backbone of the global SAR system.
They are responsible for the organization of SAR services and the coordination
and conduct of SAR operations within maritime SAR regions.26 The annex to the
SAR Convention requires assignment of one RCC or RSC to each maritime SAR
region.27 The RCC should be located where it can perform its coordination function most effectively, have twenty-four-hour availability, be staffed with trained
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personnel, have the ability to receive distress alerts, and maintain plans of operation for different types of distress scenarios.28
In situations in which an RCC may not be able to coordinate SAR services
effectively over a specific geographic area within its SAR region, a coastal state’s
SAR authority can establish an RSC to exercise responsibility for coordinating
SAR operations within a designated search-and-rescue subregion (SRS).29 The
RSC, which can be just as capable as an RCC, may be delegated authority to coordinate SAR operations independently within its SRS. However, an RSC generally
has fewer responsibilities than its associated RCC.30
The global SAR system, while not perfect, continues to improve every year as
nations work together to save lives at sea. SAR authorities worldwide understand
their responsibilities under the SAR Convention. Lessons learned from SAR cases
are developed and shared among international SAR authorities and organizations. Coastal states in many regions of the world are realizing that effective SAR
services cannot be provided independently. In these regions, coastal states are
working together to develop regional SAR plans and cooperative arrangements
to implement regional SAR systems based on the framework mandated in the
SAR Convention. There is still plenty of work to be accomplished, but through
the IMO and ICAO positive improvements to the global SAR system continue
to be made.
OBLIGATIONS OF THE SHIPMASTER AND THE COASTAL STATE:
PERSONS RESCUED AT SEA
In May 2014, a U.S. rescue coordination center was notified that a passenger ship,
transiting on the high seas, had come across what appeared to be a dilapidated vessel with a large number of persons on board in the vicinity of a coastal state. On the
basis of the size and condition of the vessel and the presence of thirty-nine persons
on board, the passenger ship embarked the persons, consistent with its international
obligation to render assistance to those in distress at sea.
Even though the passenger ship was in the vicinity of this coastal state, the rescue of the thirty-nine survivors occurred in the maritime SAR region of a second
coastal state. After the thirty-nine survivors were safely on board, the passenger ship
resumed its transit to the second coastal state, its next port of call. During its transit,
the shipmaster notified the authorities of the rescue and that his ship had embarked
the thirty-nine survivors. However, upon arrival, the authorities made no effort to
coordinate the disembarkation of the survivors in their country or to another place
of safety, as required by the SAR Convention. As a result, the passenger ship was
forced to retain the thirty-nine survivors on board when it departed for its next port
of call, in the United States.
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Because of the coastal state’s failure to meet its obligation to coordinate the disembarkation of the survivors to a place of safety as required by the SAR Convention,
the passenger ship was forced to continue to bear the burden of caring for the thirtynine survivors upon departure. Subsequently, the U.S. Coast Guard was notified of
the situation, contacted the passenger ship, and arranged for a rendezvous at sea
between the passenger ship and a Coast Guard cutter. As planned, the passenger
ship met with the cutter, which facilitated the at-sea transfer of the thirty-nine survivors without incident.
In effect, the United States, in particular the U.S. Coast Guard, was forced to
assume the responsibility to coordinate the disembarkation and disposition of the
survivors rescued by the passenger ship on behalf of the coastal state. Once the transfer was complete, the passenger ship was released from its obligations and continued
its transit to the United States.31
This actual incident illustrates what is required of ships transiting the world’s
oceans and of coastal states implementing the global SAR system. In this incident, the shipmaster fulfilled his duty to render assistance to persons rescued at
sea. However, the coastal state refused to assist in coordinating the disembarkation of the survivors or to relieve the shipmaster of his obligation to care for the
survivors. As a result, in this instance the global SAR system failed. It cannot be
stressed enough that both the shipmaster and the coastal state must be active
participants in the global SAR system—both must be committed to saving lives
at sea.
What follows is a description of the duties and obligations of shipmasters
and coastal states in ensuring the success of maritime lifesaving operations. It is
important for both to be cognizant of their responsibilities, as well as for each to
develop processes and procedures to implement the global SAR system.
Shipmaster
Ships at sea are the eyes and ears of the global SAR system. In many instances, it
is ships that receive notification of persons in distress, and they can be the first
SAR resources available to render assistance. Ships conduct lifesaving operations
every day in the world’s oceans, and generally welcome the opportunity to save
lives.
Three international conventions formally enshrine in international law the
important duty of the shipmaster to render assistance to persons in distress at
sea.32 Compliance with this duty is essential to preserving the integrity of the
global SAR system.
First, the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention of 1974 is one of the most
important treaties concerning merchant ship safety.33 Chapter V, regulation 33,
states:
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The master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to provide assistance, on
receiving information from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to
proceed with all speed to their assistance, if possible informing them or the search
and rescue service that the ship is doing so. This obligation to provide assistance
applies regardless of the nationality or status of such persons or the circumstances in
which they are found. If the ship receiving the distress alert is unable or, in the special
circumstances of the case, considers it unreasonable or unnecessary to proceed
to their assistance, the master must enter in the log-book the reason for failing to
proceed to the assistance of the persons in distress, taking into account the recommendation of the Organization to inform the appropriate search and rescue service
accordingly.34

Second, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in
article 98, provides that shipmasters have a duty to render assistance to persons
in distress:
1.	 Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do
so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers:
			(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost;
			(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if
informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be
expected of him;
			(c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship,
its port of registry and the nearest port at which it will call.35

Note that article 98 is addressed to the flag state; it is the flag state that must
ensure that any ship flying its flag renders assistance to persons in distress at sea.
The shipmaster has the duty to render assistance “so far as he can do so without
serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers.”36
Third, the Salvage Convention in article 10 states:
1.	 Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel
and persons thereon, to render assistance to any person in danger of being lost at
sea.
2.	 The States Parties shall adopt the measures necessary to enforce the duty set out in
paragraph 1.
3.	 The owner of the vessel shall incur no liability for a breach of the duty of the master under paragraph 1.37

Notably, there are circumstances in which a shipmaster would not be duty
bound to aid persons in distress. For example, a shipmaster is not required to
place his ship and crew in undue peril in order to attempt to render assistance.38
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In addition, there is no duty to attempt to render assistance in instances where
doing so would be impracticable or futile.39
All three conventions affirm the shipmaster’s duty to render assistance to
persons in distress at sea and to treat any rescued survivors humanely while on
board the ship.40 Most shipmasters realize that, if the situation were reversed and
they themselves were in distress, they would want another ship to provide the
same assistance.41
Does the same treaty law concerning the shipmaster’s duty to render assistance to persons in distress apply to warships?42 The complex nature of military
operations at sea means that diverting a warship to assist in a SAR operation and
embark survivors can pose a challenge, especially when attempting to coordinate
survivor disembarkation with a coastal state’s SMC. And while conducting a
maritime SAR operation can be difficult for a warship during peacetime, it can
be even more complicated during armed conflict.
Interestingly, the SOLAS (chapter V, regulation 33) and Salvage (article 10)
Conventions do not apply to warships and other noncommercial, state-owned
vessels; the conventions do not mandate that these classes of vessels render assistance to persons in distress.43 However, it remains customary international law44
for states to ensure their warships act in a manner consistent with this requirement.45 By comparison, UNCLOS does impose this obligation on the flag state
to require masters to comply with article 98. The SAR Convention, as previously
stated, provides the framework for coastal states to implement the global SAR
system; however, it does not “carve out” an exemption for certain classes of vessels
from complying with its requirements. A party to the SAR Convention is obligated to ensure that all ships under its flag render assistance to persons in distress.46
Under the SAR Convention, a coastal state may receive notification of a person
in distress, assume the role of SMC, and have its RCC contact a warship in the
vicinity of a distress incident to divert and render assistance. If the warship is
in a position and is able to render the assistance, the commanding officer (CO)
should do so when the SMC so requests. If it is the CO who becomes aware of
persons in distress, he should contact the coastal state whose SAR region the
ship is transiting and relay any information concerning the distress incident.
The coastal state would assume SMC and coordinate the response with the CO,
including the disposition of any survivors once embarked on the warship.
Can the CO of a warship at sea decide not to render assistance to persons in
distress, even if the warship is in a position to do so and could provide timely
assistance, but—owing to other “operational commitments”—is considered “not
available”? Who would decide, in a particular instance, whether the CO of a
warship can be relieved of his duty to render assistance to persons in distress?
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While this may be considered a difficult situation, the overall answer is no. For
example, under U.S. Navy and Coast Guard policy, the CO always retains the duty
to render assistance to persons in distress at sea if able to do so.47 It also can be
argued that, with this historical and universal principle enshrined in the SOLAS
Convention, the Salvage Convention, and UNCLOS, the CO’s duty to render
assistance to persons in distress constitutes customary international law as well.
This is especially relevant during peacetime when, considering the circumstances
of the distress incident, a warship may be the only available resource capable of
conducting a lifesaving operation. The circumstances on scene and the CO’s coordination with the SMC and his operational chain of command should dictate
the best course of action to ensure that persons in distress are rescued.
The Coastal State
Under the SAR Convention, a state has the responsibility to implement the global
SAR system.48 To fulfill this mandate, the coastal state establishes a national SAR
system that effectively coordinates SAR operations to render assistance when
notified of persons in distress.49 If the most effective SAR resource available for
a particular SAR operation is a merchant ship (or any other vessel best suited to
render the assistance), the SMC should divert the ship to save lives.
As the shipmaster fulfills this duty to render assistance to persons in distress,
he has an expectation that the coastal state will fulfill its own obligation to assist in coordinating the disembarkation of survivors rescued at sea to a place of
safety and to minimize the impact on his ship. For example, the SMC should do
everything possible to limit the deviation of a ship from its intended course to
assist persons in distress. Granted, there are times when a particular ship is the
only SAR resource available. However, diversion of a merchant ship in particular
should be limited, if at all possible. Additionally, the SMC should reconsider
ever diverting a merchant ship from its intended port of call to a different port
to disembark rescued survivors. Such a diversion can cause significant logistical
and liability challenges for the ship, shipping company, and shipping agent, and
should be avoided.50 While these types of SAR cases may be challenging for the
SMC, who very well may be required to coordinate survivor disembarkation and
disposition with another coastal state, the global SAR system will benefit when
the shipmaster knows the SMC will minimize the impact on his ship’s intended
voyage when he renders assistance to persons in distress.51
This relationship between the shipmaster and the coastal state is crucial to
the effectiveness of the global SAR system. While the shipmaster has the duty to
render assistance to persons in distress, the coastal state is obligated to coordinate
the SAR operation effectively and efficiently in support of the responding shipmaster. Without a cooperative relationship, a ship has limited incentive to render
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aid to a distressed vessel, as opposed to passing by so as to meet its arrival time at
its next port of call. Coastal-state support of ships saving lives at sea is a critical
component of the global SAR system, and is enshrined in the SAR Convention:52
Parties shall co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters of ships providing
assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released from their obligations
with minimum further deviation from the ships’ intended voyage, provided that
releasing the master of the ship from these obligations does not further endanger the
safety of life at sea. The Party responsible for the search and rescue region in which
such assistance is rendered shall exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such coordination and co-operation occurs, so that survivors assisted are disembarked from
the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety. . . . In these cases, the relevant
Parties shall arrange for such disembarkation to be effected as soon as reasonably
practicable.53

As mentioned above, a “place of safety” is an important concept in the global
SAR system for both the coastal state and the shipmaster. The IAMSAR manual,
volume 1, describes a “place of safety” as
[a] location where rescue operations are considered to terminate; where the survivors’ safety of life is no longer threatened and where their basic human needs (such
as food, shelter and medical needs) can be met; and, a place from which transportation arrangements can be made for the survivors’ next or final destination. A place of
safety may be on land, or it may be on board a rescue unit or other suitable vessel or
facility at sea that can serve as a place of safety until the survivors are disembarked at
their final destination.54

Identifying a place of safety should be coordinated between the shipmaster
and the coastal-state SMC responsible for coordinating the SAR operation. The
priority always should be to minimize the impact on the ship that conducted the
rescue and has survivors on board.55 A place of safety may not be necessarily a
location that is most advantageous to the survivors. However, it should be a location where all the criteria defining a place of safety can be achieved. It cannot
be overemphasized that the SMC has the primary responsibility for determining
the place of safety, in coordination with the ship that rendered the assistance.56
Additionally, the coastal state’s SMC, in coordinating a SAR operation, must
remember that under the SAR Convention a ship diverted to render assistance57
is considered a SAR facility, not a SAR unit, and should not be considered necessarily a place of safety simply because the survivors are no longer in distress.58
Unlike a SAR unit, which has the equipment and trained personnel to conduct
SAR operations, a ship diverted to render assistance to persons in distress may
not have the resources on board to care for what may be large numbers of survivors properly, nor to meet the criteria for a place of safety.59 When a ship is
diverted to render assistance, the coastal state, in coordinating disembarkation,
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should take into consideration the number of survivors rescued, the ship’s estimated time of arrival at its next port of call, the survivors’ condition, and other
critical factors.60 Normally, the SMC would coordinate survivor disembarkation
at the ship’s next port of call or with another coastal state61 to limit complications
and minimize the impact on the ship that conducted the rescue.62
If either the coastal state or the shipmaster fails to fulfill the obligations under
international law, the global SAR system becomes ineffective. If a shipmaster
ignores persons in distress because of the potential time delay and logistical
challenges associated with rescuing the survivors, or if the coastal state does not
fulfill its obligation to coordinate SAR operations within its maritime SAR region
as well as to disembark rescued survivors, the system is threatened—and lives
imperiled on the world’s oceans can be lost. Both the shipmaster and the coastal
state are responsible for saving lives at sea.
Mixed Migration by Sea
Mixed migration by sea is a difficult problem that afflicts many regions of the
world.63 Tragically, lives are lost every year when overloaded boats are overturned
and hundreds, if not thousands, of people perish; others perish in extremely poor
and hazardous conditions in overloaded boats unfit to make an ocean voyage.
People engage in at-sea migrations for many reasons; these include desperate
pursuit of a better life, if not survival. Regional problems and challenges have resulted in these mass migrations; proposing solutions goes well beyond the scope
of this article. However, the sheer number of “persons in distress” has stretched
the limits of the global SAR system. Merchant ships, other vessels, and coastalstate resources are tasked to render assistance. Many are not equipped or manned
to support dozens, if not hundreds, of persons who may remain on board an
assistance-rendering vessel for several days.
In March 2015, a meeting to address unsafe mixed migration at sea took
place at IMO headquarters on Albert Embankment, London, United Kingdom.64
Participants at the meeting included representatives of the IMO member states,
intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as
senior representatives from the IMO, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and several other UN agencies. Challenges concerning mixed migration at sea were discussed.
In his opening address, Koji Sekimizu, IMO secretary-general, succinctly stated
the problem: “The issue of mixed migration by sea, including irregular migration, has been a serious concern for decades—if not longer. But, in recent years,
it has reached epidemic proportions, to the extent where the whole system for
coping with such migrants is being stretched up to, and sometimes beyond, its
breaking point.”65
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Several statistics presented at the meeting highlight the critical nature of this
problem:
• “The conflict in Syria, which enters its fifth year in March 2015, has caused
the largest displacement crisis of our time. There are now more than 3.2 million Syrian refugees, a number that is growing by 100,000 every month.”66
• In 2014, over two hundred thousand people were rescued and over three
thousand deaths were reported in the Mediterranean Sea alone as a result of
unsafe, irregular, and illegal sea passages.67
• In the first six months of 2015, 137,000 refugees and migrants crossed the
Mediterranean Sea.68 This compares with 75,000 in the same period in 2014,
marking an 83 percent increase over 2014.69
• More than 1,800 migrants have perished in at-sea migration attempts so far
in the first six months of 2015.70
• In mid-April 2015, eight hundred people died in the largest maritime refugee
disaster on record, highlighting the significant increase in migrants dying or
missing at sea.71
• There are reports of dozens of migrants dying from hypothermia after being
recovered by SAR resources, demonstrating the dangerous nature of these
unsafe maritime transits in dilapidated vessels.72
• In the first three months of 2015, over seven hundred merchant vessels were
diverted from their routes to recover and rescue migrants making unsafe passages just in the Mediterranean Sea alone.73
The interplay between mixed migration by sea and SAR presents an extremely
difficult challenge because of the complex humanitarian nature of these operations. Many coastal states consider each mass migrant incident a SAR case that
should be conducted under the SAR Convention and coordinated by a coastalstate SMC, through the RCC. However, this is not the case.74 Some incidents
may include persons in distress; however, many more appropriately could be
considered law-enforcement or border security events.75 In addition, care must
be taken to ensure that migrants are not refugees.76 Refugees should be afforded
the protections required under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
1951 (Refugee Convention).77
The condition of the vessel, the weather on scene, and the persons on board
as well as the judgment of the SAR unit or facility on scene and the SMC should
dictate whether a migrant incident triggers the rendering of assistance to persons
in distress under the SAR Convention or its treatment as a national border /
law-enforcement action. Determining whether large numbers of persons in a
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mass-migration scenario are in distress can be particularly challenging for the
SMC. The global SAR system is activated when a person declares he is in distress
or when SAR authorities are notified of a person in distress. However, in many recent mixed-migration-at-sea operations, migrant vessels have been declaring that
they are “in distress” so that their “survivors” will be transferred to a merchant
ship or other SAR unit and transported to a place of safety. This continues to be
an ongoing, difficult problem in the Mediterranean Sea, in particular.
Another difficulty is that, while the shipmaster is required to embark persons
assisted, the coastal state has no specific international mandate to receive the
survivors from the ship.78 The RCC is required to coordinate the disembarkation
of rescued survivors; however, some coastal states refuse to assist the ship and
receive the migrants. Unfortunately, the SAR Convention does not impose a duty
for a coastal state to accept migrants from a merchant ship, even if the incident
occurred within the coastal state’s SAR region.79 Kathleen Newland provides a
good summary of this problem:
The intersection of maritime law and refugee law thus leaves ship owners, masters,
and crews in a quandary. They must pick up refugees and asylum seekers whose lives
are in danger, but no state is required to take them in.
The ship itself cannot be considered a “place of safety”—indeed, carrying a large
number of unscheduled passengers may endanger the crew and passengers themselves, owing to overcrowding, inadequate provisioning, and the tensions of life in
close quarters. The inability to disembark rescued passengers in a timely fashion and
return to scheduled ports of call creates a profound disincentive for the maritime
industry to engage actively in search and rescue missions.80

The IMO may want to consider developing an international convention to
provide the international community with a basis for coordinating and conducting these challenging mixed-migration-at-sea operations.81
ASSISTANCE ENTRY
The United States Coast Guard received notification that a vessel was hard aground
on rocks in a coastal state’s territorial sea, with three persons on board. The Coast
Guard diverted a Coast Guard cutter that was available to render assistance. The
Coast Guard notified the coastal state’s authorities of the incident. The Coast Guard
cutter arrived, remained outside the territorial sea, and established communications with the vessel aground. Those on the vessel communicated their concern
regarding the deteriorating condition of the vessel and adverse weather conditions.
The vessel stated that the coastal state’s authorities were on scene but were not providing any assistance. The coastal state’s authorities notified the Coast Guard that
the on-scene Coast Guard cutter was not authorized to enter the state’s territorial
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sea to conduct a rescue operation, and indicated that the vessel in distress should
arrange for local commercial salvage.
Because of the deteriorating on-scene conditions, in which the vessel was listing
sixty degrees and taking on water; the adverse weather; the lack of support from
the coastal state’s authorities on scene in assisting the vessel; and the presence on
board of a sixty-five-year-old crewmember who began to experience symptoms of a
heart attack, the Coast Guard cutter made the decision to enter the territorial sea
to conduct a rescue operation. The Coast Guard cutter rescued the three persons on
board and their personal property.82
The incident described above highlights the complex challenges, from an
international law and policy perspective, facing any shipmaster or aircraft commander attempting to fulfill his duty to render assistance to persons in distress,
particularly in another coastal state’s territorial sea.83 Does the shipmaster have
a duty to rescue persons in distress even in another coastal state’s territorial sea?
Are aircraft also obliged to conduct these types of rescue operations? What are
the implications for a warship or military aircraft conducting a rescue operation
in a coastal state’s territorial sea?84 The problem is that these rescue operations
can cause unintended concern for the coastal state if the ship’s or aircraft’s purpose for entering its territorial sea is misconstrued.
While not specifically defined, the principle of assistance entry (AE) is established through international conventions85 and customary international law.86
In support of this mandate to rescue persons in distress anywhere on the seas,
the U.S. Coast Guard developed policy for the conduct of AE rescue operations
within a coastal state’s territorial sea by Coast Guard ships and aircraft.87 To
ensure compliance with international conventions, AE rescue operations policy
should respect three principles: (1) the sovereign right of a state to control and
regulate entry into its territorial sea; (2) the humanitarian need to assist persons
in distress quickly and effectively without regard to nationality or circumstances;
and (3) that entry into a coastal state’s territorial sea does not require seeking or
receiving permission from the coastal state to conduct the rescue operation in its
territorial sea.88
What follows is seven different AE scenarios that SAR authorities and legal
advisers should consider in developing national and agency-specific AE policies,
accompanied in each case by an overview of the applicable international legal and
policy concerns. It is important to work through the issues and prepare positions
that can be provided to the shipmaster and the aircraft commander for guidance.
When persons are in distress and a government ship or aircraft is in a position
to render assistance, valuable time should not be wasted seeking guidance and
legal advice before rendering the necessary assistance.89 These discussions should
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occur; however, legal positions and policies should be developed before any of
these scenarios are encountered.
Scenario A
A government ship transiting on the high seas receives a distress broadcast and
diverts to render assistance to a person in distress in a coastal state’s territorial
sea. Does the ship need to obtain the coastal state’s consent to enter its territorial
sea to render assistance to the person in distress?
In this scenario, the government ship would not be required to obtain consent
from the coastal state before rendering assistance to persons in distress in the
coastal state’s territorial sea. However, the shipmaster should notify the coastal
state of his intention to render the assistance, the approximate distress location,
and the ship’s intention to transit into the state’s territorial sea to conduct the rescue operation. UNCLOS and the SOLAS and Salvage Conventions mandate that
the shipmaster has the duty to render assistance to persons in distress throughout
the oceans.90
While the coastal state exercises sovereignty over its territorial sea, that sovereignty is not unlimited. In the case of AE, the coastal state has limited ability to
interfere with the entry of a ship conducting a rescue operation.91 Likewise, the
assisting ship is also limited in its operations within a coastal state’s territorial sea.
For example, (1) there must be persons in distress before a government ship may
enter into a coastal state’s territorial sea to render assistance, and (2) there is a limitation on what activities the ship may conduct during an AE rescue operation.
Specifically, the government ship is limited to rescuing persons in distress only.
There are conditions that should be met for a ship to conduct AE. For example,
U.S. Coast Guard policy affirms that a Coast Guard SAR unit may conduct AE
into a coastal state’s territorial sea to render assistance to a person in distress if, in
the judgment of the CO, the on-scene situation meets the following three criteria:
(1) there is reasonable certainty (on the basis of the best available information,
regardless of source) that a person is in distress; (2) the distress location is reasonably well known; and (3) the SAR unit (or SAR facility) is in position to render
timely and effective assistance.92
Additionally, because of the urgency to take immediate action to rescue persons in distress, AE should not be delayed while the coastal state is notified of
the government ship’s intention to render assistance in its territorial sea. Even if
the assistance to a person in distress already is being coordinated by the coastal
state’s RCC, as envisioned in the SAR Convention, the government ship’s duty to
render timely assistance remains.93
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Scenario B
A government ship transiting on the high seas receives a distress broadcast and
diverts to render assistance to a person in distress in a coastal state’s territorial
sea. Can the ship use its embarked helicopter and small boat to assist in the rescue operation? Can a military aircraft transiting in oceanic airspace also divert
and enter a coastal state’s airspace to assist in the rescue operation, or must the
aircraft first obtain permission from the coastal state? Can a military aircraft
enter a coastal state’s territorial sea even if no surface unit is participating in the
rescue operation?
There is no international instrument that expressly prevents a government
ship from using its embarked aircraft or small boat in rendering assistance to a
person in distress. Embarked aircraft and small boats should be considered an
extension of the ship;94 all available resources necessary to the lifesaving operation should be used, even if the location of the distress incident is in a coastal
state’s territorial sea.95
In addition to a ship using an embarked aircraft for an AE rescue operation,
any other available aircraft made aware of a distress can and should divert to
render assistance in a coastal state’s territorial sea.96 The use of an aircraft for an
AE rescue operation would be governed by the same criteria placed on use of a
surface rescue unit.97
The legal justification for the use of an aircraft in the conduct of an AE rescue
operation cannot rest solely on UNCLOS; both articles 18 and 98 are silent on
whether aircraft can assist persons in distress in a coastal state’s territorial sea.98
However, the SAR Convention does consider the use of aircraft in the conduct
of SAR operations.99 This makes sense, since the purpose of the SAR Convention is to implement the global SAR system, which provides the international
framework for organizing and standardizing SAR processes and procedures in
the coordination and conduct of lifesaving operations. To carry out this purpose,
the SAR Convention supports the use of any and all rescue capabilities that can
be used during a SAR operation, including rescue operations within any coastal
state’s territorial sea.100
Scenario C
Can a government ship “rescue” property while rendering assistance to a vessel
in distress (e.g., personal property on board the vessel, floating in the water, etc.)
in a coastal state’s territorial sea, in addition to rendering assistance to persons in
distress? To render the necessary assistance, can the ship tow the imperiled vessel
into safe waters? After the ship brings any survivors on board, can it “rescue” the
vessel and property, if they are still salvageable?101
The international conventions mandating a shipmaster’s duty to render assistance to persons in distress do not contemplate the “rescue” or “recovery” of
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property in an AE rescue operation in a coastal state’s territorial sea.102 It is a
person in distress who is assisted, not property. Therefore, the requirements for
the conduct of an AE rescue operation should not be applied to the recovery of
property. However, it can be argued that the recovery of property incidental to
the conduct of an AE rescue operation is appropriate. This may include, for example, the recovery of critical medicine a survivor may require, towing a vessel
that would facilitate the rescue of the persons in distress, and towing a disabled
vessel.
Unless other arrangements are made between the shipmaster and the coastal
state, the government ship contemplating the recovery of property not incidental
to the AE rescue operation and within the coastal state’s territorial sea should (1)
complete the AE rescue operation, (2) depart the coastal state’s territorial sea,
and (3) seek permission to reenter the territorial sea to recover or salvage the
property. This also would include the recovery of illegal contraband that could
be used for any prosecution of the survivors if they were conducting a smuggling
operation (e.g., narcotics).
Scenario D
A government ship transiting on the high seas receives a distress broadcast and
enters a coastal state’s territorial sea to render assistance to a person in distress.
After a reasonable amount of time, it cannot locate the distress incident location.
Can the ship conduct a search in an attempt to locate the person in distress?
While no international instrument permits a coastal state to refuse entry of a
government ship into its territorial sea to conduct an AE rescue operation, the
SAR Convention does require authorization from the coastal state to conduct a
search for persons in distress. If the ship conducting the AE rescue operation is
unable to locate the persons in distress in a reasonable amount of time, then the
proper course of action would be (1) to depart the coastal state’s territorial sea
and (2) to seek permission to conduct a search coordinated by the coastal state’s
SMC through the RCC responsible for the SAR region in which the person in
distress is (presumably) located.103
Scenario E
A government ship transiting on the high seas receives a distress broadcast from
a vessel taking on water in a coastal state’s territorial sea. The shipmaster notifies
his command authority that he is diverting to render assistance. The command
authority coordinates notifying the coastal state that the ship is entering its territorial sea to render assistance to the vessel. The coastal state notifies the command authority that its SAR facility is en route to provide assistance and advises
the ship that its assistance is not required. What should the shipmaster do? What
should the ship’s command authority do?
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A government ship’s duty to conduct an AE rescue operation is not nullified
because the coastal state reports it has dispatched SAR facilities or units to rescue
a person in distress. If, in the judgment of the shipmaster, the coastal state’s assistance is inadequate or not timely, then the distress still may be ongoing, and
his duty would continue regardless of the coastal state’s assertions or intent. This
decision must rest with the shipmaster on scene, who has the duty to render the
assistance.104 However, if the coastal state’s SAR unit is able to arrive on scene and
conduct the rescue, the shipmaster’s duty to render assistance is fulfilled.
Scenario F
Do the same requirements for a government ship to render assistance in a coastal
state’s territorial sea apply in international straits while transiting?105
The shipmaster’s duty to render assistance to persons in distress applies
throughout the ocean, whether in the territorial sea, in straits used for international navigation, in archipelagic waters, in the exclusive economic zone, or on
the high seas.106
Scenario G
A government ship transiting on the high seas receives a distress broadcast from
a vessel under attack by armed robbers while transiting through a coastal state’s
territorial sea. The government ship diverts to render assistance. Would this incident be considered an AE rescue operation?
This scenario should not be considered AE; UNCLOS (article 98), as well
as the SOLAS (chapter V, regulation 33) and Salvage (article 10) Conventions,
would not apply. Additionally, if the incident is not considered a rescue operation, then the SAR Convention also would not apply.107 The issue is whether a
vessel under attack should be considered to be “in distress” (from a SAR perspective), with any response to be coordinated under the requirements of the
SAR Convention. Interestingly and appropriately, there is no formal definition
of distress in the SAR Convention or any other international convention.108 This
gives a person in extremis wide latitude in determining whether to declare distress and seek assistance. However, a vessel under attack should not be considered
in distress, with any response to be coordinated under the SAR Convention; it
would be more appropriate to consider this type of incident a law-enforcement
or military operation.109
This does not mean, however, that a coastal state’s RCC cannot coordinate a
response in support of law-enforcement authorities or military resources that
may be used to assist the ship under attack. The coordination and conduct of this
type of operation would be implemented through a coastal state’s national policies and procedures. In addition, if persons are injured during the response, the
operation could include the medical transport of injured persons, which would
be considered a SAR operation.
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This position—that a vessel under attack is not considered “in distress”—
was affirmed in a 2015 legal ruling in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. The case highlighted the important distinction among antipiracy,
law-enforcement, and military actions and SAR operations. The court’s ruling provides an important distinction that warrants consideration by lawenforcement, military, and SAR authorities; in some coastal states, the coordination, policies, processes, procedures, and resources used to conduct these types of
actions very well may not be the same as those used to conduct SAR operations.110
In 2011, during NATO-conducted antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden
and the Indian Ocean, a U.S. warship engaged Jin Chun Tsai 68 (JCT 68), a fishing
vessel from Taiwan that pirates had hijacked more than a year earlier and were
using as a mother ship for pirate operations. On board JCT 68 were pirates and
three hostages; the latter consisted of the original shipmaster, Wu Lai-Yu, and
two Chinese crewmembers. During the engagement, the warship used disabling
fire to stop the vessel. After the pirates surrendered, the warship’s boarding team
went on board JCT 68. Three of the pirates and Wu had been killed during the
warship’s use of disabling fire. Subsequently, the pirates and the two remaining
Chinese crewmembers were removed from the vessel. The following day, JCT 68
was sunk intentionally—with Wu’s body still on board, as the NATO task force
commander directed.
Wu’s widow subsequently initiated legal action against the United States in the
District Court for the District of Maryland, seeking damages for her husband’s
death and the loss of JCT 68. The court granted the government’s motion to
dismiss the legal action, reasoning that the complaint was not a legal issue to be
decided in a court of law. Wu’s widow appealed the ruling in the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit; the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision
to grant the government’s motion. In determining whether a vessel under attack
is considered “in distress,” any response to which would fall under the requirements of the SAR Convention, the court of appeals affirmed an important distinction concerning the action the warship in question conducted:
Plaintiff is likewise mistaken in categorizing the USS Groves’s engagement with the
Jin Chun Tsai 68 as a “Good Samaritan” action, or a “rescue operation” analogous to
the rescue by the U.S. Coast Guard of distressed mariners. . . . The focus of the USS
Groves’s operation was to stop the depredations of the pirates, in part by depriving the pirates of their stolen mother ship. Sinking the Jin Chun Tsai 68 was part of
the course of action worked out by the military commanders to further maritime
security. The district court correctly recognized that because the Jin Chun Tsai 68 was
sunk under direct NATO orders, the court could not adjudicate plaintiff ’s claim that
the decision to sink the vessel was negligent or unlawful.111
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This distinction is important when considering the conduct of SAR operations under the SAR Convention. Some coastal states may train and equip SAR
units that would be responsible for conducting SAR operations only, not lawenforcement or military actions. Additionally, SAR authorities may rely on
volunteer SAR organizations or seek the assistance of Good Samaritans in the
vicinity of a vessel or persons in distress to assist in a particular SAR operation.
The global SAR system was never envisioned to support other types of actions.112
In summary, any ship or aircraft conducting an AE rescue operation must
notify the coastal state of the intended course of action. Because of the perceived
imminence of the distress and the urgency to take immediate action, the shipmaster or aircraft commander is not required to seek permission from the coastal
state to fulfill his duty to render assistance and save lives. Even if the coastal state
notifies the ship or aircraft rendering assistance that it has dispatched a SAR
unit, if the shipmaster or aircraft commander believes the coastal-state SAR unit
will not arrive in a timely manner, the duty to render assistance remains, and the
shipmaster or aircraft commander must continue the rescue operation. The SAR
Convention was never intended to limit or restrict a ship or aircraft that is available to render assistance to persons in distress. However, it would be appropriate
for the shipmaster to coordinate the AE rescue operation with the coastal state’s
RCC, which should assume SMC of the SAR case. The shipmaster or aircraft
commander, in communicating his actions to the coastal state, must ensure there
is no misunderstanding about the craft’s intent to conduct an AE rescue operation. Saving lives is the priority, even in a coastal state’s territorial sea.
FORCIBLE EVACUATION FOR SAR
In 2011, the U.S. Coast Guard was notified that a twenty-four-foot sailboat registered in the United States and with one person on board was possibly in distress.
The reporting source had received a voice mail from the person’s satellite phone late
in the evening stating, “Emergency, emergency,” and nothing more. The last report
received placed the sailboat seventy miles south of the United States and thirty miles
offshore. The Coast Guard assumed SMC for the SAR operation and launched a
Coast Guard aircraft and diverted a Coast Guard cutter to render assistance.
The aircraft located the sailboat, was able to see the person moving on deck, but
was unable to hail him on the radio. It did appear to the aircraft that the sailboat’s
boom was damaged. The Coast Guard cutter arrived on scene and sent a boarding
team to the sailboat to assess the situation. The boarding team confirmed the boom
was destroyed and the sailboat’s only outboard engine had fallen off the vessel.
The boarding team advised the person that he should evacuate the vessel for
his own safety, but he refused. However, the Coast Guard cutter and its boarding
team on the sailboat realized that due to the condition of the sailboat the person’s
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life was in jeopardy. In consultation with the Coast Guard SAR chain of command,
the Coast Guard cutter compelled the person to depart the sailboat with the cutter’s
boarding team. The cutter determined that the sailboat was in such a dilapidated
state that it was unsalvageable; the sailboat was marked and abandoned at sea.
The survivor was transferred to the Coast Guard cutter and returned to the United
States.113
Finally, this article considers the challenge of compelling a person to abandon
his vessel to save his life. Thankfully, SAR authorities encounter such situations
only infrequently; a person in distress who requests assistance normally wants
to leave his vessel if the SAR responders on scene believe it necessary for his
safety.114
The international conventions do not address specifically the use of force to
compel a person to abandon his vessel in a life-threatening situation. The intent
here is to provide a very brief overview and discussion of this issue, in order for
coastal states and SAR authorities to consider whether national and agencyspecific SAR policies are adequate and well understood by all levels in the SAR
chain of command. As can be seen in the scenario related above and in the fishing
vessel Northern Voyager SAR case described below (which resulted in a lawsuit
against the U.S. Coast Guard), these incidents can and do occur.
SAR authorities should consider several questions:
• What if an SMC is notified that a vessel is in distress and dispatches a SAR
unit to render assistance, but the vessel’s captain refuses to disembark, even
though in the judgment of the SAR unit on scene he will perish if he does
not abandon the vessel?
• What if a merchant ship is diverted to render assistance, but the vessel’s
captain refuses to abandon the vessel? The ship’s crewmen most likely would
not be trained in the use of force; they are merely fulfilling their duty to assist in the lifesaving operation. What advice should the SMC give to the
shipmaster?
• What if the crew or passengers wish to evacuate a vessel in distress, but the
vessel’s captain refuses to allow them to depart? What should the SAR unit
or SAR facility on scene do? Should the use of force be contemplated to allow
passengers and crewmembers to disembark the vessel in distress?
• If necessary, should force be used to compel the person in distress to leave
his vessel? Does it matter whether the SAR unit is trained in the use of force?
What type of force and extent of use should be contemplated?
• What are the legal implications of compelling a person against his will to
abandon his vessel in what is perceived to be a life-threatening situation?
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• What if the forcible evacuation of a person is being contemplated on a vessel
of a different flag state?115 How does that complicate the proposed use of
force?
These are difficult questions applied to challenging, life-threatening situations
—and SAR authorities should address them before this type of incident occurs.
Forcibly compelling a person to abandon his vessel presents the SAR responder
on scene who is attempting to provide the lifesaving assistance with a difficult
situation, and may result in controversy, property loss, and litigation.
In the United States, there is only one lawsuit that primarily discusses a SAR
unit compelling a person in distress to abandon his vessel to save his life. In
Thames Shipyard and Repair Company v. United States, the owner and insurer
of the U.S.-documented fishing vessel Northern Voyager sued the United States,
alleging that the disabled vessel sank, in part, because the U.S. Coast Guard compelled the vessel’s captain to leave against his will.116
In November 1997, after losing its starboard rudder off the northeastern
coast of the United States, the 144-foot Northern Voyager experienced significant
flooding in the steering compartment, which was threatening to flood the vessel’s engineering compartment as well. Northern Voyager’s captain notified the
Coast Guard of the situation, which assumed SMC and dispatched two SAR units
to provide additional pumps and render any other assistance Northern Voyager
might require. Despite the crew’s attempts to curtail the progressive flooding, the
fishing vessel developed a port list, settled further in the water, and was threatening to capsize and sink without warning with the crewmembers and Coast Guard
personnel on board. The SAR units on scene, in contact with the SMC at the RCC
coordinating the response, decided the only course of action left was to evacuate the remaining crewmembers before the vessel sank. When the Coast Guard
personnel on Northern Voyager informed the captain that it was time to abandon
ship, he refused to leave. The Coast Guard personnel informed him that if he did
not cooperate, he would be compelled to depart, using force if necessary. As a
result, the remaining members of Northern Voyager’s crew, the captain, and the
assisting Coast Guard personnel evacuated the vessel. The fishing vessel sank a
short while later.
Both the district court and the court of appeals held that U.S. law protected the
Coast Guard’s decision to evacuate the captain forcibly from the life-threatening
situation that occurred on Northern Voyager.117 The Supreme Court of the United
States declined to review the case.118
In contemplation of both the operational and legal difficulties involved in
forcibly evacuating a person from his vessel, even in a life-threatening situation,
the Coast Guard does provide guidance to SAR units and the Coast Guard SAR
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chain of command. Coast Guard policy provides that, if time permits, the SAR
unit on scene should consult with the SMC; but that the SAR unit can evacuate
a person forcibly from his vessel if it judges that (1) a true life-threatening situation exists, and (2) the vessel to be abandoned in fact does require immediate
assistance.119 If time further permits, the decision to evacuate a person forcibly
from his vessel should be made at the most competent operational and legal level
in the SAR chain of command.120
In summary, SAR authorities should consider whether their current SAR
policies and procedures provide adequate guidance for this challenging “forcible
evacuation” scenario; if not, they should give further thought to developing new
or improved policies and procedures for their SAR chain of command.
The global SAR system, while not perfect and in need of continuous improvement, does provide a means of notification about and response to persons in
distress at sea. As long as people continue to sail the world’s oceans, there will be
a need to provide effective lifesaving services to those who need assistance.
International conventions provide the legal foundation for each coastal state
to implement a national SAR organization. Coastal states must develop the SAR
processes and procedures and provide the ships, boats, aircraft, and dedicated
personnel that conduct lifesaving operations at sea. Ships plying the world’s
oceans are important contributors to the global SAR system and normally are
willing to come to the aid of those in distress. When ships render assistance in
a SAR operation, the SMC must work with the shipmaster to coordinate the
response and delivery of the survivors to a place of safety, thereby limiting the
impact on the shipmaster.
This article considered the conduct of AE rescue operations in a coastal state’s
territorial sea and some different AE scenarios that may be encountered. While
AE rescue operations occur infrequently, SAR authorities nonetheless should
develop national and agency-specific policies for ships and aircraft that may be
required to conduct these operations and ensure their commanders understand
them.
Finally, this article discussed the difficult situation of a person who refuses to
abandon his vessel even when the SAR unit on scene believes that evacuation is
the only option left to save lives. While SAR authorities encounter such situations
very infrequently, national and agency-specific policies and guidelines should be
developed to address this type of incident.
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NOTES

1.	Lyman J. Gage, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury,
to Captain Francis Tuttle, Revenue Cutter
Service, “Letter of Instructions,” 15 November
1897, in Report of the Cruise of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Bear and the Overland Expedition for the Relief of the Whalers in the Arctic
Ocean, from November 27, 1897, to September
13, 1898 (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1899), pp. 5–10, available at
www.uscg.mil/.
2.	International Maritime Organization [hereafter IMO], International Convention on
Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, 2006 ed.
(London: IMO, 2006). Entered into force: 22
June 1985; number of contracting states: 106.
3.	“International Convention on Maritime
Search and Rescue (SAR),” International
Maritime Organization, www.imo.org/.
4.	Epigraph: Meg Jones, “A Year Later, Oshkosh
Survivor of Cruise Ship Crash Still Cruising,”
Milwaukee-Wisconsin Journal Sentinel, 14
January 2013, available at www.jsonline.com/.
5.	These international conventions will be discussed in greater detail later in this article.
6.	The annex to the SAR Convention mandates
(paragraph 2.1.2) that “Parties shall either
individually or, if appropriate, in co-operation
with other States, establish the following basic
elements of a search and rescue service: 1)
legal framework; 2) assignment of a responsible authority; 3) organization of available
resources; 4) communication facilities; 5)
co-ordination and operational functions; and
6) processes to improve the service including
planning, domestic and international cooperative relationships and training. Parties
shall, as far as practicable, follow relevant
minimum standards and guidelines developed by the Organization.”
7.	The annex to the SAR Convention provides
(paragraphs 1.3.4, 1.3.5, and 1.3.6, respectively) the following definitions: “Search and Rescue Region: An area of defined dimensions
associated with a rescue co-ordination centre
within which search and rescue services are
provided”; “Rescue co-ordination centre:
A unit responsible for promoting efficient
organization of search and rescue services
and for co-ordinating the conduct of search
and rescue operations within a search and
rescue region”; “Rescue sub-center: A unit

subordinate to a rescue co-ordination center
established to complement the latter according to particular provisions of the responsible
authorities.”
8.	Convention on International Civil Aviation,
7 December 1944, 9th ed. 2006, ICAO doc.
7300.
9.	IMO / International Civil Aviation Organization, International Aeronautical and Maritime
Search and Rescue Manual [hereafter
IAMSAR manual] (Croydon, U.K.: CPI
Group, 2013).
10.	The annex to the SAR Convention defines
(paragraph 1.3.3) search and rescue service as
“[t]he performance of distress monitoring,
communication, co-ordination and search
and rescue functions, including provision of
medical advice, initial medical assistance,
or medical evacuation, through the use of
public and private resources including cooperating aircraft, vessels and other craft and
installations.”
11.	IAMSAR manual, vol. 1, p. v.
12.	Ibid., p. 1-1 (paragraph 1.1.3). It should also
be noted (paragraph 1.3.1) that SAR services
can be established by individual states or
regionally: “These services can be provided
by States individually establishing effective
national SAR organizations, or by establishing
a SAR organization jointly with one or more
other States.”
13.	Ibid., p. xiii. The SC is defined as “[o]ne
or more persons or agencies within an
Administration with overall responsibility
for establishing and providing SAR services
and ensuring that planning for those services
is properly co-ordinated.” Volume 2 goes on
to state (paragraph 1.2.2) that “SCs have the
overall responsibility for establishing, staffing,
equipping, and managing the SAR system, including providing appropriate legal and funding support, establishing RCCs and rescue
sub-centres (RSCs), providing or arranging
for SAR facilities, co-ordinating SAR training,
and developing SAR policies. SCs are the top
level SAR managers; each State normally will
have one or more persons or agencies for
whom this designation may be appropriate.”
14.	Ibid., vol. 1, p. xiii. The SMC is defined (paragraph 1.2.3) as “[t]he official temporarily
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		assigned to co-ordinate response to an actual
or apparent distress situation.” See also ibid.,
vol. 2, p. 1-2.
15.	Ibid., vol. 1, p. xii. The OSC is defined (paragraph 1.2.4) as “[a] person designated to coordinate search and rescue operations within
a specified area.” See also ibid., vol. 2, p. 1-3.
16.	Ibid., vol. 1, p. xi. The ACO is defined (paragraph 1.2.5) as “[a] person or team who coordinates the involvement of multiple aircraft
in SAR operations in support of the SAR mission co-ordinator and on-scene co-ordinator.”
See also ibid., vol. 2, p. 1-3.
17.	Comparable to the annex to the SAR Convention, the Chicago Convention’s annex 12
(Search and Rescue) provides the framework for contracting states to implement an
aeronautical global SAR system. The SAR
system under the Chicago Convention also
has aeronautical SAR regions worldwide, in
which contracting states are responsible for
coordinating SAR operations. This global
aeronautical SAR system complements, or
stands in parallel to, the maritime system.
18.	The annex to the SAR Convention states
(paragraph 2.1.4): “Each search and rescue region shall be established by agreement among
Parties concerned. The Secretary-General
shall be notified of such agreements.”
19.	SAR agreements can be bilateral or multilateral. For example, in 2011, the eight Arctic
nations (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United
States) concluded an agreement that delimited the entire Arctic region into aeronautical
(Chicago Convention) and maritime (SAR
Convention) SAR regions between the parties. It also formalized SAR cooperation and
coordination among the eight states. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, 12
May 2011, available at oaarchive.arctic
-council.org/.
20.	IAMSAR manual, vol. 1, p. 1-5 (paragraph
1.6.3).
21.	See note 10 for a definition of search and
rescue service. The coastal state is responsible
for the coordination and conduct of SAR
operations within its SAR region.
22.	The annex to the SAR Convention (paragraph 2.1.7) is very clear on this point: “The
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delimitation of search and rescue regions
is not related to and shall not prejudice the
delimitation of any boundary between States.”
The IAMSAR manual, vol. 1, p. 2-8 (paragraph
2.3.15[e]) goes on to state that “[a]n SRR [SAR
region] is established solely to ensure that
primary responsibility for co-ordinating SAR
services for that geographic area is assumed by
some State. SRR limits should not be viewed
as barriers to assisting persons in distress. . . .
In this respect co-operation between States,
their RCCs and their SAR services should be
as close as possible.”
23.	The High Seas Convention, article 1, defines
high seas as “all parts of the sea that are
not included in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State.” Convention on
the High Seas, 29 April 1958, U.N.T.S. 450, p.
11, available at treaties.un.org/. Entered into
force: 30 September 1962; number of parties: 77. UNCLOS, which replaced the High
Seas Convention, states in article 86: “The
provisions of this Part apply to all parts of
the sea that are not included in the exclusive
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.” United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10
December 1982 [hereafter UNCLOS], available at treaties.un.org/. Entered into force: 16
November 1994; number of parties: 167.
24.	The annex to the SAR Convention (paragraph 2.1.9) states: “Parties having accepted
responsibility to provide search and rescue
services for a specified area shall use search
and rescue units and other available facilities
for providing assistance to a person who is,
or appears to be, in distress at sea.” (See note
58 for the definition of SAR facilities and SAR
units.) The annex to the SAR Convention allows for the use of any resources to save lives
at sea. The national administration must be
able to coordinate the response to persons in
distress though the RCC/RSC.
25.	The IAMSAR manual, vol. 1, paragraph 2.1.1,
provides an excellent overview when describing SAR as an international system: “The SAR
system, like any other system, has individual
components but must work together to provide the overall service. Development of a
SAR system typically involves establishment
of one or more SRRs, along with capabilities to receive alerts and to co-ordinate and
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provide SAR services within each SRR. Each
SRR is associated with an RCC. For aeronautical purposes, SRRs often coincide with flight
information regions (FIRs). The goal of ICAO
and IMO conventions relating to SAR is to
establish a global SAR system. Operationally, the global SAR system relies upon States
to establish their national SAR systems and
then integrate provision of their services with
other States for world-wide coverage.”
26.	Ibid., p. 2-3, paragraph 2.3.1.
27.	The annex to the SAR Convention (paragraph
2.3.1) states: “Parties shall individually or in
co-operation with other States establish rescue co-ordination centres for their search and
rescue services and such rescue sub-centres as
they consider appropriate.” It should be noted
that under the Chicago Convention’s annex
12, the global aeronautical SAR system also
requires contracting states to make provision
for an aeronautical RCC (ARCC); one ARCC
is assigned for each aeronautical SAR region.
By comparison, under the global maritime
SAR system, a maritime RCC (MRCC)
coordinates maritime SAR operations in
a designated maritime SAR region. When
nations implement a national SAR system
in which a particular RCC coordinates both
aeronautical and maritime SAR, it is known
as a joint RCC. Where a coastal state has instituted both ARCCs and MRCCs, aeronautical and maritime SAR authorities must work
closely together to ensure the various types of
SAR operations with overlapping aeronautical and maritime SAR regions are effectively
coordinated. When considering the coordination between aeronautical and maritime SAR
services, the annex to the SAR Convention
(paragraph 2.4.1) states: “Parties shall ensure
the closest practicable co-ordination between
maritime and aeronautical services so as to
provide for the most effective and efficient
search and rescue services in and over their
search and rescue regions.” This same imperative is established as a recommendation in the
Chicago Convention’s annex 12, paragraph
3.2.2.
28.	IAMSAR manual, vol. 1, pp. 2-4–2-5.
29.	Ibid., p. xiv. Search-and-rescue subregion is
defined as “[a] specified area within a search
and rescue region associated with a rescue
sub-centre.” For example, the U.S. Coast
Guard maintains two RSCs (RSC San Juan,

Puerto Rico, and RSC Guam) that coordinate
SAR operations with their respective SRSs.
30.	Ibid., p. 2-9.
31.	The facts portrayed in this vignette are known
by the author, who attests to their accuracy.
The vignette is presented for consideration of
the legal and policy issues involved.
32.	
Oxford Dictionary, s.v. “international law,”
www.oxforddictionaries.com/: “A body of
rules established by custom or treaty and
recognized by nations as binding in their
relations with one another.” The Commander’s
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations
further describes international law as “that
body of rules that nations consider binding in
their relations with one another. International
law derives from the practice of nations in
the international arena and from international agreements. International law provides
stability in international relations and an
expectation that certain acts or omissions will
effect predictable consequences. If one nation
violates the law, it may expect that others will
reciprocate. Consequently, failure to comply
with international law ordinarily involves
greater political and economic costs than
does observance. In short, nations comply
with international law because it is in their
interest to do so. Like most rules of conduct,
international law is in a continual state of
development and change.” U.S. Navy / Marine
Corps / Coast Guard, The Commander’s
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations
(2007) [hereafter Commander’s Handbook], p.
20, available at www.jag.navy.mil/.
33.	The IMO website explains that “[t]he SOLAS
Convention in its successive forms is generally regarded as the most important of all
international treaties concerning the safety of
merchant ships. The first version was adopted
in 1914, in response to the Titanic disaster,
the second in 1929, the third in 1948, and the
fourth in 1960. The 1974 version includes the
tacit acceptance procedure—which provides
that an amendment shall enter into force on a
specified date unless, before that date, objections to the amendment are received from an
agreed number of Parties. As a result the 1974
Convention has been updated and amended
on numerous occasions. The Convention in
force today is sometimes referred to as
SOLAS, 1974, as amended.” “International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
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(SOLAS), 1974,” International Maritime Organization, www.imo.org/.
34.	IMO, SOLAS, Consolidated Edition, 2009
(London: IMO, 2009), p. 268. The SOLAS
Convention applies to vessels on international
voyages, commercial vessels in particular.
SOLAS allows exceptions for warships (and
others) but encourages these ships to act
in a manner consistent with its provisions.
Entered into force: 25 May 1980; number of
contracting states: 162.
35.	UNCLOS, article 98.
36.	
Commander’s Handbook, p. 1-1, states:
“Although the United States is not a party to
the 1982 LOS Convention, it considers the
navigation and overflight provisions therein
reflective of customary international law and
thus acts in accordance with the 1982 LOS
Convention, except for the deep seabed mining provisions.” Additionally, the duty for U.S.
shipmasters to render assistance is stipulated
in the United States Code (USC); 46 USC
§ 2304(a)(1) states: “A master or individual
in charge of a vessel shall render assistance
to any individual found at sea in danger of
being lost, so far as the master or individual
in charge can do so without serious danger to
the master’s or individual’s vessel or individuals on board.” Additionally, “A master or individual violating this section shall be fined not
more than $1,000, imprisoned for not more
than 2 years, or both.” However, as further
stated in 46 USC § 2304, this obligation does
not apply to U.S. warships.
37.	International Convention on Salvage, 28 April
1989, available at www.imo.org/. Entered into
force: 14 July 1996; number of contracting
states: 67.
38.	E.g., the Salvage Convention, article 10,
requires a shipmaster to render assistance
“so far as he can without serious danger to
his vessel, her crew and her passengers.” This
is also stipulated in the SOLAS Convention,
chapter V, regulation 33, paragraph 1, quoted
in the text above, where the shipmaster must
make a determination about whether he can
render assistance to a person in distress.
39.	E.g., the annex to the SAR Convention
(paragraph 4.8.1) states: “Search and rescue
operations shall continue, when practicable,
until all reasonable hope of rescuing survivors
has passed” (emphasis added). According

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

Printer_Winter2017Review.indb 53

BUT TON

53

to paragraph 4.8.4, “If a search and rescue
operation on-scene becomes impracticable
and the rescue co-ordination centre or rescue
sub-centre concludes that survivors might
still be alive, the centre may temporarily suspend the on-scene activities pending further
developments, and shall promptly so inform
any authority, facility or service which has
been activated or notified” (emphasis added).
40.	SOLAS Convention, chapter V, regulation
33, paragraph 6, states: “Masters of ships who
have embarked persons in distress shall treat
them with humanity, within the capabilities
and limitations of the ship.”
41.	IMO Resolution MSC.167(78), Guidelines
on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea
(adopted 20 May 2004), provides general
guidance (paragraph 5.1) for shipmasters.
“SAR services throughout the world depend
on ships at sea to assist persons in distress.
It is impossible to arrange SAR services that
depend totally upon dedicated shore-based
rescue units to provide timely assistance to all
persons in distress at sea. Shipmasters have
certain duties that must be carried out in order to provide for safety of life at sea, preserve
the integrity of global SAR services of which
they are part, and to comply with humanitarian and legal obligations” (emphasis added).
42.	UNCLOS, article 29, defines warship as “a
ship belonging to the armed forces of a State
bearing the external marks distinguishing
such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by
the government of the State and whose name
appears in the appropriate service list or its
equivalent, and manned by a crew which is
under regular armed forces discipline.” See
also Commander’s Handbook, p. 2-1.
43.	The SOLAS Convention, chapter I, regulation
3, lists the following classes of ships that are
exempted from complying with the regulations unless specifically stated in a particular
regulation: (1) ships of war and troopships;
(2) cargo ships of less than five hundred gross
tons; (3) ships not propelled by mechanical
means; (4) wooden ships of primitive build;
(5) pleasure yachts not engaged in trade; and
(6) fishing vessels. Additionally, the Salvage
Convention, article 4, details the nonapplicability of the convention to “State-owned
vessels”: “1. Without prejudice to article 5,
this Convention shall not apply to warships
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U.S. Coast Guard Regulations (1992), article
4.2-5 (Assistance), provides a similar mandate
for the COs of U.S. Coast Guard ships to
render assistance to persons in distress. These
respective regulations make no distinction
between peacetime and wartime operational
requirements. (Note: rendering assistance to
persons in distress under the law of armed
conflict is not considered within the scope of
this article.)

or other non-commercial vessels owned or
operated by a State and entitled, at the time
of salvage operations, to sovereign immunity
under generally recognized principles of
international law unless that State decides
otherwise.
		“2. Where a State Party decides to apply the
Convention to its warships or other vessels
described in paragraph 1, it shall notify the
Secretary-General thereof specifying the
terms and conditions of such application.”
44.	In Hasan v. United States of America (2010),
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, in its opinion and order,
provided an overview of customary international law: “[the] body of rules that nations
in the international community universally
abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal
obligation and mutual concern.” Available at
www.unicri.it/. In addition, the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, article 38(1)
(b), describes customary international law as
“a general practice accepted as law.” Available
at www.icj-cij.org/. This understanding of
customary international law is further affirmed in the Commander’s Handbook, which
states (p. 20): “The general and consistent
practice among nations with respect to a particular subject, which over time is accepted by
them generally as a legal obligation, is known
as customary international law. Customary
international law is the principal source of
international law and is binding upon all
nations.”
45.	For example, in the United States, the requirement for COs of warships to render assistance
to persons in distress at sea is mandated in
U.S. Navy Regulations (1990), article 0925
(Assistance to Persons, Ships and Aircraft in
Distress): “1. Insofar as can be done without
serious danger to the ship or crew, the commanding officer or the senior officer present
as appropriate shall: a) proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress
if informed of their need for assistance,
insofar as such action may reasonably be
expected of him or her; b) render assistance
to any person found at sea in danger of being
lost; c) afford all reasonable assistance to
distressed ships and aircraft; and d) render assistance to the other ship, after a collision, to
her crew and passengers and, where possible,
inform the other ship of his or her identity.”

46.	The annex to the SAR Convention applies
to its contracting states. It is the contracting
state that is obligated to ensure its ships comply with their obligation to render assistance
at sea. See also paragraph 2.1.10.
47.	The disembarkation of survivors can be
conducted in several ways: (1) by the warship
transferring survivors at sea to another craft
to ensure it can resume normal operations;
(2) by the SMC coordinating disembarkation
with the coastal state that would be the warship’s next port of call; or (3) in any other way
that would relieve the warship of its burden
to care for the survivors. As stated previously, the SMC should strive to minimize the
impact on the warship (SAR Convention,
paragraph 3.1.9).
48.	The annex to the SAR Convention (paragraph 2.1.1) states: “Parties shall, as they are
able to do so individually or in co-operation
with other States and, as appropriate, with
the Organization, participate in the development of search and rescue services to ensure
that assistance is rendered to any person in
distress at sea.”
49.	Additionally, the coastal state must coordinate the SAR response regardless of who the
persons in distress are. The annex to the SAR
Convention (paragraph 2.1.10) makes this
requirement very clear: “Parties shall ensure
that assistance be provided to any person in
distress at sea. They shall do so regardless
of the nationality or status of such a person
or the circumstances in which that person is
found.”
50.	A more appropriate course of action than
diverting a ship from its next port of call
would be to have the ship rendezvous with
and transfer SAR survivors to a SAR unit for
further transport to a place of safety.
51.	IMO Resolution MSC.167(78) provides the
priorities for rendering assistance to persons
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rescued at sea. Paragraph 3.1 states in part:
“When ships assist persons in distress at
sea, co-ordination will be needed among all
concerned to ensure that all of the following
priorities are met in a manner that takes due
account of border control, sovereignty and security concerns consistent with international
law: 1) Lifesaving: All persons in distress at
sea should be assisted without delay; 2) Preservation of the integrity and effectiveness of
SAR services: Prompt assistance provided by
ships at sea is an essential element of global
SAR services; therefore it must remain a top
priority for shipmasters, shipping companies
and flag States; and 3) Relieving masters
of obligations after assisting persons: Flag
and coastal States should have effective
arrangements in place for timely assistance
to shipmasters in relieving them of persons
recovered by ships at sea” (emphasis added).
52.	The SAR Convention is the means by which
parties have agreed to fulfill their duty to render assistance in most circumstances. However, the duty to render assistance continues
to exist for every mariner. If it appears that
the process agreed to in the SAR Convention
will not result in timely and effective assistance in a particular situation, a shipmaster is
still under obligation to come to the aid of the
person in distress.
53.	Annex to the SAR Convention, paragraph
3.1.9.
54.	IAMSAR manual, vol. 1, p. xiii.
55.	A place of safety very well may be the ship’s
next port of call. The goal of the SAR Convention is to minimize the impact on the ship.
However, a life raft, even with ample rations,
is not considered a place of safety. According
to the SOLAS Convention, a life raft is considered a lifesaving appliance and does not
meet the requirements for or the definition
of a place of safety. The SOLAS Convention, chapter III, regulation 3, explains that a
lifeboat or life raft is a survival craft, “capable
of sustaining lives of persons in distress from
the time of abandoning the ship.” Persons
afloat in a life raft must still be considered
“in distress” until appropriate assistance is
rendered and the persons are delivered to a
place of safety.
56.	The Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic of 1965 mandates
that it is states that must coordinate the
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disembarkation of persons rescued at sea.
Section 7.C (Emergency Assistance) affirms
this important requirement, stating in part,
“7.8 Standard. Public authorities shall facilitate the arrival and departure of ships engaged in: . . . the rescue of persons in distress
at sea in order to provide a place of safety for
such persons.” In addition, standard 7.9 states,
“Public authorities shall, to the greatest extent
possible, facilitate the entry and clearance
of persons, cargo, material and equipment
required to deal with situations described in
Standard 7.8.” Convention on Facilitation of
International Maritime Traffic, 9 April 1965,
available at www.ifrc.org/. Entered into force:
5 March 1967; number of contracting states:
115.
57.	Or any other vessel that diverts to render assistance to persons in distress.
58.	The annex to the SAR Convention (paragraph 1.3.7) defines search and rescue
facility as “[a]ny mobile resource, including
designated search and rescue units, used to
conduct search and rescue operations.” By
comparison, search and rescue unit is defined
(paragraph 1.3.8) as “[a] unit composed of
trained personnel and provided with equipment suitable for the expeditious conduct of
search and rescue operations.” The IAMSAR
manual, vol. 1, goes on to state (p. 2-10, paragraph 2.5.3) that SAR units “may be under
the direct jurisdiction of the SAR service or
other State authorities or may belong to nonGovernmental or voluntary organizations.”
59.	IMO Resolution MSC.167(78) stipulates
(paragraph 6.13) that “[a]n assisting ship
should not be considered a place of safety
based solely on the fact that the survivors
are no longer in immediate danger once
aboard the ship. An assisting ship may not
have appropriate facilities and equipment to
sustain additional persons on board without
endangering its own safety or to properly care
for the survivors. Even if the ship is capable of
safely accommodating the survivors and may
serve as a temporary place of safety, it should
be relieved of this responsibility as soon as
alternative arrangements can be made.”
60.	IMO Resolution MSC.167(78) further
explains (paragraph 6.15) this important
aspect of coordinating the disembarkation
of any persons rescued at sea: “The Conventions, as amended, indicate that delivery to a
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place of safety should take into account the
particular circumstances of the case. These
circumstances may include factors such as
the situation on board the assisting ship, on
scene conditions, medical needs, and availability of transportation or other rescue units.
Each case is unique, and selection of a place
of safety may need to account for a variety of
important factors.”
61.	On 10–11 December 2014, the U.S. Coast
Guard participated in the annual Dialogue on
Protection Challenges, in Geneva, Switzerland, on the theme “Protection at Sea.” The
meeting, sponsored by the UNHCR, focused
on mixed migration at sea. During the meeting, an International Chamber of Shipping
(ICS) representative made an excellent point:
It is the shipmaster who must determine
whether to deviate from his intended voyage
and transit to the “nearest port of call” or
to continue to the ship’s “next port of call.”
Coastal states need to understand and support the shipmaster’s decision, which will take
into account important on-scene conditions
as well as other logistical and risk factors.
The “nearest port” may not be a viable option
for the shipmaster. The coastal state needs to
respect the shipmaster’s decision and coordinate disembarkation of survivors accordingly.
“Shipping Industry Calls on Governments to
Address Migrants at Sea Crisis,” International
Chamber of Shipping, www.ics-shipping.org/.
62.	In 2015 IMO/UNHCR/ICS jointly published
an excellent resource: Rescue at Sea: A Guide
to Principles and Practice as Applied to
Refugees and Migrants (2015 Rescue at Sea
Guide). In discussing the action required by
governments and RCCs in coordinating a
merchant ship rendering assistance to persons in distress, it states: “Governments have
to coordinate and cooperate to ensure that
Masters of ships providing assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released
from their obligations with minimum further
deviation from the ship’s intended voyage,
and have to arrange disembarkation as soon
as reasonably practicable.” It goes on to state
(p. 12) that “the Government responsible for
the SAR region in which the rescued persons
were recovered is primarily responsible for
providing a place of safety or ensuring that
such a place of safety is provided.” Available at
www.imo.org/.

63.	Judith Kumin, “The Challenge of Mixed
Migration by Sea,” Forced Migration Review,
no. 45 (February 2014), available at www
.fmreview.org/, provides a good overview of
what is considered mixed migration by sea:
“Contemporary irregular migration is mostly
‘mixed,’ meaning that it consists of flows
of people who are on the move for different reasons but who share the same routes,
modes of travel and vessels. They cross
land and sea borders without authorisation,
frequently with the help of people smugglers.
IOM and UNHCR point out that mixed flows
can include refugees, asylum seekers and
others with specific needs, such as trafficked
persons, stateless persons and unaccompanied or separated children, as well as
other irregular migrants. The groups are not
mutually exclusive, however, as people often
have more than one reason for leaving home.
Also, the term ‘other irregular migrants’ fails
to capture the extent to which mixed flows
include people who have left home because
they were directly affected or threatened by a
humanitarian crisis—including one resulting
from climate change—and need some type
of protection, even if they do not qualify as
refugees.”
64.	IMO Secretariat, “Outcome of the Interagency High-Level Meeting to Address
Unsafe Mixed Migration by Sea: Note by the
Secretariat” (LEG 102/INF.3), Legal Committee 102nd Session (9 March 2015), pp. 1–2,
available at www.imo.org/.
65.	Koji Sekimizu, IMO Secretary-General,
opening comments (High-Level Meeting
to Address Unsafe Mixed Migration by Sea,
London, March 2015), p. 1, available at www
.imo.org/.
66.	Glaucia Boyer, “Development Dimensions of
Mixed Migration” (presentation, High-Level
Meeting to Address Unsafe Mixed Migration
by Sea, London, March 2015), p. 10, available
at www.imo.org/. Mrs. Boyer added, “The
scale and protracted nature of the crisis is
challenging the ability of the international
community to meet the continuing need for
essential, life-saving humanitarian aid.”
67.	Sekimizu, opening comments, p. 1.
68.	United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees [hereafter UNHCR], The Sea Route
to Europe: The Mediterranean Passage in the
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Age of Refugees (1 July 2015), p. 2, available at
www.unhcr.org/.
69.	“Unsafe Mixed Migration by Sea,” International Maritime Organization, www.imo.org/.
70.	Ibid.
71.	UNHCR, The Sea Route to Europe, p. 2.
72.	IMO Secretariat, “Outcome of the Interagency High-Level Meeting,” p. 2.
73.	Ibid.
74.	The summary conclusions from an 8–10
November 2011 UNHCR experts meeting in
Djibouti, “Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in
Distress at Sea—How Best to Respond?,” state
(paragraph B.7): “The specific legal framework governing rescue at sea does not apply
to interception operations that have no search
and rescue component.” Available at www
.unhcr.org/.
75.	Considering the level of concern for the safety
of persons or craft that may be in danger,
the SMC will determine in which emergency
phase (uncertainty, alert, or distress) to classify the SAR incident. (IAMSAR manual, vol.
2, paragraph 3.3.1.) In particular, the annex
to the SAR Convention (paragraph 1.3.13)
defines distress phase as “[a] situation wherein
there is a reasonable certainty that a person,
a vessel or other craft is threatened by grave
and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance.” In many mixed-migration
operations the SAR Convention would not
apply necessarily because the circumstances
of the incident may not meet the criteria for
any of the three emergency phases.
76.	It is important to understand the differences
among refugees, asylum seekers, and economic
migrants. (1) The 2015 Rescue at Sea Guide
provides a good description of the difference
between a refugee and an asylum seeker. An
asylum seeker is a person who “is seeking
international protection and whose claim
has not yet been finally decided. Not every
asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized
as a refugee. Refugee status is ‘declaratory’—
that is, determining refugee status does not
make a person a refugee, but rather recognizes that a person is a refugee.” The guide
goes on to state that “[r]escued persons who
do not meet the criteria of the 1951 Refugee
Convention definition of a ‘refugee,’ but who
fear torture or other serious human rights
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abuses or who are fleeing armed conflict may
also be protected from return to a particular
place (‘refoulement’) by other international or
regional human rights or refugee law instruments.” (2) There is also a difference between
refugees and economic migrants. In its
fiftieth-anniversary issue, “The Wall behind
Which Refugees Can Shelter,” of its Refugees
publication the UNHCR states: “An economic
migrant normally leaves a country voluntarily
to seek a better life. Should he or she elect to
return home they would continue to receive
the protection of their government. Refugees
flee because of the threat of persecution and
cannot return safely to their homes in the
circumstances then prevailing.” “Most Frequently Asked Questions about the Refugee
Convention,” Refugees, no. 123 (2001), p. 16,
available at www.unhcr.org/.
77.	The Refugee Convention, article 1A(2),
defines refugee as a person who, “owing to
a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country.” Available at www.unhcr.org/.
Convention entered into force: 22 April 1954;
number of parties: 145.
78.	Annex to the SAR Convention, paragraph
3.1.9.
79.	Patricia Mallia, “The MV Salamis and the
State of Disembarkation at International Law:
The Undefinable Goal,” American Society of
International Law Insights 18, no. 11 (15 May
2014), www.asil.org/. Ms. Mallia adds that
“the SAR Convention only lays down an obligation of coordination and cooperation and
does not necessarily entail an explicit duty to
allow disembarkation in a particular port.”
80.	Kathleen Newland, “Troubled Waters: Rescue
of Asylum Seekers and Refugees at Sea,”
Migration Information Source (1 January
2003), www.migrationpolicy.org/. This was
also affirmed in the report (paragraph C.10)
from the previously mentioned UNHCR
experts meeting in Djibouti in 2011:
“Fundamentally, a core challenge in any
particular rescue at sea operation involving asylum-seekers and refugees is often the
timely identification of a place of safety for
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disembarkation, as well as necessary followup, including reception arrangements, access
to appropriate processes and procedures,
and outcomes. If a shipmaster is likely to
face delay in disembarking rescued people,
he/she may be less ready to come to the assistance of those in distress at sea. Addressing
these challenges and developing predictable
responses requires strengthened cooperation and coordination among all States and
other stakeholders implicated in rescue at sea
operations.”
81.	The IAMSAR manual, vol. 2, p. xviii, defines
mass rescue operation (MRO) as “[s]earch
and rescue services characterized by the need
for immediate response to large numbers of
persons in distress, such that the capabilities normally available to search and rescue
authorities are inadequate.” The question is
whether a mixed-migration-at-sea incident
would actually include “persons in distress”;
and, if there are large numbers of persons
involved, would the incident be classified as
an MRO? In many instances, these incidents
could be considered illegal trafficking in persons; it would seem that the United Nations
Convention on Transnational Organized
Crime (TOC Convention)—in particular
annex II, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children—would be more
applicable than the SAR Convention. The
TOC Convention and protocols are available
at www.unodc.org/. Entered into force: 29
September 2003; number of parties: 185. If
mixed-migration-by-sea incidents do not
primarily constitute the rescue of persons in
distress, and are not adequately addressed in
the TOC Convention, the international community may want to consider developing an
international instrument that would serve as
the basis for the coordination and conduct of
these maritime operations.
82.	The facts portrayed in this vignette are known
by the author, who attests to their accuracy.
The vignette is presented for consideration of
the legal and policy issues involved.
83.	In defining territorial sea, UNCLOS, article
2, states: “1. The sovereignty of a coastal State
extends, beyond its land territory and internal
waters and, in the case of an archipelagic
State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. 2.

This sovereignty extends to the air space over
the territorial sea as well as to its bed and
subsoil.” Article 3 continues, “Every State has
the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical
miles, measured from baselines determined
in accordance with this Convention.”
84.	The Commander’s Handbook (paragraph
2.4.1) defines military aircraft as “all aircraft
operated by commissioned units of the armed
forces of a nation bearing the military markings of that nation, commanded by a member
of the armed forces, and manned by a crew
subject to regular armed forces discipline.”
85.	For example, AE is envisioned in UNCLOS.
In describing innocent passage, article 18
provides for the assistance of persons in
distress: “2. Passage shall be continuous and
expeditious. However, passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the
same are incidental to ordinary navigation
or are rendered necessary by force majeure
or distress or for the purpose of rendering
assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in
danger or distress” (emphasis in bold added).
86.	At the 1991 convening of IMO’s SubCommittee on Lifesaving, Search and Rescue,
the United States submitted to the subcommittee a note, “SAR on or over Foreign Territorial Seas” (LSR 22/8/4, 19 January 1991),
which argued (paragraph 3) the U.S. position
that “[t]he obligation to rescue persons in
distress regardless of nationality is based on
the principle and time-honored tradition that
those at sea will, wherever they can without
undue risk, assist others in danger or distress.
. . . Thus, coastal state’s right to control activities in its territorial seas is balanced with the
requirement to rescue those in distress from
perils of the sea.” This U.S. paper was also
discussed at the sixty-fifth session of IMO’s
Legal Committee (1991) and duly recorded
in its “Report of the Legal Committee on the
Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session” (LEG 65/8,
11 October 1991). While several delegations shared the U.S. position, the committee agreed “that there existed no right of
assistance entry in public international law at
present; this principle is neither embodied in
any convention, nor established by customary law. Many delegations emphasized in
this connection that it was important not to
upset the delicate balance between the duty
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to render assistance, on the one hand, and
the sovereign right of coastal States to control
entry into or operation in their waters on the
other” (emphasis added). Over the two decades since the Legal Committee reached this
conclusion, the concept of AE has continued
to become established as a standard principle
enshrined through international conventions
and customary international law.

serious danger to his vessel and persons
thereon, to render assistance to any person in
danger of being lost at sea” (emphasis added).
All three conventions make no geographical
distinction concerning the obligation of the
shipmaster to render assistance to persons in
distress. The duty to render assistance should
be considered to apply on the high seas and
territorial sea of any coastal state.

87.	This article uses the term “AE rescue operation,” not “SAR operation.” When a ship or
aircraft enters a coastal state’s territorial sea
to render assistance to persons in distress, the
purpose is to rescue, not search for, survivors.
Scenario D addresses this distinction further.

91.	For example, UNCLOS, article 2, states: “The
sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and other
rules of international law” (emphasis added).

88.	
United States Coast Guard Addendum to the
United States Search and Rescue Supplement to
the International Aeronautical and Maritime
Search and Rescue Manual, COMDTINST
M16130.2F (January 2013) [hereafter USCG
Addendum], p. 1-45, paragraphs 1.8.1.4 and
1.8.1.5, available at www.uscg.mil/. See also
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
instruction Guidance for the Exercise of Rightof-Assistance Entry, CJCSI 2410.01D (3 September 2013) [hereafter CJCSI], p. 2, available
at www.dtic.mil/. Note: the U.S. Coast Guard
uses the term “assistance entry” (AE), while
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) uses
the term “right of assistance entry” (RAE)
when discussing the conduct of rescue operations in a coastal state’s territorial sea.
89.	The SOLAS Convention does not apply to
warships. UNCLOS and the Salvage Convention do not limit what types of vessels can
conduct an AE rescue operation in a coastal
state’s territorial sea. However, the emphasis
of this article is on AE rescue operations
conducted by government ships (including
warships).

59

92.	
USCG Addendum, p. 1-46, paragraph 1.8.2.4.
As will be discussed later in this section, U.S.
Coast Guard and DoD SAR policy allows for
both aircraft and surface units to conduct AE
rescue operations.
93.	The SAR Convention was never intended to
limit or restrict any available warship or other
ship in the conduct of immediate lifesaving
assistance to persons in distress, even in a
coastal state’s territorial sea. The annex to the
SAR Convention (paragraph 4.3) states: “Any
search and rescue unit receiving information
of a distress incident shall initially take immediate action if in the position to assist and
shall, in any case without delay, notify the rescue co-ordination centre or rescue sub-centre
in whose area the incident has occurred.”
94.	CJCSI, paragraph 4.d.
95.	It should be emphasized that UNCLOS
and the SOLAS and Salvage Conventions
were never intended to restrict or hamper a
ship’s use of its available SAR resources (e.g.,
embarked aircraft or small boat) that could be
used in a lifesaving operation.
96.	The use of U.S. military aircraft in the conduct of RAE operations is also contemplated.
CJCSI, paragraph 6.c(2), states, “An operational commander may render immediate
rescue assistance by deploying a U.S. military
aircraft (including aircraft embarked aboard
military ships conducting RAE operations)
into the national airspace within U.S.recognized foreign territorial seas or archipelagic waters when all four of the following
conditions are met:

90.	UNCLOS, article 98(1)(a), specifically states
that the shipmaster has a duty to “render assistance to any person found at sea in danger
of being lost” (emphasis added). The SOLAS
Convention, chapter V, regulation 33, requires
“[t]he master of a ship at sea, which is in a
position to be able to provide assistance, on
receiving information from any source that
persons are in distress at sea, . . . to proceed
with all speed to their assistance” (emphasis 		“(a) A person, ship, or aircraft within the
added). Similarly, the Salvage Convention,
foreign territorial sea or archipelagic waters
article 10, paragraph 1, requires “[e]very
is in danger or distress from perils of the sea
master . . . , so far as he can do so without
and requires immediate rescue assistance;
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as for vessels (e.g., nations may recognize
the right to conduct AE rescue operations
more readily for vessels than for aircraft). In
addition, the conduct of AE rescue operations
by nonmilitary vessels is apt to cause less
coastal State concern than entry by military
vessels. Therefore, safety of the rescue unit
must be considered in light of the views of the
coastal State whose territorial sea or overlying
airspace is being entered.”

		“(b) The location is reasonably well known;
		“(c) The U.S. military aircraft is able to render
timely and effective assistance; and,
		“(d) Any delay in rendering assistance could
be life-threatening.”
97.	For example, the USCG Addendum, paragraph 1.8.2.5, states that “Coast Guard rescue
aircraft may conduct an AE rescue operation in a coastal State’s territorial sea, when
in the judgment of the aircraft commander:
(a) There is reasonable certainty (based on
the best available information regardless of
source) that a person is in distress; (b) The
distress location is reasonably well known;
and (c) The SAR unit (or SAR facility) is in
position to render timely and effective
assistance.”
98.	Article 18(2) of UNCLOS concerns ships in
the conduct of innocent passage in a coastal
state’s territorial sea. See also note 83.
99.	The annex to the SAR Convention promotes
using all available means for rendering assistance to persons in distress. For example,
in the conduct of search operations, paragraph 3.1.3 states: “Unless otherwise agreed
between the States concerned, the authorities
of a Party which wishes its rescue units to
enter into or over the territorial sea or territory of another Party solely for the purpose
of searching for the position of maritime
casualties and rescuing the survivors of such
casualties, shall transmit a request, giving full
details of the projected mission and the need
for it, to the rescue co-ordination centre of
that other Party, or to such other authority as
has been designated by that Party” (emphasis added). While paragraph 3.1.3 describes
the requirement for aircraft entering into a
coastal state’s territorial sea for the purpose of
searching, the aircraft would not be required
to seek permission for the conduct of an AE
rescue operation. The criteria for the conduct
of an AE rescue operation by an aircraft
should be met prior to rendering any assistance in a coastal state’s territorial sea (see
notes 96 and 97).

101.	The Salvage Convention, article 1(a), defines
salvage as “any act or activity undertaken to
assist a vessel or any other property in danger
in navigable waters or in any other waters
whatsoever.”
102.	It is at this point where U.S. Coast Guard and
DoD AE policy set forth in CJCSI 2410.01D
differ. The USCG Addendum states (paragraph 1.8.2.6[b]) that Coast Guard rescue
assets shall not conduct an AE rescue operation “[t]o rescue (or salvage) property (other
than in limited cases, such as for the retrieval
of medical supplies, or other property that
may assist in the conduct of the lifesaving
operation).” In contrast, CJCSI 2410.01D allows for the rescue of property: “RAE applies
only to rescues in which the location of the
persons or property in danger or distress is
reasonably well known” (emphasis added).
As mentioned previously (note 88), another
difference is that the Coast Guard uses the
term “assistance entry,” while DoD uses “right
of assistance entry.” The Coast Guard prefers
AE, believing the term advances the service’s
objectives in international engagements.
Many nations view AE solely as a duty, not a
right, even a limited one. While the distinction between a “duty” and “right” has legal
significance, the practical distinctions are
minimal, since international support exists
for entry into a coastal state’s territorial sea to
render assistance to those in distress.

103.	The annex to the SAR Convention (paragraph 3.1.2) states: “Unless otherwise agreed
between the States concerned, a Party should
authorize . . . immediate entry into or over its
territorial sea or territory of rescue units of
other Parties solely for the purpose of search100.	The USCG Addendum does provide a note of
ing for the position of maritime casualties
caution on the use of aircraft and ships in the
and rescuing the survivors of such casualties”
conduct of an AE rescue operation. Paragraph
(emphasis added). As previously noted (note
1.8.1.6 states: “Customary practice for aircraft
99), the annex continues (paragraph 3.1.3):
conducting AE rescue operations in a coastal
“Unless otherwise agreed between the States
State’s territorial sea is not as fully developed
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concerned, the authorities of a Party which
wishes its rescue units to enter into or over
the territorial sea or territory of another Party
solely for the purpose of searching for the
position of maritime casualties and rescuing
survivors of such casualties, shall transmit
a request, giving full details of the projected
mission and the need for it, to the rescue
co-ordination centre of that other Party, or to
such authority as has been designated by that
Party” (emphasis added). In addition to Coast
Guard policy not authorizing the conduct of
an AE rescue operation to recover property
or to search for persons in distress, the USCG
Addendum also states (paragraph 1.8.2.6) that
an AE rescue operation cannot be conducted
(1) to assist persons not in distress, or (2)
within a coastal state’s internal waters or over
its landmass.
104.	The SOLAS Convention, chapter V, regulation 33, requires the master of a ship at sea
that is in a position to render assistance to
persons in distress to provide that assistance.
Stating that the master is required to render
assistance demonstrates that it is the master
who determines whether a person is in
distress.
105.	The Commander’s Handbook, paragraph
2.5.3.1, describes international straits as follows: “Straits that are used for international
navigation between one part of the high seas
or an exclusive economic zone and another
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone are subject to the legal regime of transit
passage. Transit passage exists throughout
the entire strait (shoreline-to-shoreline) and
not just the area overlapped by the territorial
sea of the coastal nation(s). Under international law, the ships and aircraft of all nations,
including warships, auxiliary vessels, and
military aircraft, enjoy the right of unimpeded transit passage through such straits and
their approaches.” Transit passage is defined
as “the exercise of the freedoms of navigation
and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit in the normal
modes of operation utilized by ships and
aircraft for such passage.” See also UNCLOS,
part III (Straits Used for International
Navigation).
106.	Myron H. Nordquist, series ed., Satya N.
Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, general eds.,
United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

Printer_Winter2017Review.indb 61

BUT TON

61

Sea: A Commentary, vol. 3, Articles 86 to 132
(The Hague, Neth.: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995),
p. 177.
107.	While the annex to the SAR Convention
does not explicitly state that law-enforcement
actions are not coordinated and conducted
within the framework of the global SAR
system, the IAMSAR manual, vol. 2, does
provide guidance for assistance in “other
than SAR operations” (see note 112). Another excellent guide for determining what
generally would be considered a “SAR case”
is paragraph 4.c of CJCSI 2410.01D, which
states that RAE is conducted by U.S. military
ships in support of “the time-honored mariners’ duty under customary international law
of rendering rapid and effective assistance to
persons, ships, or aircraft in imminent peril
at sea without regard to nationality or location” (emphasis added). The CJCSI goes on
(paragraph 5.c) to define perils of the sea as
“accidents and dangers peculiar to maritime
activities including storms, waves, and wind;
grounding; fire, smoke, and noxious fumes;
flooding, sinking, and capsizing; loss of
propulsion or steering; and other hazards of
the sea.” This definition provides not only a
good understanding of when U.S. military
ships should conduct AE rescue operations,
but also a broad characterization for when the
SAR Convention would apply and when activation of the global SAR system is warranted.
108.	The annex to the SAR Convention does
provide (paragraph 1.3.13) a definition of
distress phase (see note 75). The coastal-state
SMC makes the determination of whether
this definition applies considering the circumstance of a particular SAR operation. If a
person declares that he is in distress, the SMC
normally would activate the coastal state’s
distress phase processes and procedures to
provide the necessary assistance.
109.	George K. Walker, Definitions for the Law
of the Sea: Terms Not Defined by the 1982
Convention (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995),
p. 169, provides a good overview of what
should be considered a distress: “‘Distress,’ as
used in UNCLOS Articles 18, 39, 98 and 109,
and as incorporated by reference in UNCLOS
Articles 45 and 54, means an event of grave
necessity, such as severe weather or mechanical failure in a ship or aircraft; or a humancaused event, such as a collision with another
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ship or aircraft. The necessity must be urgent
and proceed from such a state of things as
may be supposed to produce in the mind of
a skillful mariner or aircraft commander a
well-grounded apprehension of the loss of
the vessel or aircraft and its cargo, or for the
safety or lives of its crew or its passengers.”

the SAR Convention and would not normally
apply to a mixed-migration-at-sea incident,
which might or might not constitute a SAR
case. The unique nature of mixed-migrationat-sea operations would require development
of unique processes and procedures to meet
the requirements of those types of operations.

110.	Wu Tien Li-Shou, plaintiff-appellant, v.
United States of America, defendant-appellee,
on appeal from the U.S. District Court for
the District of Maryland, brief for the United
States of America, appellee, No. 14-1206 (4th
Cir., 23 January 2015).

115.	The UN Convention on Conditions for
Registration of Ships (not in force), article 2,
defines flag State as “a State whose flag a ship
flies and is entitled to fly.” Article 1 indicates
that a flag state must “exercise effectively its
jurisdiction and control over such ships with
regard to identification and accountability
of shipowners and operators as well as with
regard to administrative, technical, economic
and social matters.” Additionally, UNCLOS
article 91 states: “1. Every State shall fix the
conditions for the grant of its nationality to
ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have
the nationality of the State whose flag they are
entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link
between the State and the ship.

111.	Ibid., p. 38.

112.	The IAMSAR manual, vol. 2, also recognizes
this important distinction. In paragraph
7.4.2 it states: “In situations such as piracy or
armed robbery against ships where the ship
or crew is in grave and imminent danger, the
master may authorize the broadcasting of a
distress message, preceded by the appropriate
distress alerts (MAYDAY, DSC, etc.), using
all available radiocommunications systems.
Also, ships subject to the SOLAS Convention
		“2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it
are required to carry equipment called the
has granted the right to fly its flag documents
Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) for sendto that effect.” Walker, Definitions for the Law
ing covert alerts to shore for vessel security
of the Sea, pp. 193–95, provides a detailed
incidents involving acts of violence against
explanation of the term flag State as used in
ships (i.e., piracy, armed robbery against ships
UNCLOS.
or any other security incident directed against
116.	Thames Shipyard and Repair Company,
a ship). . . . National procedures can vary but
plaintiff in cross-claim, appellant, v. United
the role of the RCC, if involved, is usually to
States, defendant, appellee; Northern Voyager
receive the SSAS alert and inform the security
Limited Partnership; OneBeacon America
forces authority that will be in charge of the
Insurance Company f/k/a Commercial Union
response. Actions taken by the RCC upon reInsurance Company, plaintiffs, appellants, v.
ceiving a covert SSAS alert include: . . . place
United States, defendant, appellee, 350 F.3d
SAR resources on standby, if appropriate,
247 (1st Cir., 26 November 2003).
since it may become a SAR case” (emphasis added). This section in vol. 2 is placed
117.	In particular, both the district court and the
in chapter 7, which is titled “Emergency
court of appeals held that the discretionary
Assistance Other than Search and Rescue,”
function exception to liability under 46 USC
emphasizing that a law-enforcement action
§ 742 (the Suits in Admiralty Act, which
should not initially be considered a SAR
allows for a limited waiver of the U.S. federal
operation as envisioned in the SAR Convengovernment’s sovereign immunity from civil
tion; however, a SAR case may arise out of a
lawsuits) and 46 USC § 781 (the Public Veslaw-enforcement action.
sels Act, which allows for legal action against
the United States for damages caused by a
113. The facts portrayed in this vignette are known
public vessel) protected from further judicial
by the author, who attests to their accuracy.
review the Coast Guard’s decision to evacuate
The vignette is presented for consideration of
the master forcibly from Northern Voyager.
the legal and policy issues involved.
114.	This discussion is based on SAR cases that
would be coordinated and conducted under

118.	The court of appeals brief included the following comment: “The facts of this case lead
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history.” For those interested in this issue, this
us to conclude that the Coast Guard reacted
case is well worth reading.
rationally, and that human life could reasonably have been deemed to be at serious risk
119.	Coast Guard SAR policy states that a
had Captain Haggerty and his crew not been
voluntary evacuation of a person should
removed. The Northern Voyager, without
be considered the preferred alternative to
steering, was rolling in six to eight foot ocean
removing the person forcibly from his vessel.
seas. Water was pouring in. She was developThe USCG Addendum (paragraph 4.2.2)
ing an increasing port-side list. The fishing
states: “Although the Coast Guard does have
boat’s only access port was on the starboard
the authority to compel a mariner to abandon
side. The Coast Guardsmen on the vessel retheir vessel in a life threatening situation, it is
ported progressive flooding, raising the posalways preferable that a mariner voluntarily
sibility that the ship would capsize, trapping
evacuate when necessary. Coast Guard perall on board. While arguments can perhaps
sonnel should endeavor to use all means, inbe made in light of 20-20 hindsight tending to
cluding powers of persuasion, to encourage a
minimize the potential dangers had the masmariner to evacuate, when appropriate. Forcter and his fellows been allowed to remain, we
ible and/or compelled evacuations should
see no basis to doubt the objective reasononly be conducted when a life-threatening
ableness of the Coast Guard’s on the scene
emergency exists, and there is an immediate
decision to remove them.” However, Judge
need for assistance or aid.” Additionally, the
Torruella on the Court of Appeals concurred
decision to evacuate a person forcibly from
in part in and dissented in part from the
his vessel to save his life should, if possible,
majority’s recognition of the Coast Guard’s
be made in consultation with the SMC. The
authority to compel the master forcibly to
SMC, if time permits, should consult legal
abandon his ship, thus preventing him from
counsel. However, if time is of the essence
continuing efforts to save it. He wrote: “With
and the situation is life threatening, then SAR
due respect, there is no authority in law, pracpolicy should allow the SAR unit on scene to
tice, or maritime tradition that validates such
make the decision to remove a person forcibly
action by the Coast Guard, nor am I aware
from his vessel to save his life. Policies, proof the government’s having claimed such
cedures, and training must be developed and
extraordinary powers before the inception of
implemented to ensure that SAR units, SMCs,
the case.” He concluded that the discretionary
legal counsel, and the SAR organization chain
function exception did not shield the United
of command can effectively manage this type
States from liability, because a decision canof scenario.
not be shielded from liability if the decision
120.	It
should also be noted that from a U.S. legal
maker is acting without actual authority. In
perspective,
a person who refuses to abandon
the judge’s view, “Such a momentous shift
his
vessel
at
the
request of the U.S. Coast
in policy and such an extraordinary grant of
Guard to save his own life has committed no
authority should not be undertaken absent
crime, which makes the contemplated use of
a clear legislative mandate expressed both
force even more difficult.
in the text of the statute and in its legislative
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CHANGING DOD’S ANALYSIS PAR ADIGM
The Science of War Gaming and Combat/Campaign Simulation
John T. Hanley Jr.

W

ar gaming and military modeling have a well-documented history covering over two centuries, a period that coincides with the inception and
evolution of formal professional development for military officers.1 The term war
game used here refers to “a warfare model or simulation that does not involve the
operations of actual forces, in which the flow of events affects and is affected by
decisions made during the course of those events by players representing opposing sides.”2
Beginning with the early-nineteenth-century Prussian creation of war colleges
to augment operational experience, professional
John T. Hanley Jr. earned a doctorate in operamilitary education involved a combination of the
tions research and management science at Yale
study of history and international law, the study of
University, writing his dissertation on war gaming.
A former USN nuclear submarine officer and fleet theorists who had written on the nature of war and
exercise analyst who employed military modeling to
strategy, practical exercises, and theoretical analyconduct campaign analyses, he used gaming extensively during his service with the first eighteen Chief sis as the means for understanding and developing
of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Groups as an military art and science. Carl von Clausewitz’s On
analyst, program director, and deputy director. He
War and Antoine-Henri de Jomini’s The Art of
also served as special assistant to the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Forces Pacific, in the Office of the Sec- War competed for attention. Whereas Clausewitz
retary of Defense (Offices of Force Transformation, treated war as a social phenomenon, rooted in the
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and Stratage of reason, Jomini believed in the existence of
egy), and as deputy director of the Joint Advanced
Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense immutable principles of warfare, akin to NewtoAnalyses. After serving as director for strategy at the
nian mechanics.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, he reAs war gaming became a routine part of Prustired from government in 2012 and is now an independent consultant.
sian military education, the Prussians attempted
to create rigid rules for calculating the outcomes
© 2017 by John T. Hanley Jr.
Naval War College Review, Winter 2017, Vol. 70, No. 1
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believed that war gaming contributed notably to the Prussians’ success in 1866
and 1870. However, as the popularity of war gaming spread following the Prussian victories, semirigid and free-form adjudication based on the game director’s
judgment became more popular.3
War colleges used war gaming as a basis for both practical exercises and
theoretical analyses. Both war colleges and military staffs used war gaming to
develop strategy. In addition, in the early twentieth century, quantitative military modeling outside of war gaming was adopted more widely. New techniques
were formulated, such as Lanchester equations, which Frederick W. Lanchester
published in 1916.4
During World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom instituted
operations evaluation groups, consisting of scientists, to quantify the outcomes
of military practices and seek improvements. These groups observed operations,
collected data, and created models of military operations analogous to the models
they used in scientific endeavors. Following World War II, the U.S. government
established federal contract research centers to continue this practice in peacetime.5 The Navy transformed its Operations Research Group into an Operations
Evaluation Group that became the Center for Naval Analyses. The Air Force established RAND. The Army established its Operations Research Office at Johns
Hopkins University, which became the Research Analysis Corporation. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) founded a Weapons Systems Evaluation Group that
became the Institute for Defense Analyses.6 Initially these organizations provided
mechanisms for contracting university professors; eventually, they developed
permanent staffs.
In the long-term competition with the Soviets, the emphasis shifted from
operations research to systems analysis: operations research focuses on analyzing operations to support commanders; systems analysis focuses on supporting
the Pentagon’s policy and procurement bureaucracies by attempting to quantify
the effects of proposed platforms and weapons systems employing advancing
technology. An expansion of the practice of quantification to optimize operations spread from the military to industry, leading to the creation of operations
research as a discipline.
In 1961, coming from Ford Motor Company, Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara established the Pentagon’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System and a Systems Analysis Office to oversee the selection of military systems
and force allocation and determine how much was enough to invest in defense.7
Alain C. Enthoven founded the Systems Analysis Office on well-intentioned tenets.8 However, competing interests and divisions in staff responsibilities within
and among the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the
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services and the need to align analytical processes with Pentagon staff procedures
and budget cycles resulted in these tenets never being followed fully.
Computers rapidly expanded the scale of problems addressed in the 1960s and
’70s. Computer-based campaign simulations that strung together and iterated
sets of equations modeling combat became the primary method the Pentagon
procurement bureaucracy used to undergird arguments for selecting one military
platform or technology over another. As the Department of Defense (DoD) expanded its use of contractors to conduct analyses in the 1970s, a sizable industry
emerged to support and embed Pentagon analytical practices. “Unfortunately, the
trend over the last decades has been for DoD studies to become more focused
on standard scenarios and big [computer] models.”9 On 8 May 2015, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work and Vice Chief of the JCS Admiral James A.
Winnefeld Jr. called for initiatives to renew war gaming within DoD.10
Scientific methods form the foundation for operations research. A frequent
criticism of war gaming is that it is less scientific, and thus less useful for prediction, than computer-based combat/campaign simulation. This article examines
war gaming and combat/campaign simulations against scientific standards to
explore their usefulness and limitations and how they complement each other.
Computer-based campaign simulation involves much larger uncertainties and
indeterminacy than generally realized. Both campaign simulation and war gaming require the use of additional analytical techniques to validate and extend their
findings.
Operations research is rooted in an interactive cycle of observing fleet/field
operations, collecting data, modeling, collecting more data, proposing changes,
then cycling through those results again. The original operations research groups
involved interdisciplinary teams of scientists employing models and paradigms
from their respective disciplines to understand military operations well enough
to predict effects. DoD needs to overhaul its current analysis paradigm and its
focus on individual major defense acquisition programs, weaning itself off large,
computer-based campaign models. It should adopt analysis campaigns and cycles
of research to meet growing security challenges within limited budgets.11
SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
The System and Its States
Bernard O. Koopman begins his study of the logical basis of combat simulation
with the following:
Basic to any scientific examination of nature is the concept of the system: the set
of interacting things considered. In a military action, the system is the totality of
men[/women] and weapons involved, together with their environment: the medium
in which the action occurs and which affects its course. And equally fundamental is
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the concept of the set of states that the system can be in, just one at any given time. . . .
In each case, the state of the system includes its physical state: positions and velocities
of the units, condition of armaments, data-gathering status, and all the meteorological specifications. But how far into the mental state of the commanders must one
go in defining the “state” of the system? This can only be settled by asking a second
question, that of the evolution of the state of the system with the passage of time.
Classical physics has traditionally considered that the state of a system is only adequately described if, once the state is given, all later states are determined: Given any
two similar systems in the same initial states, all their later states will be the same—
provided that their environmental influences (external forces) continue the same.
Thus, in Newtonian mechanics, the full and exact knowledge of the positions and
velocities of the parts of a material system determine its whole future motion. But it is
only in the simplest military operations that such an order of determinateness exists.
In far more cases, it is not feasible to specify the state of a system so that its subsequent evolution is determined. What is far more common is to have only statistical
determinateness: in a large number of similar systems starting in the same state, the
12
same proportion will go into any given later state.

The premise of combat/campaign simulation is that the evolution of the states
in some future combat can be determined adequately statistically. In war gaming, the state of the system evolves move to move through adjudication of player
decisions. Keeping in mind the concept of states helps us consider the scope and
limits of computer-based combat/campaign simulation and war gaming.
Scientific Standards
“Standards of scientific excellence, though they may occasionally be selfdefeating, on the whole and in the long run make for success.”13 However, one
must stipulate carefully what one intends when posing scientific standards, lest
they become straitjackets. “The emphasis by historians and philosophers of science is that there is no such thing as the scientific method. The more realistic
danger is that some preferred set of techniques will become identified with scientific method as such.”14
As systems analysis took hold in DoD, those seeking to determine “how much
is enough” sought to create models using equations that allowed quantitative
comparisons to predict the costs and benefits of alternative systems. As computers became more powerful, DoD turned to quantitative combat/campaign
simulations as a basis for major decisions, regarding them as more objective,
rigorous, and useful than less-formal analytical techniques, such as war gaming.
Such simulations were considered to be
• more objective, in the sense that computer models would support major
decisions based on explicit criteria of national interest, not on compromises
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among institutional forces, and provide open and explicit analysis (including
transparent data and assumptions) available to all parties
• more rigorous, in the sense that computers would provide quantitative answers to support choices among explicit, balanced, feasible alternatives and
allow reproducible runs for comparing alternatives
• more useful, in the sense that computers would allow more systematic analysis to predict the effects of decisions15
Therefore, objectivity, rigor, and usefulness provide the set of scientific standards used in this examination of combat/campaign simulation and war gaming.
Objectivity. “That is objective which insists on its own rights regardless of our
wishes, and only experience can transmit its claims to us. Experience is ultimate
because it confronts us with a continuous ultimatum. For a man to by-pass experience in the pursuit of truth is to make himself God. . . . The subjectivist lives in
a fool’s paradise.”16
Objectivity equates to “the intersubjectivity of findings independent of any
one person’s intuitive judgment.”17 Demanding intersubjectivity requires that
“a scientific observation could have been made by any observer” and “testifies
that the observation is uncontaminated by any factors save those common to all
observers.”18 “For an enterprise to be characterized as scientific it must have as its
purpose the explanation and prediction of phenomena within its subject-matter
domain and it must provide such explanation and prediction in a reasoned, and
therefore intersubjective, fashion. . . . While precise predictions are . . . preferred
to vague ones, a discipline which provides predictions of a less precise character,
but makes them correctly and in a systematic and reasoned way, must be classified as a science.”19
Concepts lead to observations, which then lead to theories and laws. Laws
have counterfactual force, carry explanatory force, and support prediction. They
serve as standpoints from which we can survey for exceptions. They provide the
basis for broader theories that advance the understanding of complicated and
complex phenomena. A definition of an expert is one who knows what context
must hold for a law to apply.20
Basic Newtonian physics involves laws strictly determining the relationships
between actions and their effects. But even physics requires statistical laws to
explain quantum phenomena, thermodynamics, etc., and cannot predict the
behavior of many multibody problems and other chaotic systems. Statistical
laws permit probabilistic explanations for phenomena involving statistical indeterminacy.21 Similarly, systems involving human behavior admit quasi laws or
tendency laws.22 “In order for the [quasi] law to be valid, it is not necessary that
no apparent exceptions occur, it is only necessary that, if an apparent exception
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/11
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should occur, an adequate explanation should be forthcoming.”23 Statements
such as “fear, honor, and self-interest are the fundamental causes of war” qualify
as quasi laws.
Both war gaming and combat/campaign simulations are pseudoexperiments:
experiments carried out on a model instead of in reality.24 The person or team
designing the experiment reduces a substantive problem to a conceptual model
on the basis of the perception of what is relevant to the problem. This conceptual
model is a world, defined as the object or system about which a person is concerned. A state of the world is a description leaving no relevant aspect undefined.
A true state of the world is a state that does in fact obtain, i.e., the true description
of the world.25 The conceptual model is reduced further to physical and semantic
(quantitative and relational) models, each equating to a theory of behavior of
the subject matter, employed in the analysis to determine the true state.26 If the
experiment serves its purpose, this system of models produces an outcome that
can be generalized by induction to advance a substantive conclusion.27
The character of military (and civil) operations involves both “an evolving physical system, and . . . an unfolding set of plans, intentions, reasoning and counterreasoning of the men [and women] engaged in the action, the commanders.”28
War gaming addresses the plans, intentions, reasoning, and counterreasoning of the roles represented in the game. It highlights “predictions regarding the
behavior of human organizations inasmuch as the latter can be simulated most
effectively by having experts play the roles of certain members of such organizations and act out what in their judgment would be the actions, in the situation
simulated, of their real-life counterparts.”29 Outcomes result from the interacting
decisions and actions of the role players, as adjudicated by game umpires and
game-control oversight.
Epistemologically speaking, the use of an expert as an objective indicator . . . amounts
to considering the expert’s predictive pronouncement as an integral, intrinsic part
of the subject matter, and treating his[/her] reliability as part of the theory about the
subject matter.30 Our information about the expert is conjoined to our other knowledge about the field, and we proceed with the application of precisely the same inductive methods which we would apply in cases where no use of expertise is made. Our
“data” are supplemented by the expert’s . . . valuations and by his[/her] judgments of
relevance . . . , and our “theory” is supplemented by the performance of experts.
In this manner the incorporation of expert judgment into the structure of our investigation is made subject to the same safeguards which are used to assure objectivity
in other scientific investigations. The use of expertise is therefore no retreat from
objectivity or reversion to a reliance on subjective taste.31

Computer-based combat/campaign simulations focus on physical aspects
of combat. Human decisions are present and have a substantial impact on the
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output, but are embedded in the simulation construction and the choice of inputs
(data and models) rather than the decisions of combatants. To encompass human
decision in statistical determinateness, one might turn to doctrine or, absent clear
doctrine or future systems, query commanders for their expert opinions regarding decisions they would make given each possible state of the system. To be
practical, this approach requires a world with few states. One also might assume
that each commander is attempting to do maximum harm and seeks a course of
action to minimize the harm to his/her forces, using the minimax convention
of game theory.32 “A more general method of this sort is for each commander to
maximize his[/her] own value function—not necessarily the negative of his[/her]
opponent’s.”33 This approach to combat/campaign simulation assumes that once
the statistics of human decision are incorporated into the model, what remains
is the statistically determinate evolution of the military system. But separating
the human from the physical model often leads to erroneous conclusions. Barry
Watts’s research indicates that, rather than having been let down by their radars
and missiles, 80–90 percent of the pilots shot down in Vietnam and Korea never
saw their attackers until it was too late to react.34
By virtue of the statistical determinateness, the basic process is stochastic.
That is, there is a definite probability—the transition probability—that if the
system is in state x at time t it will be in state xʹ at time tʹ. “Evidently, if the values
of the transition probabilities a(x, t; xʹ, tʹ) were all known, the probabilities of every
outcome of the battle would be known—and this for every assumed starting state”
(italics in original). Thus, the whole problem of the quantitative study of military
operations is that of finding the transition probabilities from knowledge that
can reasonably be obtained. “[A]ll the standard analytical models, Monte Carlo
simulations, etc., fit into this scheme.”35 Clearly, one also must have knowledge of
the transition rates to specify at which time tʹ the new state xʹ obtains.36
In practice, analyzing stochastic processes also employs the Markovian assumption, which holds that, faced with the same state, the transition probabilities
for the system remain constant throughout the process. In the context of human
decision, this means that no learning from previous states, no history, affects the
process.
Of course, when methods of computer simulation are made in the usual way they
depend for their validity on the Markov property, but when this does not apply . . .
the numerical results, however realistic they may appear, are without logical basis—at
least until they are proved to give an acceptable degree of approximation. The act
of simplifying and still retaining the Markovian character—as well as operational
realism—is an art as well as a science. Success is more apt to be achieved by limiting
the objective of the study to the answer of a precise question rather than a diffuse
37
multitude.
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In summary: to assume that such a use of machines gives even approximately
valid information about the military operation is to assume the following:
• The human uncertainties have been removed.
• The combat situation involves a system that is, at any time, in an objectively
describable state (presumes transition probabilities and rates are known).
• The situation’s state transitions are Markovian.
• Its stochastic equations can be satisfactorily approximated by difference
equations without losing their Markovian character.
• The repetition of runs gives, by the law of large numbers, satisfactorily accurate and reliable values of the desired probabilities.38
At this point, the number of states involved in a combat simulation is worth
considering.39 Consider an engagement involving m units on the Blue side and n
units on the Red side.40 Indicate that a Blue unit has engaged a Red unit by drawing a blue line between the two units. Similarly, use a red line for a Red unit engaging a Blue unit. “The resulting colored graph indicates the state of our system.
How many different graphs are possible? Of the mn possible ways of drawing the
blue lines, any one can actually be drawn or not. Hence, there are 2mn possibilities
for the blue lines; and similarly for the red. Consequently, there are 22mn possible
colored graphs.”41 See the accompanying figure for a depiction of the case for a
combined-arms rock-paper-scissors contest in which all “units” could engage
simultaneously or in any order. The number of states of this world for a single
battle is 218. If we consider whether each engagement is successful, we double the
number of states to 236. Each additional consideration enlarges the exponent for
computing the state space.
We can perform a mind experiment to estimate how large the state space
would be for a battle that a “perfect” parallel computer the size of the universe,
given the time of the universe, might compute. In this parallel computer, the
processors are as small as protons, they operate at the speed of light, and they
are packed densely into the volume of our universe. Each processor is assigned a
distinct engagement to calculate, can compute the outcome instantaneously, and
can fetch a new engagement in 10–23 seconds, an approximation of the time it
takes light to go the diameter of a proton. Given 1045 processors per cubic meter,
1081 cubic meters in the universe, 1023 calculations per second, and 10 seconds as
an epoch a bit longer than the age of the universe, this computer could perform
10168 calculations, or about 2558.42 If 4mn = 558 and we examine the same number
of force elements on both sides, this “perfect” computer could calculate the states
for an engagement with just less than twelve force units per side. Note that this
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# of states considering successful and
unsuccessful engagements = 24mn = 236
Source: Koopman, ”A Study of the Logical Basis of Combat Simulation,” pp. 871–72.

formulation of the engagement does not consider the timing of engagements,
which would vastly increase the possible states of the “world.”
Although simulations such as those of one-on-one air or naval combat might
be reduced to a computable number of states, force-on-force combat and campaign simulations quickly exceed the number of states that admit of brute-force
computation. So, how are these simulations implemented? By using a combination of shortcuts (heuristics) and clever analysis. These heuristics are essentially
quasi laws whose application requires the contribution of experts who understand well the scope of those laws’ applicability. Combat/campaign simulations
often use expected-value models to determine what would happen “on average,”
rather than Monte Carlo simulations. Increasing the number of runs does not
increase statistical prediction by the law of large numbers in these simulations,
as the expected value provides a determined outcome for each run. Lanchester
equations—developed to help predict the outcome of naval and land battles—
most often use expected values, but can employ Monte Carlo techniques.43 Varying the exponent used in Lanchester equations between square and linear laws essentially reflects the command and control and operational concept employed in
the engagement. The complexity of ground models results in heuristic techniques
such as weighted effectiveness indices / weighted unit values or qualitative judgment models to calculate engagement outcomes. All these approaches involve
subjective judgments and the insights of the analyst/team developing and using
the model. In a combat/campaign simulation, the analyst/team must use subjective judgments to anticipate every interaction represented in the simulation,
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supplement missing data, and create models that have not been validated in
actual operations or exercises.
The works of Wayne P. Hughes, Glenn A. Kent, Bernard O. Koopman, and
Paul K. Davis, among others, suggest clever approaches to overcoming computational limitations of brute-force calculations and appropriate forms of analysis.44
With the development of complexity sciences, computers came to be used to
simulate cognitive and other processes, rather than to solve equations. As Deep
Blue and AlphaGo have demonstrated, in games of finite size with well-specified
rules, computers can use artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to top human
performance.45 However, current DoD computer-based campaign simulations
use brute-force calculations. They have yet to incorporate agent-based models,
automatons, fitness landscapes, genetic algorithms, or other techniques from
complexity science. RAND incorporated some AI techniques into campaign
simulations in the 1980s, but DoD chose not to employ those features in the
simulations it adopted, instead staying with the types of deterministic and stochastic models Koopman addressed.46
So, how do we assess objectivity, given the logics of combat/computer simulation and war gaming?
Guidelines for the practice of operations research, although written with military modeling in mind, apply equally to war gaming and to combat/campaign
simulation.47 Significant distinctions between good operations research practice
and other scientific inquiry include a presumption of the existence of a client
(sponsor) and the complications presented by security classification and proprietary work. Close cooperation with the client in framing the analysis is good
practice common to any technique of analysis.
In war gaming, a design and development team develops the scenario and
reference materials (e.g., commander’s intent, task organization, subordinates’
missions, orders of battle, unit locations, weather) to establish the world and its
initial state and develop prebriefings to immerse players into the game. The team
identifies the number of competing sides, the scope of disciplines required, the
command echelons represented, the bureaucratic verisimilitude desired, and the
number and expertise of role players needed to accomplish the game objectives.
Team members also design the information conditions: the information available
to each side and its flow, the communications techniques and their verisimilitude
to accustomed formats, the physical arrangements, the move structure, and the
game rate to arrive at a desired culmination point.48 To facilitate decision making,
they construct move forms and provide for feedback among the participants. For
adjudication, they select methods and models (quantitative and qualitative) used
to change the world state resulting from each game move, and the qualifications
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and organization of game controllers and umpires. They also anticipate control
inputs of plausible events (usually wild cards, such as rogue actions or accidents
to initiate conflict) to shape player decisions to achieve game objectives.49
Combat/campaign simulations similarly frame the world for the purpose of
the pseudoexperiment and provide input data to establish its initial state. Whereas war-game design involves detailed considerations of context for role-player
decisions—with particular attention to information conditions (who knows what
and acts when), as discussed above—combat/campaign simulations remove human decision. Information conditions are embedded in the combat models. The
models selected incorporate a theory of command and control and the concept
of operations in their code—consciously or not. The analysts / team members
develop or choose models and techniques they judge appropriate to the study,
on the basis of their expertise. “A fundamental truth in analysis is that scenarios
drive the answers. Thus, much effort should go into conceiving and tuning the
scenarios used and specifying uncertainty ranges. This should be a deeply analytic affair rather than the result merely of creative people spinning stories that
raise interesting issues.”50 Whereas game scenarios are necessarily rich, to provide
the context essential for expert role playing, the world of the combat/campaign
simulation employs sparse scenarios, with only the data needed to perform the
calculations.
In war gaming, a control team and umpires run the simulation. They execute
the game design, adjudicating changes in the “true” state of the world using the
decisions of the role players, their quantitative models, and their judgments,
taking into account the game’s objectives. In computer-based combat/campaign
simulations, the computer computes the state transitions and the analyst decides
what constitutes a stopping point or state for ending the computer run. Both war
gaming and combat/campaign simulation also involve analysts who observe, record, analyze, and report on the pseudoexperiments. Costs and time available to
design, develop, and run the simulation and subsequent analysis constrain both
types of simulation.
Both war games and combat/campaign simulations involve clients, designers,
developers, and analysts employing informal reasoning processes and subjective
judgment in creating their theory of the world under study. The totality of the
participants, models, and data employed in these simulations and the relationships among them represent the theory of the war game or combat/campaign
simulation. In the case of games, this includes the role players, umpires, and
control team, in addition to any quantitative models used in adjudication. In
combat/campaign simulation, it involves the treatment of human decision and
the concepts and information conditions embedded in the models, as well as the
flow of outcomes from one process into the next (e.g., who attacked whom first).
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The motivations, expertise, tastes, beliefs, and reliability of all human participants involved in the pseudoexperiment are thus integral, intrinsic parts of the
subject matter, and therefore parts of the theory expressed in the war game or
combat/campaign simulation.
Given the subjective judgment involved in defining the world and assessing its
true state in both forms of pseudoexperimentation, objectivity comes from intersubjectivity. For combat/campaign models, this involves techniques such as the
use of models that have shown value in actual combat (e.g., those developed using
combat data in war) or that have been verified in field/fleet exercises employing actual forces. A weaker, but essential, form of verification for assessing the
objectivity of scenarios, models, and data is to open them to debate and review—
realizing that “sunlight is the best disinfectant”51—while recognizing the pitfalls
that may result from political logrolling. Interpreting the structure of relationships in and among models and how to sequence these models in pseudoexperiments relies on the subjective judgment of the developers. It also requires developers who know what factors are indeed relevant to the world under study; e.g.,
attacking air forces on the ground can be a way to gain dominance of the air.52
Operational experience is useful in developing the expertise to make such judgments. Gaming has an advantage in this regard: “In operational gaming, the simulated environment is particularly effective in reminding the expert, in his[/her]
role as a player, to take all the factors into account . . . that are potentially relevant; for if he[/she] does not, and chooses a tactic or strategy which overlooks
an essential factor, an astute ‘opponent’ will soon enough teach him[/her] not to
make such an omission again.”53 “People sensitive to a variety of responsibilities
collaborate, applying the criteria that are relevant to their own interests, making
estimates that reflect their own kinds of knowledge, and putting themselves in
a mood to worry about probabilities rather than just a list of possibilities. They
really live through a simulated crisis and not only learn things about their plans
and their predictions but learn something about the nature of crisis.”54
Gaming allows all participants—role players, control team, umpires—the right
of reclama when they need additional information for a decision or question the
adjudication of a move. Manual games are particularly useful in this regard. In
manual games (which may employ computer calculation in adjudication), players
must make decisions from one turn to the next, taking into account the current
situation; and procedures used to evaluate the consequences of the players’ decisions must be quite clear to the players—simple enough for them to understand.55
Gaming achieves objectivity by allowing all experts involved to share both
their formal and informal reasoning explicitly and openly. Deficits in knowledge
and both consensus and dispute are evident, thus providing a foundation for
further inquiry. Critiques provide ways to improve the games continually. By
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contrast, the details of combat/campaign simulations are evident only to the
analyst/team that developed the simulation or to someone willing to conduct a
detailed study of the data and models used in the simulation.
In all science, good practice calls for independent review. However, in this
field the practice is difficult to follow owing to the additional costs and the limitations that security and proprietary concerns impose. Clients often use “need to
know” as an excuse to hold details of the pseudoexperiments close. Often, when a
contractor performs the analysis, the details of the pseudoexperiment are proprietary. The Operations Research Society of America promulgated “Guidelines for
the Practice of Operations Research” as a consequence of a dispute in testimony
to Congress over two studies of ballistic-missile defense that supported conflicting recommendations. The guidelines conclude as follows:
The analyst, as analyst, must restrict his[/her] analysis to the quantifiable and logically structural aspects of the problem only. In complex problems, perhaps the most
valuable thing the analyst can do is to point out to his[/her] client that there are
uncertainties deriving from such factors as:
• Lack of agreement on means of evaluating the worth of complex systems.
• Uncertainty about the technical capabilities and costs of systems yet unbuilt.
• Uncertainty about environmental and operational factors that influence
performance.
• Uncertainty about the future capabilities or intentions of possible opposition.
The analyst should be prepared to engage in dialogue with the client and other advisors to consider how other value systems, assumptions, and conditions might influence conclusions. . . . The analyst’s job, especially in tough policy questions,
is to analyze and help illuminate, and this means having the qualities of humility
and openness necessary to participate in open dialogue with the client and other
advisors.56

Subjective judgment enters once more in deciding what actions to take as a
result of the war game or combat/campaign simulation. Here again, gaming has
an advantage in that those who will decide what actions to take (or those on their
staffs) have participated in the experiment—the decision makers learn directly
from the game experience. In contrast, in the case of a combat/campaign simulation, decisions on actions to take depend on how the analyst/team used subjective
judgment to frame and report the results, adding another layer of interpretation
to the decision process.
A critique of games is that the subjective judgments of the experts involved
make them irreproducible. A question for combat/campaign simulation is
whether, given the same subject matter, independent teams would select the same
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scenarios, models, data, structures, and relationships, among them producing the
same results and the same analysis on the basis of those results. A 1973 General
Accounting Office (GAO) report following promulgation of the Operations Research Society of America’s “Guidelines for the Practice of Operations Research”
found shortfalls in independent checks to ensure the accuracy, timeliness, consistency, and overall quality of the data—about 18 percent of the models were
considered generally transferable for use by another person or another site—and
“[t]he choices of scenarios, equipment performance, and personnel operations
are based somewhat upon unknowns and uncertainties. The extent that the
model reflects the real-world situation depends on the accuracy of the modelbuilders’ judgment.”57
Relying on intersubjectivity generates concerns centering on the role of bias
in forming belief. Critiques of limitations on human judgment and decision are
legion. Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann provide a framework for how people make
decisions (unconflicted adherence, unconflicted change, defensive avoidance,
hypervigilance—as with a crowd heading for the exits in an emergency—and
vigilance).58 Even vigilant decision making may be subject to cognitive, egocentric (self-serving motives), or affiliative (organizational or social acceptability)
constraints.59 Charles Pierce provides a set of methods for fixing belief similar to
those above, including tenacity (such as a child hears from its mother), authority
(the will of an institution), apriority (the adoption of self-evident assumptions
that are clear to the user, but to no one else), and finally the method of science.60
Humans are exceptionally poor at assessing subjective probabilities.61 “When we
pit [political] experts against minimalist performance benchmarks—dilettantes,
dart-throwing chimps, and assorted extrapolation algorithms—we find few signs
that expertise translates into greater ability to make either ‘well-calibrated’ or
‘discriminating’ forecasts.”62 Humans make decisions on the basis of their tastes
(preferences) and beliefs (subjective probabilities).63 They persist in even discredited beliefs. The Central Intelligence Agency provides four reasons for this
persistence: “We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive; mind sets tend to
be quick to form but resistant to change; new information is assimilated to existing images; and initial exposure to blurred or ambiguous stimuli interferes with
accurate perception even after more and better information becomes available.”64
However, “[w]hether a distortion common to all can nevertheless be said to
yield something objective is a philosophical question that has no bearing on the
conduct of the human enterprise of science. The methodological question is
always limited to whether what is reported as an observation can be used in subsequent inquiry even if the particular observer is no longer part of the context.”65
Thus, for objectivity, the analytical team / rapporteurs in war gaming should
note the assumptions and design choices that went into the game, arguments
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both for and against a particular course of action by teams making their decisions, and what outcome the team hoped to achieve, capturing both consensus
and disputes. Objectivity in combat/campaign simulation involves using models
validated by observation of operations or field/fleet exercises, employing data
collected from those exercises. Studies done in advance of actual operations
should be compared with what transpired and why.66 Analysts of both war games
and combat/campaign simulations should keep in mind the motivations and
beliefs of the participants and should extract from the experiment that which
subsequent inquiry could verify or refute.
Rigor. Aristotle said, “A well-schooled man is one who searches for that degree of
precision in each kind of study which the nature of the subject at hand admits.”
Kaplan goes on to note, “Another failing of models—more accurately, of model
builders—consists in an undue emphasis on exactness and rigor.”67 Used in this
way, rigor too often is equated to precise quantification, usually in the form of
increasing the number of significant figures relative to a decimal point. However,
the tests of rigor are whether (1) the analytical techniques used are appropriate to
the subject matter, (2) we can articulate clearly the details of the method used and
how we arrived at conclusions, and ultimately (3) we can state what valid lessons
the study produced. Employing analytical techniques that provide overly exact
answers that do not reflect the uncertainties and indeterminacy inherent in the
subject matter are not rigorous.
Rigor is related closely to objectivity. It demands careful attention to the design of a war game or combat/campaign simulation to achieve the objectivity
described above. It also requires efforts to understand the quality of data used in
quantitative models, estimating the range of uncertainty in quantitative results,
and framing conclusions in quasi law–like statements that reflect the consensus
and disagreement of those involved in the pseudoexperiment. New understandings of chaos and complexity also raise questions regarding the treatment of human action in combat simulations.
A first test of rigor is the data used in quantitative and semantic modeling. The
most reliable data are collected during operations or exercises that are essentially
the same as those represented in the model. Operations research originated during World War II with the collection of data, then the use of those data to develop
models of the operation under study.68 Many of those models and the modeling
techniques have persisted, but sustained efforts to collect data at sea or in the field
are now rare. The 1973 GAO study found that in 85 percent of the cases submitted to the researchers, DoD activities used data obtained from sources other than
field exercises or actual experience.69
Beginning with its World War II experience involving malfunctioning torpedoes, the U.S. submarine force began collecting data on every torpedo fired.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/11

Printer_Winter2017Review.indb 78

84

12/15/16 1:53 PM

War College: Winter 2017 Full Issue

HA N L E Y

79

When tasked with creating an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability in 1949,
Submarine Development Group 2 developed a process of designing exercises to
test technology and tactics, collecting data on system and platform (including
crew) performance during those exercises, using the submarine approach and attack manual to standardize the data, and reconstructing the exercises to quantify
the results.70 Using this process, the submarine force went from having essentially
no ASW capability in 1949 to having the world’s premier ASW capability in 1969.
The process led to continual improvement of the search and combat models used
in war games and combat/campaign simulations. At-sea exercises discovered
and corrected errors in search models implemented on computers.71 The Navy
used a similar approach in its Tactical Development and Evaluation Program and
some equipment-development programs in the 1970s and ’80s.72 However, oddly
enough—given accelerating demands for data—as computer simulation became
more popular in the Pentagon for platform and weapon systems analysis (what
DoD calls program analysis), emphasis on prototyping equipment and collecting data on processes and performance at sea and in the field waned. Structured
operational testing and evaluation for systems in development largely replaced
mission-oriented operations analysis involving all aspects of the system’s use and
its effectiveness as one of a suite of systems.
Recent efforts to return to the roots of operations research have encountered
difficulties. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, initiatives to put analytical teams
into the field were severely limited by commanders’ concerns about protecting
the analysts—and controlling the data. Although we have been fighting in that
region for a decade and a half, data on processes and performance from the field
have not been the source for modeling and experimentation that they were in
World War II.
The majority of friendly-force data used in computer-based combat/campaign
simulation come from structured operational testing and evaluation of system
performance (which may or may not reflect its performance in actual field/
fleet use, with different concepts of employment) or from expectations of future
system performance based on key performance parameters used for design.
However, data from structured tests have not proved reliable. In World War II,
“experimental results overestimated the casualty production rate for tanks by a
factor of two; for artillery duels by a factor of three; and for pure infantry actions
by a factor of seven.” 73 Given the human penchant for survival and the fog and
friction of war, structured tests provide overly optimistic estimates.
Lest you think we are better off now with modern computers and powerful algorithms built into our best models, here is a more recent example. The U.S. Navy
depends mightily for defense of the fleet on the Aegis missile system. Using data from
controlled experiments at sea, one may calculate that if you shoot two missiles at an
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incoming missile and they are operationally and statistically independent of each other, and if you also add some point defense, you can expect to shoot down 90 percent
or more of the attacking anti-ship cruise missiles. What is the combat record? First,
in battles at sea warships of other states have averaged around 75 percent success in
defending themselves. On the other hand, all of their success must be attributed to
soft kill and point defense weapons, not to surface-to-air missiles [SAMs]. Second,
there are several instances of warships that might have defended themselves but did
not, illustrated by the recent successful missile attack on the Israeli missile ship Hanit.
Navy analysts will also remember the Exocet hits on the defendable USS Stark and
HMS Sheffield. Third, in the entire record of over 220 missiles fired on ships at sea
starting in 1967, only one anti-ship missile has been shot down by a SAM.74

Models predicted the United States would incur thirty thousand casualties in
Operation DESERT STORM, not the roughly three hundred that actually occurred;
and half of those casualties did not occur in battle.75 Models for casualty estimates
almost never include friendly fire. Even when friendly-force data are available
in a combat model, factors such as the reliability and effectiveness of allied and
adversary weapons, the proficiency of an adversary in using counterfire or countermeasures that depend on the adversary’s training, etc., must be estimated. Key
data disputes “often center around order of battle, unit effectiveness, munitions
quantities, chemical warfare performance degrade values, advance rates, sortie
rates, and concepts of operation [CONOPS]. More time is spent instantiating and
refining CONOPS information than systems performance data. Hence the obvious utility of wargames to understand CONOPS and the flow of the warfight.”76
In World War II, the operations evaluation groups determined that a simple
estimate of the error in a model is the individual percentage error of the data times
the square root of the number of data elements. For a model with five thousand
data entries and a tight error range of 10 percent, this equates to a factor of seven.77 The 1973 GAO report found that 27 percent of the models they examined
had over ten thousand coded instructions. Campaign models that DoD currently
uses typically have on the order of one hundred thousand data elements and
hundreds of equations and semantic models establishing the relationships among
the data elements. Mistakes in the internal validity of computer models resulting
from treating continuous functions as discrete and stipulating relationships for
which no theory or data exist to allow computation compound the errors in the
final calculation.78 Adding detail to a combat/campaign simulation may or may
not improve the rigor, but it surely will increase the uncertainty of the calculation.
Understanding this principle, the members of the World War II Operations
Evaluation Group used a hemibel (half a decibel, or a factor of about three)
rule. If they could not demonstrate factor-of-three improvements in a recommended change, they were uncertain that they had sufficient accuracy to merit
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the recommendation, particularly considering the time and costs involved in
changing operational practices. At a recent Military Operations Research Society
workshop, a section leader informed me that military operations research no
longer uses the hemibel rule. Why not is unclear.
The use of combat models to adjudicate war games is subject to the same
concerns as is their use in campaign simulations. However, employing models
that participants can question and umpires can explain adds both objectivity and
rigor to the enterprise.
Whereas combat/campaign simulation requires the analyst/team to represent all indeterminacy as statistical, war gaming specifically addresses strategic
and structural indeterminacy. Strategic indeterminacy means that the outcome
largely is determined by the interaction of role-player decisions and the adjudication of control/umpires (who may be considered additional actors). Structural indeterminacy involves uncertainties in appropriately bounding the subject under
study, determining which elements are relevant to include in characterizing the
state of the world, and understanding the relationships among those elements.
Manual games are good for the following:
• study of partially understood dynamic processes
• study of partially understood force interactions
• building of players’ backgrounds for future study and analysis
• continual game improvement on the basis of players’ criticisms79
Where the fundamental character of the subject under study involves strategic
and structural indeterminacy, war-gaming techniques are more appropriate than
combat/campaign simulation. Adding the data and formalities needed for computation detracts from, rather than adds to, rigor.
Usefulness and Value. The final criterion for science under exploration is the
value or usefulness of the study or, in our case, the pseudoexperiment. Usefulness is the ability to use the experiment to take appropriate action. It presumes
objectivity and rigor.
DoD turned to computer-based combat/campaign simulation because it desired methods that could produce rapid, objective, rigorous simulations to examine contingencies involving different adversaries to predict force requirements,
study strategic/operational concepts, and compare costs and effects of alternative
new platforms or weapons systems. DoD found these simulations useful in providing a common basis for making comparisons on a timeline consistent with
annual program and budget development.
However, the “method of Monte Carlo [or any other form of combat/cam
paign simulation] has one particular value: its educative or intuition-building
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effect on those who behold the actual performance of the process. It allows the
results of experimental variations of certain factors of the situation to be perceived in a direct and life-like way. This appearance of realism is so great that
it has often led observers to forget that they were not in fact observing nature
directly: a disastrous error.”80
The predictive value of a large-scale, complicated combat/campaign computer simulation depends on how the analyst/team represents the results. Good,
scientific analysis of computer-based campaign simulation can support quasi
laws such as the identification of governing factors, but not strictly statistical or
deterministic answers. Also, the premise that changing the characteristics of one
system while leaving the rest of the world the same can determine an outcome
assumes no feedback between the change and the rest of the system (e.g., that
a change in combat capability will not influence commanders’ decisions and
CONOPS). However, DoD’s use of computer-based simulation seeks to predict
outcomes rather than to develop deep understanding of the factors governing the
outcomes of battles and campaigns. Rarely do reports address governing factors
or attempt to quantify the uncertainties inherent in the simulation.81
When DoD clients are facing a decision, telling them that their simulation
identified topics that require future study is rarely what they want to hear. However, failure to identify unresolved issues from the pseudoexperiment obfuscates
important uncertainties that should be considered. Science values the so-called
heuristic fertility of studies rich in implications for further observations, experiment, or conceptualization.82
Making predictions from games presents challenges similar to making predictions from combat/campaign simulations, with the added proviso that although
there is widespread skepticism about accepting any prediction of human behavior
—much less quantified predictions—from a game, predictions derived from
computer models are widely accepted. Yet although experts making stand-alone
predictions are unreliable, “[e]xperience has shown that people often tend to
adopt the same solutions to similar problems. Insofar as this is true, a realistic war
game may predict the future, or at least some aspects of it[,] quite accurately.”83
Where games have preceded military battles and campaigns, they have demonstrated value in anticipating adversary tactics and courses of action and the
many governing factors needed to prosecute battles and campaigns successfully.
Examples include the following:
• Naval War College (NWC) games anticipating tactics in the Russo-Japanese
War
• battle of Tannenberg gaming by both the Russian and German general staffs
• German general staff gaming of the Schlieffen Plan before World War I
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• gaming different strategic approaches for a war with Japan at the College
between the world wars
• Japanese gaming of the battle of Midway
• NWC gaming of the naval mining campaign against the Japanese in World
War II
• German and Russian general staffs gaming the German invasion of Russia
(Operation BARBAROSSA) in World War II
• Israelis’ gaming before their operations
• U.S. Joint Staff gaming in anticipation of North Vietnam’s Tet offensive
In almost all these cases, the games accurately predicted factors driving the
success of future operations. However, in many cases the military system was
unable to adapt in a timely fashion or the games had no effect on the political
leadership conducting the war. Sometimes senior military leaders rejected game
results.84
The Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group (CNO SSG) conducted
a game exploring the implications of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in February
1990, before the actual invasion in August. Although the game had Iraqi forces
advancing into Saudi Arabia toward the oil fields, otherwise it accurately anticipated a need for nontraditional coalitions, challenges in strategic lift, and the
inadequate numbers of precision weapons on deployed Navy forces, among other
things.85 Yet many senior officials briefed on the game in March 1990 expressed
no interest, viewing Iran rather than Iraq as the adversary of concern. Requests
for game documents increased as Iraq conducted the invasion.
“Gaming is a powerful method for simultaneously mastering complexity, enhancing communication, stimulating creativity, and contributing to consensus
and a commitment to action.”86 Thomas C. Schelling found the following: “First,
the games are intensely stimulating; people are very active; ideas and conjectures
get tossed around and analysed by a highly motivated group of people; a great
deal of expertise is collected in a single room, expertise that is not often collected together; and people discover facts, ideas, possibilities, capabilities, and
arguments that do not in any way depend on the game but nevertheless emerge
in it.” Players discover important facts that may never have occurred to them or
are counter to what they understood (e.g., unprecedented acts excite attention,
jurisdictional seams, and overlaps), and ways that players not represented in their
usual thinking affect the feasibility and acceptability of possible courses of action.
[T]he game, as a social and intellectual occasion, tends to be highly productive of little
things of this sort. . . .
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Second, people . . . learn more . . . about a country, by going through a game . . .
than by any cram course [of equivalent time]. . . . If somebody were going to be responsible for some operations in the Pacific Islands, or were going to be Deputy Chief
of Mission in Finland, or going to run an [Agency for International Development]
program in Cyprus, just putting him[/her] into a game for three days focused on the
area he[/she] is going to would teach him[/her] more than he[/she] could get by any
kind of briefings, lectures, reading program, or other program of self-improvement.

Third, acquaintance is made with people with whom one might have occasion to
work in the future involving intense common experience in joint problem solving. These by-products are just preliminary to costs. People can spend the other
362 days of the year pursuing other forms of analysis and learning. “All analytical
techniques, all research methods, all stimulants to the imagination are dangerous. This includes games. But games are not much worse in this regard than the
other techniques.”87
A critique of current professional military education is that it does not give
officers a detailed appreciation of military geography in theaters of interest or of
adversaries’ weapons systems and their concepts for using them. Theater-level
games are valuable for learning geography, including the military geography of
basing; the kinds and ranges of adversary and allied forces that may come into
play and the complications they represent; and the logic of adversary concepts,
as represented by Red teams. At the tactical level, war games are good for teaching junior officers the capabilities of adversary forces in an experiential way that
tends to stick better than reading intelligence reports.88 As the Prussian and German militaries recognized, games are exceptionally useful for developing an appreciation of command relationships and skills in writing orders and in working
through control of forces in complicated situations.
Between the world wars, the German army (Wehrmacht) conducted field
exercises during the summer and gamed when in garrison the rest of the year.
During winter, each echelon, from the general staff to the company level, gamed
their roles in the operations contemplated, then took what they gamed to the field
the next year, beginning with company-level exercises and culminating, usually
in August, in as large-scale an exercise as they could manage. With the army restricted in size by treaty, the games aimed to teach each rank, career enlisted and
officer, how to perform at two ranks senior so the army could expand quickly.
During war, these games became rehearsals for upcoming operations and occasionally continued as battles were being fought. The games were of great value to
the Wehrmacht for developing concepts such as the blitzkrieg, and for developing
its operational competence when it had sufficient forces to retain the initiative.89
The interaction of experts trying to achieve opposing aims within the context
provided in the scenario helps ensure that relevant factors are not overlooked.
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Games provide a basis of shared experience and a common vocabulary.90 Whereas creativity of the analyst in combat/campaign simulation is reflected in the
coding and analysis, the Markov assumption does not allow for learning during
the game. Including learning algorithms (e.g., Bayesian calculations) in the code
further complicates analysis of the results. In war games, the role players adapt to
each state of the world, as provided by game umpires and control. Courses of action that do not provide desired results lead to reexamining possible approaches
and objectives. New ideas that do work become apparent to all participants, contributing to the consensus needed to generate commitment to a course of action.
Concerns over the appearance of realism in gaming represent the same risks and
unintended consequences as those resulting from combat/campaign modeling.91
The scope of issues amenable to war gaming exceeds that of combat/campaign
simulation. Manual war gaming is uniquely suited to increasing our understanding of and appreciation for the information dimension of warfare.92 Ultimately,
military operations are about influence: deterring or compelling change in others’
actions inconsistent with one’s political aims, while reassuring and encouraging
others’ actions that are consistent with one’s political aims. The critical feature
of a game, as opposed to computer modeling or any other forms of one-sided
analysis,
is that at least two separate decision centers are involved, neither of which is privy to
the other’s planning and arguing, neither of which has complete access to the other’s
intelligence or background information, neither of which has any direct way of knowing everything that the other is deciding on. . . . What this mode of organization can
do that can not otherwise be done is to generate the phenomena of understanding
and misunderstanding, perception and misperception, bargaining, demonstrations,
dares and challenger’s [sic], accommodation, coercion and intimidation, conveyance
of intent, and uncertainty about what each other has already done or decided on. . . .
. . . If I draw a face with a hidden picture there is no way for me to tell how hard it is
to see the face except to show the picture to somebody. . . .
It is the peculiar element of collaboration, communication, and bargaining, that is
involved in any crisis game, that cannot be captured by “straightforward” unilateral
analysis. . . .
. . . [I]n arguments about the treasures or dangers that one may stumble on in games
it is significant that there is at least something that games can do or generate that cannot be done or generated in any other way.93

Another value is that those who participate in a pseudoexperiment learn far
more than those who receive a report of the study’s findings. Few clients have the
time or technical ability to understand the internal details of the combat/campaign simulation; they instead rely on their analytical teams to distill key findings
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relevant to the objectives of the study. In contrast, war gaming facilitates participation by those who must make and implement decisions. Joint planning dictates
that, ideally, “the individuals who were deeply involved in the development of the
COAs [courses of action]” should participate in the gaming used to develop those
COAs.94 War gaming facilitates recognition-primed decision making that allows
commanders and their staffs to adapt rapidly to emerging situations, using their
experiences in games “demanding careful sequential analysis of plans, decisions,
events, and intelligence.”95
IMPLICATIONS FOR DOD ANALYSIS AND A WAY AHEAD
The principal implication of this assessment is that DoD should overhaul its
analytical paradigm that began with the Systems Analysis Office and evolved
with the development of computers. DoD should rely on talented analysts and
not again make the mistake of attempting to create universal answer machines
through standardized processes and techniques. The focus of analysis for acquisition and force development should shift from individual weapons systems to capabilities to conduct sets of missions. DoD should reinvigorate the examination
of warfare and military operations to develop an appreciation of fundamental
questions to focus analysis, balancing a marketplace of ideas and approaches with
the instincts of its hierarchy to centralize planning. It then should employ analysis campaigns, using cycles of research focused on top decision makers’ concerns,
that incorporate the following:
• war gaming
• DoD’s investment in large-scale campaign models, to develop intuition and
help identify factors governing combat outcomes
• field/fleet operations analysis
• intelligence collection
• campaign analysis
• quantitative modeling using simple, understandable models that incorporate
only governing factors derived from observation and analysis (as opposed to
creating computer code for each combat process and adding more code to
already complicated models to address new technologies and phenomena)
• the study of history and recent advances in complexity sciences, and complementary analytical techniques based on advances in artificial intelligence
and cognitive and social sciences
• review of study results against actual operations
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No new analysis paradigm can meet scientific standards without addressing
the roadblocks created by the abuse of need-to-know strictures and proprietary
control of analyses.
Avoiding Past Mistakes
With the recent policy to make more use of war gaming, the first principle for
a way forward should be to avoid mistakes of the past. Efforts to use large-scale
computer modeling to create universal answer machines were misguided. In its
search for systematic analysis routines, the natural tendency of the Pentagon will
be to create similar standardized systems of war gaming that would allow those
developing procurement programs and strategists to “turn the crank” to address
issues as they arise. However, even the most objective and rigorous efforts in the
past have not produced the desired results, as the following examples indicate.
RAND Strategy Assessment System. In the 1980s, concerns over the ability to
analyze a possible war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact leading to a nuclear
exchange motivated the OSD Office of Net Assessment to sponsor RAND in developing the RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS). The approach was to
combine the best features of war gaming and analytical modeling in a comprehensive, farsighted framework for comparing views rigorously and moving toward
some conclusions. RAND formed a stellar team to do the work, led by Paul Davis.
To this effort, war gaming provided the following:
• the contextual richness of complete scenarios
• interaction of political and military factors
• operational constraints
• often-ignored features of real war (e.g., unconventional attacks against
command-and-control communications)
• asymmetries in objectives and perceptions
• asymmetries in national forces, doctrines, and styles
• relatively realistic descriptions of military campaigns
• action and reaction among the nations involved in the conflict
Analytical modeling provided the following:
• clarity of assumptions and causality
• reproducibility
• logical structure and rigor
• efficiency, permitting many war games (multiscenario analysis)
• depersonalization, by laying issues out on paper logically96
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To make gaming more efficient and rigorous, the RSAS approach used AI
techniques to replace human teams. To make the process transparent, the design permitted human interaction at all levels, with the exception of some core
model and execution coding. The intent was not to eliminate the role of expert
judgment but “to capture most of the human-expert contribution in background
research reflected in the models.”97 Computer code was written so that analysts
knowledgeable in the subject matter did not need to have extensive experience
to read and program decision rules.98 The team intended that analysts and senior
decision makers would be able to get definitive explanations and have the opportunity to change assumptions readily.
Departures from traditional analysis included automated game-based simulation to permit multiscenario analysis, heuristic rule-based modeling to make
explicit the key assumptions on which outcomes depend, structured military
campaign analysis, and interactive force-operations modeling. This would enable
the analysis to treat interrelationships among strategic and nonstrategic forces;
cut across theater boundaries, military services, and types of warfare; and reflect
the effects of special phenomena such as unconventional warfare and failures in
command and control.99 The aim was not to predict outcomes but to understand
what affected outcomes most.
In 1986, government agencies received the first installations of RSAS. An
RSAS Steering Group, consisting of sponsors, developers, and users, approved
requests to use the system. Although the RAND team intended that actual decision makers use the system for policy analysis, it proved too complicated to be
of use in evaluating immediate operational situations, and high-level decision
makers turned to their own analysts. RSAS was open to review, critique, and
improvement. The challenge was that it was akin to an engineering library. One
could investigate any subject, but only the developers could comprehend the
whole system.100
As a spin-off from RSAS, RAND developed the Joint Integrated Contingency
Model (JICM). It designed the model to be modular for transparency and to
avoid needing to add hundreds of thousands of input variables. “As the model
[JICM] was used in later years, however, the optional simplicity fell into disuse as
users focused on getting the detailed databases ‘right’ (meaning agreed upon) for
running standardized cases.”101
Although RSAS and JICM were as objective, rigorous, and comprehensive as
was practical, the limited interests and capacity of the DoD bureaucracy defeated
RAND’s sophisticated efforts to meet exacting standards of science.
Joint Warfare System. In a subsequent effort to allay concerns over the services
using their own scenarios, models, and data, in the 1990s OSD began funding
the Joint Warfare System (JWARS) to “support multi-billion dollar resource
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allocation decisions and critical operational planning.” JWARS was “a closedform analytic simulation” using deterministic and stochastic models, including
information operations, and “high-level abstractions of sensor and communications systems, the related information flows, imperfect perception of the battlespace, and command decision making.”102 The aim, as with individual service
campaign simulations, has been to create a simulation to determine the effects of
varying the characteristics of a system or concept by turning a crank, leaving the
rest of the simulation unperturbed.
Given the expansiveness of the state space, the use of models and data based
on judgment rather than observations from operations or exercises, and the likely
feedback among systems characteristics and concepts, this approach involves
large uncertainties that are difficult to quantify. As Koopman stated, “Rightly
employed, it [combat simulation] gives a useful indicator in evaluations; it can
never be relied on to predict the future.”103 JWARS was expensive, yet could not
accomplish the vision of those who conceived and advocated for it.
Analytic Agenda / Support to Strategic Analysis. Given the expense and challenges of JWARS, in 2002 Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld created an
Analytic Agenda (now called Support to Strategic Analysis—SSA) to transform
DoD’s analysis system supporting strategic and programmatic decision making.
The Analytic Agenda was a set of activities designed to do the following:
• Articulate, through scenarios, the secretary’s guidance to the department
about the missions, environments, and threats for which the future force
should be prepared.
• Apply joint concepts to future missions depicted in planning scenarios.
• Produce standardized, accessible, transparent data and common assumptions for department-wide use in analysis.
• Design and conduct major joint analyses to support decisions on force structure, investments, and capability trade-offs.104
This effort did result in scenarios for analysis approved by DoD leadership,
and it created conferences at which the services met to agree on common datasets
they would use in their analyses. Each service was assured of having one of its
preferred scenarios included. The services also used their preferred “all-purpose”
campaign simulations for their capability-development processes, incorporating
data beyond that in the common datasets as needed. However, few of these data
came from detailed analyses of operations and exercises. These efforts have had
little impact on cross-service force structure investments or capability trade-offs.
The details of studies done using these simulations are classified and proprietary, limiting opportunities for review of their objectivity and rigor. OSD, the
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Joint Staff, and the services should take care not to create a similar, highly structured set of expensive, complex, proprietary war games.
No defense problem is specified well enough that an optimum can be calculated
without employing subjective judgment to establish values. The large campaign
simulations used for SSA result in large sets of feasible courses of action. Expecting large combat/campaign simulations or war games to resolve conflicting preferences among institutional forces within the military-industrial-congressional
enterprise that drive the defense program and budget is illogical.105 Improvements to JWARS or the SSA are incapable of providing the precise predictions for
resolving complicated and complex defense issues that those who misunderstand
scientific rigor expect. “As one goes up the scale of complexity, the personal qualities of the analyst shift from scientific to artistic and his[/her] model from precise
to abstract. That is why asking me which model to buy is asking the wrong question. Instead, ask me which analysts and modelers to hire.”106
Capabilities-Based Planning
DoD’s acquisition system, which consumes the vast majority of the Pentagon’s
attention and analytical effort, focuses on major defense acquisition programs—
platforms and systems that involve the commitment of billions of dollars.107 Under Secretary Rumsfeld, DoD attempted to introduce capabilities-based planning
as a means of putting the development of individual weapons systems in context.
Capabilities-based planning has received rough treatment in recent reviews for
being tied to the revolution in military affairs and force transformation, focusing on concepts such as net-centric warfare rather than on strategy to defeat the
strategies and forces of identified potential adversaries. These critiques largely
miss the mark.108
The usual driver for acquisition is that an aircraft, vehicle, or vessel is reaching
the point where it is expensive to maintain or upgrade with new technology, and
a military service proposes to replace that platform with a new one incorporating the latest generation of technology. A 1992 study of the cost growth of DoD
Major Force Program categories since Secretary McNamara instituted them in
1962 demonstrated that DoD needs 7 percent growth in its budget to maintain
its force structure if it continues attempting to replace each platform with the
latest generation on a one-for-one basis.109 Using the rule of 72, this means that
a 4 percent growth in defense budgets results in halving the force roughly each
quarter of a century.110
Following the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD made an effort to institute “strategic and tactical” acquisition reform.111 A major part of the reform
involved pilot Evaluation of Alternatives on topics such as integrated air and missile defense as a basis for resource allocation, rather than conducting an Analysis
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of Alternatives for each major defense acquisition program. The effort demonstrated promise, but failed when key leaders departed. Also, weapons program
managers wanted to know what the study would show before providing their data
for analysis, despite direction from higher authorities.
If DoD is to overcome its accelerating mismatch between limited budgets and
growing challenges, it requires a new analysis paradigm and a culture focused
more on national security than on protecting parochial service and program
priorities by withholding knowledge and data.
Asking Essential Questions and Selecting Appropriate Methods
Adoption of a new analysis paradigm will involve some time before the paradigm
becomes institutional practice within DoD, and will incur transition costs. DoD
should ensure that initial efforts focus on substantive issues. In the 1950s and
’60s, federally funded research centers led the way in understanding the implications of nuclear weapons for warfare and deterrence. RAND employed Bernard
Brodie, Herman Kahn, Thomas C. Schelling, Albert J. Wohlstetter, and Roberta
M. Wohlstetter, among many other highly talented intellects, to explore fundamental questions of war in the nuclear age, strategy and games, and many other
topics. Now, federally funded research and analysis centers have become principally an extension of Pentagon staff studies. Funding for independent research
on fundamental questions has been eliminated in favor of studying the issue du
jour, which eliminates many fundamental distinctions between federally funded
research centers and for-profit defense contractors. In addition to making better
use of its Office of Net Assessment, which under the leadership of the recently
retired Andrew W. Marshall (who came to OSD from RAND in the 1970s) had a
long history of searching for the right questions, DoD should return to the former model and mission for federally funded research centers, having them help
DoD’s leadership understand the questions they should be asking and the issues
they should analyze.
DoD should realize that the principal value of good analysis is in eliminating infeasible or unsuitable courses of action, and that no analyses can provide
point solutions to complicated problems. Prevailing concepts and political power
among those involved will determine the final trade-offs in defense policy and
plans within the space of feasible and suitable solutions. Centralized processes
that give too much power to one institution, such as OSD or the Joint Staff, are
likely to generate more mistakes than a messier analytical competition among
concepts, methods, and proposed solutions. The Secretaries of Defense must
earn their pay.
That said, different subjects call for different analytical approaches. In turning to war gaming, DoD should avoid the law of the instrument.112 To improve
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rigor, the Military Operations Research Society should assist DoD in developing
guidelines for analysts to align analytical techniques with the fundamental characteristics of subjects under study.
The most appropriate action from pseudoexperimentation, whether war gaming
or combat/computer simulation, is exploring the validity of the findings using
other techniques. Analysis campaigns involve using a variety of techniques to
address important issues. Cycles of research emphasize the interaction among
these techniques as progress in one investigation informs others and is in turn
informed by them.
Learning from RSAS and decades of experience in defense analysis, Davis
recommends analysis campaigns. “The analysis campaign should provide for
breadth with a mix of models, human gaming, historical analysis, trend analysis,
and collaboration with experienced operators,” and should consider multiple
objectives. The approach is to conduct first-cut analyses to narrow the world
under consideration, then to conduct detailed analyses. “Campaign models, for
example—when used with large negotiated databases for only some standard
case—are poor decision aids but are excellent for integration, for understanding
the many facets of a successful large operation, and for building analyst expertise
that is valuable in answering specific questions quickly, often with simpler models.”113 As an example of first-cut analysis considering multiple objectives, Hughes
recommends examining alternative futures.
For example, in determining the best naval forces to influence China and our Asian
allies, it is essential to remember that the same American ships and aircraft, many
of which are built for 30 and even 40 years of combat life, must serve our interests
whether the China-American international relationship at any given moment is
one of cooperation, competition, crisis containment, or conflict at different levels
of intensity. By testing our fleet’s utility in each circumstance we can judge how and
where risks are involved with different fleet compositions and deployment patterns.
The OSD Office of Net Assessment found that looking at alternative futures by region
or economic circumstance was powerful. One did not make predictions about which
future was most likely to come to pass. Instead [one] looked for common forces, solutions, deployments and negotiating positions that were suited for every future.114

Scenario planning has proved an effective technique for resolving structural
indeterminacy.115 Davis provides a comprehensive matrix of instruments (techniques) assessed by important attributes to be considered in an analysis campaign.116 The discussion below represents the author’s appreciation of techniques
essential to cycles of research.
War Gaming and Combat/Campaign Simulation. War gaming and combat/
campaign simulation are complementary to each other. Both provide insight to
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participants on factors governing the contingency under study and issues and
data needing further study. War games are particularly valuable for helping
those employing DoD’s large, computer-based campaign models to understand
CONOPS and the flow of campaigns.117
Fleet/Field Operations Analysis. Games and combat simulation should tie directly to field/fleet exercises experimenting with new concepts, using prototype systems designed to address capability enhancements, and carefully collecting data
to inform important areas of ignorance and assumptions used in plans, games,
and campaign simulation.
The approach and attack manual served as a basis for data collection to
advance U.S. submarine force capabilities rapidly, as did the coordination-indirect-support (CIDS) fleet exercise guide for operational data on fleet communications. The analysis based on these data demonstrated that a CIDS concept
for using submarines as an outer screen for aircraft carriers was infeasible. The
fleet communications data, collected in ten fleet exercises over a two-year period
in the late 1970s, provided the basis for the Warfare Environment Simulator, a
simulation sponsored by Naval Electronics System Command (now the Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Command) focused on command and control. Unfortunately, the Warfare Environment Simulator morphed into the Naval Warfare
Simulation System, losing its focus on using fleet data and on command and
control, instead becoming a large-scale campaign simulation.118
NWC war games served as the basis for developing new operational concepts
to be explored at sea, both before World War II and during the 1980s and ’90s.
Fleet exercises in the 1920s and ’30s turned concepts for amphibious and carrier
air warfare and underway replenishment of naval task forces into key capabilities
for the World War II effort. Fleet exercises in the 1980s translated operational
concepts developed by the CNO SSGs (at the College) into capabilities to execute
the 1980s Maritime Strategy.119 Similarly, in the 1990s, the Navy Warfare Development Command (then collocated at the College) pursued fleet experimentation through a program called Sea Trial. However, the Navy did not sustain that
effort. A debate exists over whether dedicated units are required to conduct such
experimentation. The submarine force since 1949, the Navy Tactical Development and Evaluation Program in the 1970s, and U.S. Pacific Command around
2000 have made experimentation a matter of routine during fleet and joint exercises. Data collected from routine rather than structured exercises better represents what would occur in unstructured combat and operations.
As part of war-gaming initiatives, OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services should
reinvigorate field/fleet experimentation and embed operations analysts in deployed battalions and carrier strike groups and on higher-echelon staffs to collect
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data on operations and exercises. For large programs and issues, exercise and
operations analysis guides using conceptual processes would provide consistent
datasets for analysis and use in pseudoexperimentation. Those educated in engineering and the hard sciences are likely to perform in the field as well as or better
than those educated in operations research curricula emphasizing mathematical
programming (optimization) and stochastic processes.120
Cyber warfare should receive particular attention, given current challenges in
creating operational models. Beyond Red teams, white hats should experiment
in the field with what it would take to turn unmanned systems into kamikazes attacking their host forces, for example, before making large investment decisions.
Intelligence Collection. War games also should be tied to intelligence collection
and analysis. While military intelligence naturally tends to focus on possible adversary technical capabilities (e.g., range and accuracy of weapons), war games
require Red teams that understand adversary planning, training, ethos, and operational concepts. Similarly, war games also suggest adversary courses of action that would create difficulty for the Blue team. Therefore, war-game findings
should play into intelligence requirements to determine whether adversaries have
identified and are preparing to execute such courses of action.
Campaign Analysis. Rather than using war games or large campaign models that
require significant amounts of time to set up, rapid, focused analyses on the eve
of war have demonstrated value in anticipating important outcomes. Shortly before each war began, Captain/Professor Wayne Hughes gave Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS) students seventy-two hours to analyze the Falklands War between
the United Kingdom and Argentina, the wars in Afghanistan, and the wars in
Iraq. These analyses all provided results that would have been valuable to the
commanders involved.121 The key is selecting appropriate measures for quantification. Selecting appropriate analytical measures begins with developing an appreciation for the principal factors governing outcomes, and often is not done
well.122
What useful results reasonably can be expected from war gaming and rapid
campaign analysis, since accurate results cannot be expected? At NPS, Hughes
teaches the students in his joint campaign analysis course that these war-gaming
and campaign analyses provide the following:
• patterns of activity, both tactical and operational; the reward of new tactics
to accompany new technology
• a focusing by decision makers and their staffs on the important things—
those most likely to influence the outcome and achieve “victory,” or whatever
the intended outcome is
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• synthesized information about almost anything: the traffic, the places of
concealment, the beaches, the mountain passes to block, the critical roads, or
the vital bridges to protect or destroy; and, perhaps most important because
it is calculable, the time to arrive on scene and the logistical support necessary to sustain operations
• advice to the decision maker that is quantitative, objective, informed,
specific—and incomplete
• unexpected side benefits; for example, in designing a warship one might discover that it is not a good idea to put too many eggs in one basket if the ship
can be lost while performing a dangerous task123
Observe that predicting outcomes, or even winners by some criterion, does
not appear on the list. Hughes is a great proponent of campaign analysis and its
value—if one does not claim too much predictive power from it. Decisions have
to be made amid uncertainty, and informed decisions are better than those based
on individual experience and personal predilections alone.124
Simple versus Large Combat Models. Good analysis derives from understanding
those few essential features of the subject under study that govern an outcome.125
Although using models to understand essential features is valuable, attempting
to predict outcomes by adding ever more detail without considering the implications for additional uncertainty is antithetical to analysis. Campaign analyses
and manual war games employing simple, focused combat models and rules that
are understood and subject to question by all participants can expose the factors
that govern success—i.e., those on which commanders and capability developers
should focus.
Barring a more exact method for quantifying the uncertainty of a combat
simulation, the analyst should estimate the typical error involved in the variables
used in the models, multiply that times the square root of the number of variables, and present and report the result as the range of uncertainty in the quantitative findings. Although simulations are of great value in providing insights to
analysts, analysts should be appropriately humble in recommending program or
policy changes solely on the basis of the outcomes of their models.
Complexity Sciences. Advances in complexity sciences raise questions regarding
current combat models and present new opportunities for defense analyses. The
combat models used in war gaming and campaign simulations were developed
before more recent improvements in understanding chaos and complexity. Chaos
involves sensitivity to initial conditions on a space of measure zero. In a space of
measure zero, no matter how precise an interval, area, or n-dimensional volume
around an initial state, there exist points that will result in far different future
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states of the system. A pendulum hung amid three magnets—such as Clausewitz described in explaining the pulls of government (reason), the population
(primordial violence), and the military (chance) in war—is such a chaotic system. Classical physics and statistics, as discussed above, presume that describing the initial state allows prediction of future states, at least with probabilities.
The foundations for statistics on spaces of measure zero are not well understood.
Mathematics based on continuity does not apply in chaotic and in many complex
systems.
Complexity involves power laws. Power laws have a mean, but unlike Poisson
or Gaussian distributions, their standard distribution is infinity.126 The law of
large numbers does not apply to power laws. Power laws apply to phenomena
such as earthquakes—and to much of human behavior that involves bursts of
activity.127 Historically, a small number of pilots and submarine commanders account for the most kills. Is this a power law? If so, how do combat models account
for the distribution of talent among pilots and commanders? More broadly, how
many events treated statistically in combat/campaign simulation involve chaotic
and complex phenomena that make Monte Carlo processes and Markov assumptions inappropriate?
Warfare is renowned for extended periods of boredom followed by bursts of
intense activity during battle. The outcome of battles is determined by tens to
107 motivated agents performing individual functions that are more difficult to
represent than molecules in a liquid or gas. Agent-based models involve agents
executing rules based on the local information they have. These models are
known for demonstrating emergent behavior, such as the collapse of a line of
troops when adjacent soldiers retreat.128
Fundamental features of warfare suggest chaos and complexity sciences
may be more fruitful for understanding underlying phenomena than current
models.129
History, Cognitive and Social Sciences, and Artificial Intelligence. The cycle of
research for war gaming and combat/campaign simulation also extends to studying history and developments in social science, including experimental gaming
on human behavior (such as in behavioral economics) and cognitive science
studying developments in understanding the brain, etc., to explore human reasoning and dynamics.
AI has had recent success in defeating human champions in games such as
chess and Go, and increasingly is embedded in computers and weapons. Having
people who understand AI on a team conducting analysis campaigns will add
considerable value to the effort.
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Reviewing Previous Results. A final area of emphasis in a cycle of research is
reviewing previous results.
Clearly war gaming and campaign simulations are a blend of an objective, scientific
approach and the artistry of human designers and participants. What can be done to
evaluate how well individual studies, or a series of mutually reinforcing games, simulations, results, and conclusions have aided decision makers? One thing that is rarely
done is to review “old” studies and evaluate their strengths and weaknesses after the
projected future scenario year has passed. It is too much to ask, perhaps, for an evaluation of the study results and conclusion and it is exceedingly difficult to evaluate any
study’s impact on decisions it was to have enlightened.130

An objective examination of the scenario, the Red and Blue forces available,
and the Red and Blue force combat capabilities after the fact can consider how
well the study anticipated reality.131 Independent review of key features of the
analysis will contribute to objectivity and rigor and help to identify analytical
techniques appropriate to the subject matter.
The extent to which pseudoexperiments, whether war games or combat/
campaign simulations, are scientific depends wholly on the character of their
execution. “Electronic computers, game-theoretic models, and statistical formulas are but instruments after all; it is not they that produce scientific results
but the investigator who uses them.”132 Neither type of simulation is inherently
more scientific than the other. The principal difference is that combat/campaign
simulation is analytical—reducing the problem to constituent pieces—while war
gaming emphasizes synthesis—ensuring all relevant factors are considered, including how they work together.
War gaming and large-scale computer-based combat/campaign simulation
differ little in their inability to predict quantitative outcomes. The scientific value
of the pseudoexperiment lies in the objectivity, rigor, and usefulness of the theory
the pseudoexperiment represents. This includes the motivations, tastes and beliefs, and expertise of all the participants, including the client.
War gaming has a record of anticipating factors that largely govern outcomes,
thus preventing surprise. Because DoD has used combat/campaign simulation
for quantitative prediction, its performance at comparing quantitative results of
combat models with actual combat has been less accurate and less reliable than
that of war gaming that explored the processes and nonquantitative features that
would affect a campaign most. Whereas those commanding and conducting operations rarely have the motivation and skills to become deeply involved in combat/campaign modeling, they can make the time and do have the skills to participate in war gaming. Repeated war gaming can provide firsthand experiences

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

Printer_Winter2017Review.indb 97

103

12/15/16 1:53 PM

98

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 1, Art. 11

to limit surprise and facilitate recognitive decision making that allows rapid
adaptation to emerging situations.
Using governing factors uncovered through war gaming, detailed computer
models, campaign analyses, or other techniques to create simple models of the
phenomena requires much more analytical skill than adding detailed models
of additional processes to existing computer models. Simpler models provide
greater understanding with appropriate precision than complicated computer
models with large numbers of variables that give an appearance of precision but
whose range of uncertainty is difficult to estimate and grows with the uncertainty
of each parameter added and the square root of the number of variables.
Returning to the roots of operations research—observing, modeling operations, and collecting data in the field—is an essential aspect of a cycle of research.
Work in the field yields data and knowledge that increase understanding of which
concepts actually work and which do not, and provides essential data for use in
computer and war-gaming simulation.
Although the discussion of questions and possibilities raised by developments
in complexity sciences is incomplete, it suggests a need to reexamine combat
models and to extend analytical techniques to add the rigor of appropriate techniques to combat simulation.
The Pentagon needs to overhaul its analysis paradigm if it is to meet growing
security challenges with limited budgets. Overhauling the Pentagon’s analysis
paradigm again will require interdisciplinary teams of scientists—from both hard
and social sciences, and with an appreciation for the humanities—interacting in
analysis campaigns and cycles of research. Client and contractor use and abuse
of need-to-know security barriers and proprietary restrictions on studies present
formidable obstacles to implementing scientific standards in DoD studies.
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A HIMAL AYAN CHALLENGE
India’s Conventional Deterrent and the Role of Special Operations
Forces along the Sino-Indian Border
Iskander Rehman

E

ver since 1962, when soldiers from the People’s Republic of China inflicted
a humiliating defeat on Indian forces, India and China have maintained an
uneasy coexistence along the world’s longest disputed frontier.1 While certain aspects of the Sino-Indian security dynamic have improved markedly, others have
given rise to growing unease. On the positive side of the ledger, the two nations
have succeeded in avoiding a direct, armed conflict since a bloody skirmish in
1967, and have developed a number of confidence-building measures to prevent
isolated incidents from spiraling out of control. Similarly, neither country any
longer actively sponsors proxies or foments insurgencies on the other’s soil. Analysts also have pointed to the relative stability of the Sino-Indian nuclear dyad,
which does not appear to present the same escalatory risks as the India-Pakistan
strategic relationship.2
Other issues and developments, however, are cause for concern. While the
Sino-Indian relationship may have become less overtly conflictual, the military
rivalry between the two rising Asian powers has taken on different aspects and
has spread to new theaters. In addition to their long-standing border dispute,
there is now a maritime component to the Sino-Indian rivalry.3 Meanwhile,
enduring sources of tension—such as China’s
Iskander Rehman is a senior fellow at the Pell Cenmilitary support of Pakistan and India’s harboring
ter for International Relations and Public Policy at
of the Tibetan government in exile—continue to
Salve Regina University in Newport, Rhode Island.
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the Line of Actual Control (LAC)—let alone resolve the issue. Finally, certain
ongoing trends in Chinese strategic behavior—whether in China’s near seas or
along the Sino-Indian border—have generated grave concern in New Delhi,
whose vocal strategic community regularly points to a perceived recrudescence
in Chinese border incursions.
Following one particularly tense standoff in 2013, the Indian government
confirmed the creation of a long-discussed new Mountain Strike Corps, with the
professed goal of reinforcing India’s conventional deterrent along the Sino-Indian
border. This massive accretion in manpower was presented as part of a larger,
more-sustained Indian effort to address a perceived growing military imbalance
with China. A core component of this effort has been to reinforce India’s basing
and transport infrastructure in a singularly austere operating environment. These
developments have been commented on widely, both in India and abroad. Yet
there has been a surprising lack of granular analysis of the Sino-Indian military
dynamic, whether in terms of the two states’ respective orders of battle, competitive advantages and disadvantages, or theater strategies.
Drawing on field trips to the Himalayan border states of Sikkim, Himachal
Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir as well as close to thirty interviews with intelligence officials and Indian Army (IA) and special forces officers, both serving and
retired, this article aims to give a clearer picture of the security situation along
the Sino-Indian border. In particular, it questions whether the Indian military’s
current operational concepts are sufficiently tailored to the nature of the terrain
and the evolving Chinese challenge. It suggests a more proactive approach to territorial defense, one that places a greater emphasis on the integration of forwarddeployed, highly mobile teams of Indian special operations forces (SOFs) coupled
with advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precisionstrike capabilities, and complemented by an extensive network of tribal scouts
and militias.
To develop this argument, this article proceeds in three substantive parts. The
first briefly summarizes the current military “state of play” along the border, outlining both countries’ respective orders of battle, modernization plans, and operational concepts. It argues that, while possibilities for greater escalation always
exist, in the near- to medium-term future any Sino-Indian territorial conflict is
likely to be relatively limited in scope and short in duration, rather than a protracted, large-scale, force-on-force campaign.4 Such a conflict also would differ
in a number of key characteristics from the war of 1962, most notably in that it
would take place under a nuclear shadow and with the likely involvement of air,
space, and cyber assets.
The second section conducts a survey of the literature on special operations
and mountain warfare, and reflects on the role that Indian SOFs could play in
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the event of a limited Sino-Indian border war. Their potential function as a force
multiplier is examined along three axes, or spectra, of conflict: their ability to
counter acts of creeping coercion, or “gray-zone aggression”; their aptitude to
perform vital enabling functions in mutually denied or deeply contested areas;
and their capacity to wage special warfare campaigns across the Plateau of Tibet.
Throughout, the article draws attention to the distinct geographic characteristics
of the putative battle space; the high elevations, harsh temperatures, and rugged
topography of many critical subregions along the border would have a defining
impact on any combat operations.
The third and final section evaluates whether India has developed the requisite capabilities to implement such a nimble, proactive strategy. It examines this
question through a tripartite lens, focusing on the operational, institutional, and
political-strategic barriers to implementing such a strategic shift. The research
findings are summarized in the conclusion.
THE SINO-INDIAN MILITARY DYNAMIC ALONG THE LAC: THE
CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Certain misperceptions endure regarding the military balance along the SinoIndian border. The most common is that China’s localized military strength
along the LAC far outweighs India’s.5 In reality, India possesses a clear advantage
in sheer number of troops. With regard to airpower, New Delhi also holds something of an edge over its trans-Himalayan rival, even though it may be eroding
rapidly—in large part owing to the continued hemorrhaging of India’s fighter
fleet and the growing density and sophistication of China’s integrated air defense
system (IADS) in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).6 The vulnerability of
India’s air-basing infrastructure to artillery and missile strikes is, as we shall see,
another concern. When it comes to mobile and lightweight artillery—perhaps
one of the most critical factors, given the nature of the terrain—China holds the
upper hand, in large part because of India’s unending procurement woes in this
domain.7
However, a simple bean-counting approach to the Sino-Indian military balance, based on various correlations of forces, rapidly reveals its limits. Indeed,
analysts long have pointed to the manifold difficulties inherent in measuring
military power and effectiveness. A nation’s “conversion capability,” or its capacity
to convert resources into a balanced, well-trained, and technologically proficient
force, is a key metric when gauging military power.8 Another is its ability to tailor
its strategies and force structure effectively to the nature of the threat it faces.9
When examining the continental dimensions of the Sino-Indian military rivalry, four factors are important to keep in mind.
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The first is the difference between the countries’ territorial defense postures.
Whereas India maintains a large (and growing) body of troops relatively close to
the border, China’s military presence in the TAR is more limited. In accordance
with its doctrine on frontier defense, China stations most of its conventional
forces in its interior, to be surged in times of crisis.10 This posture has been facilitated by the impressive development of China’s highway and high-speed railway
networks, particularly the extension of the Qinghai–Tibet railway.11 These logistical feats have not been lost on Indian planners, who estimate that Beijing could
dispatch several divisions to the LAC within a few days.12
The second defining factor is the nature of the climate and terrain. Topographically, different portions of the LAC vary substantially. Areas along the Indian
side are not amenable to mechanized warfare, except certain parts of Ladakh
and northern Sikkim. Owing to the high elevations of the Plateau of Tibet, Chinese ground forces benefit from some commanding advantages—they overlook
many Indian forward positions, rendering surveillance and artillery operations
easier to execute—and are better acclimatized physiologically to high-altitude
warfare.13 On the other hand, the altitudes of the TAR make high-tempo air
campaigns more difficult: at very high altitudes jet engines take longer to ignite
owing to lower air density, and fighter aircraft are constrained in terms of their
overall payload capacity. The weather also can have an inordinate impact on the
planning and conduct of military operations: in mountainous environments, meteorological conditions are highly unpredictable and can shift drastically within
a few hours.14 Extreme cold, altitude, and weather affect almost every element of
military equipment, ranging from artillery cannon to helicopter rotors.15 Even
precision-guided aerial munitions can undergo significant performance variations at very high altitudes.16 During the harsh winters, certain mountain passes
can be inaccessible temporarily, while other regions, such as Aksai Chin, paradoxically can be rendered more passable for heavy vehicles by the presence of a
thicker layer of frost and ice. In Arunachal Pradesh, some of the world’s heaviest
quantities of rainfall regularly cause landslides, disrupting motorized traffic and
troop movements.
The third major factor is the infrastructure disparity along the LAC. Whereas
Chinese troops can gain rapid access to most areas along the LAC, Indian troops
often have to trek several hours, if not days, to attain certain areas.17 The People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) also benefits from a much more robust, multilayered
communications architecture, having laid fiber-optic cabling and installed numerous small-aperture terminal satellite stations.18
Finally, the two nations have erected very different command structures along
the border. Whereas in India the responsibility for the defense of the LAC is divided among several regional army and air force commands, in February 2016
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China announced a major military rezoning that folded the former Chengdu and
Lanzhou Military Regions into one unified western theater command.19 This will
have an impact on China’s military effectiveness in the event of conflict, noted
one Indian defense analyst, allowing for greater unity of effort and a “more rationalized marshalling of military resources.”20
CHINA’S REVITALIZED WAR-ZONE STRATEGY AND THE
EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S TERRITORIAL DEFENSE
China’s Revitalized War-Zone Strategy
Chinese war planning traditionally has placed a heavy emphasis on preemptive
military action as a means of seizing the initiative and throwing an adversary off
balance. Considered under the overarching rubric of active defense, PLA operations in the Korean War of the early 1950s, the Sino-Indian War of 1962, and the
Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 all have been qualified by Chinese analysts as “selfdefensive counterattacks,” even though in each case it was Beijing that launched
general hostilities.21 For Chinese thinkers, there is no clear conceptual firewall
separating defensive grand strategies from offensive military tactics. To the contrary, preemptive military action is framed as an integral part of the Chinese concept of escalation management, or war control.22 Beijing’s military planning with
regard to the Sino-Indian border is a reflection of this tradition, and of its broader
thinking on “war-zone campaigns” and “winning informationized local wars.”
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, the PLA
began to redefine some of its core strategies and concepts. The war-zone campaign doctrine, formulated in the 1990s, placed a new emphasis on jointness,
transtheater mobility, and the rapid massing of strength on a particular front.23
Writings called for the concentration of “elite forces and sharp arms” and stressed
the importance of “gaining initiative from striking first” and “fighting a quick
battle to force a quick resolution.” When it came to conflicts along China’s terrestrial borders, it was argued that a growth in the effectiveness of transregional
support operations—principally via enhanced rail mobility—would allow the
PLA to surge units stationed deep within China’s interior rapidly. These forces
would be shielded by interlocking “mobility corridors” generated by early strikes
on an adversary’s standoff platforms or the movement of mobile surface-to-air
missile (SAM) batteries.24 China’s concept of informationized local wars, which
complements in many ways the war-zone campaign doctrine, attaches inordinate
importance to operations in the cyber and space domains and to prevailing in the
electromagnetic spectrum.25
Many of these key tenets permeate contemporary Chinese military thinking
with regard to future operations along the LAC. Thus, in the event of a conflict
with India, conventional forces would be surged from the Chinese interior, with
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the vast majority being deployed via rail, and another portion being flown in
via heavy airlifter, and potentially also via government-requisitioned civilian
aircraft.26 As Larry Wortzel has noted, the Chinese fully seem to expect that air,
cyber, and electronic operations will be part of any Sino-Indian border contingency.27 A key role of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), along with the PLA Rocket
Force (PLARF), would be to conduct standoff strikes to interdict, disrupt, and
delay the arrival of Indian forces coming from the lowlands. As one Chinese
military analyst notes, “Along the Sino-Indian borders, where the IA enjoys . . .
manpower superiority vis-à-vis the PLA, the PLAAF will launch ‘shielding bombardment’ campaigns in a defensive land war to rebuff the enemy’s second-tier
infantry and logistical reinforcement. If India’s supporting units are delayed in
getting to the battlefield, PLA reinforcements from the rear can arrive at the front
line to consolidate the defense line and launch a counterattack.”28
PLA SOF units no doubt would be central to China’s concept of “key counterattacks.” According to the PLA’s The Science of Campaigns, one of the key roles
of Chinese special operations units would be “to assault enemy vital targets,
paralyze enemy operational systems, reduce enemy operational capabilities,
and interfere, delay, or disrupt enemy operational activities to create favorable
conditions for main force units.”29 One recently retired Indian SOF general drew
attention to this aspect of Chinese thinking on special operations, noting, “If a
divisional size attack is launched, say, in Tawang, then the Chinese could employ
SOFs to cut off all routes for buildup of reserves, attack specific sensors, and also
raid artillery and logistic locations. The deep induction of SOFs for providing
early warnings and information on the movement of Indian reserves could also
be tasked.”30
China’s Western Military Region possesses its own SOF brigade (formerly attached to the Chengdu Military Region) and both the Xinjiang and TAR Military
Districts have large, dedicated SOF units, as well as elite, rapid-reaction units of
People’s Armed Police (PAP).31
India also has been following, with a certain degree of trepidation, the rapid
development of China’s airborne assault capabilities, in the form of the PLAAF’s
15th Airborne Corps. Consisting of three divisions numbering over 35,000
troops, with a light artillery and mechanized component, the 15th Airborne
Corps is headquartered in Xiaogan, from which it is expected to reach any part
of China within ten hours.32 The Central Military Commission has prioritized its
modernization, and its capabilities recently were bolstered by the introduction of
the Y-20 heavy airlifter.33 The 15th Airborne Corps is considered “key to the War
Zone Campaign Concept” and would be used “for the kind of disruptive deep
strikes that the War Zone Campaign calls for.”34 Indian military planners have
monitored closely the growing number of large-scale airborne exercises the PLA
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has conducted in the TAR over the past few years, with one retired air marshal
making the following observation: “We are aware of China’s increasing focus on
airborne assault operational capability, involving integrated forces. . . . A future
[limited] war could see the Chinese depending heavily on their airpower for
air defense and air support. Offensive operations would be SOF- and air assault
forces–intensive, unlike the simple infantry operations of 1962 vintage.”35
India’s concerns over certain aspects of the PLA’s war-zone campaign doctrine
and evolving force structure have been amplified by recent developments in
China’s strategic behavior, most notably along the Sino-Indian border but also
in the South and East China Seas. Since the eastern Ladakh border standoff in
2013, there have been a number of similarly fraught confrontations.36 One such
incident in 2014 reportedly led to the deployment of close to one thousand troops
by each side.37 Territorial incursions have continued ever since, with notable tensions flaring in September 2015 and, most recently, in March 2016.38
The Evolution of India’s Attitude toward Territorial Defense
India’s responses to China’s intensified military coercion have been twofold. First,
the country has decided to augment its force structure significantly, with new
battalions of scouts; via the stationing of additional air, missile, and surveillance
assets; and by raising a new Mountain Strike Corps. Second, it has sought to
remedy one of its key defensive shortcomings: the paucity of rail and road infrastructure in certain key border regions.
The latter represents an important shift away from the so-called scorchedearth strategy that had held sway since 1962. For many decades Indian military
planners deliberately eschewed the development of border infrastructure, as
they feared it would facilitate Chinese ingress deep into the Indian plains and
lowlands.39 According to one informed journalistic account of the Indian military’s thinking vis-à-vis the Sino-Indian border, it was only in the middle of the
first decade of this century that the IA began to see the pitfalls of this approach
more clearly.40 The lack of solid infrastructure along the Indian side of the LAC
had rendered large tracts of contested land acutely vulnerable to Chinese probing and creeping forms of encroachment. Trudging through treacherous terrain
on foot or via mule train, Indian patrols often discovered Chinese preparation of
positions or infrastructure development only weeks after it had occurred. In the
depth of winter, when snow rendered some footpaths impassable, Indian forces
tacitly conceded certain areas, only to reinvest them in the spring. In the event of
a standoff, China could surge reinforcements more rapidly, with Indian troops
perhaps taking hours, if not days, to arrive at their destination. In short, while
an absence of infrastructure conceivably could help delay a large-scale invasion,
it had proved remarkably inadequate at deterring Chinese military coercion and
territorial encroachment.41
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It also had become gradually more apparent that a short-duration, limited,
border conflict is far more likely than a protracted, large-scale, force-on-force
campaign, not only because of the nature of current Chinese operational planning, but because both nations would be conducting military operations under a
nuclear overhang. As one much-discussed Indian report noted in 2012, “Though
both countries have a doctrine of ‘no first use,’ the nuclear factor can be expected
to impose caution on political decision makers on both sides. The stakes at issue
will again determine the degree of risk in political calculations. Generally, the
nuclear factor can be expected to limit the scale of conflict and impact the scope
of feasible political objectives.”42
Finally, the longer the conflict lasts, the more likely it will attract third-party
intervention in the form of diplomatic or military assistance or both. According
to declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports, this was one of the
main reasons China planned for a short, limited war in 1962.43
Responding to a limited-war contingency requires operational agility and the
ability to respond rapidly and effectively to a crisis.44 This reinforces the need for
a tighter web of infrastructure that can enable Indian forces to react promptly to
any “tremor felt along any one of its strands.”45
Over the past few years, India has launched a bevy of large-scale border infrastructure projects, albeit with chequered results. While some progress has been
made in certain areas, most of India’s road and rail construction projects have
fallen victim to considerable delays. As of May 2016, only twenty-one of sixty-one
border road projects designated strategic had been completed.46 Similarly, while
the Indian government sanctioned the construction of twenty-eight strategic railway lines along India’s borders in 2010, six years later none have been finalized.47
The accretion of India’s conventional force structure along the LAC and the
attendant development in infrastructure provide two material indicators of the
shift in India’s defense strategy toward China. The most significant change, however, has occurred in the intellectual domain, as Indian defense planners have
adopted a much more vigorous, tactically offensive approach to territorial defense. The creation of the Mountain Strike Corps, note Indian commentators,
was part of a larger movement toward deterrence by punishment and away from
what has been perceived to be an overreliance on deterrence by denial in the
past.48 Indeed, for many decades India’s two-front planning construct called for
India simply to hold along the border with China while its forces engaged in
more-offensive operations against Pakistan to the west.49
This approach progressively has been replaced with what has been described
to this author variously as a form of “offensive defense,” a “quid pro quo strategy,”
and a “cross-border riposte strategy.” Following Clausewitz’s well-known dictum
that “a swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive” is often the most “brilliant
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point in the defensive,” Indian military planners have adapted their concepts of
operation to the natures of both the opponent and the topography.50 As one army
colonel candidly noted, mountainous terrain “can favor the first mover,” adding,
Once the Chinese seize a position, it may be very difficult to dislodge them. Rather
than expend much blood and treasure attempting to storm impregnable positions, we
should pursue a strategy of horizontal escalation and capture territory elsewhere. If
you cannot counter symmetrically, you can effectively counter by shifting the locus of
the battlefield. The political compulsions of territorial defense make things very difficult for us in the Army. Our elected government will not tolerate us losing even one
centimeter of territory. This cannot be achieved without us seizing territorial chips
for bargaining purposes elsewhere. We have to think of conflict termination.51

Another IA officer concurred, observing, “Raising the strike corps was part of a
move to create a more offensive defense. If India’s sovereignty is weakened, we
should have the ability to mount a riposte. If the PLA strikes at Tawang, we can
provide a mechanized Indian response via Ladakh. In the past we had a dissuasive
posture, solely focused on static defense. Deterrence is now being rebalanced.”52
Both Ladakh and northern Sikkim are considered good locations for mounting such a mechanized riposte, not only because they provide some of the few
staging areas along the Indian side of the LAC conducive to mechanized warfare,
but because they overlook main axes of approach (the plateau of Aksai Chin and
the Sora Funnel) and logistical lifelines, such as the China Western Highway.53
In the event of conflict, India’s mechanized forces would sweep down from these
mountain plains to conduct pincer movements behind advancing Chinese formations, with the hope of breaking troop concentration.54
India’s mechanized counteroffensive would form only one component of a
wider theater strategy, however. In addition to these movements, Indian air and
missile power would be brought to bear on transport and communication nodes
deep within the TAR, with the goal of delaying or preventing the arrival of PLA
reinforcements.55
INCORPORATING SOFS INTO INDIA’S CURRENT APPROACH TO
AREA DENIAL
Despite this shift toward a more offensive form of area denial, India’s current
approach to conventional deterrence along the LAC appears to suffer from
certain limitations. Indeed, while New Delhi’s overarching military strategy has
evolved—most notably by more vigorously stressing the need for cross-border
strikes—the force structure changes it preconizes are remarkably similar to those
pursued in the wake of the 1962 war: a massive accretion in conventional land
power.56
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New Delhi also continues to rely on geographically dispersed conventional
units or on poorly equipped paramilitary forces, the latter in the form of the
Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), as India’s first line of defense in many of the
forward areas most vulnerable to Chinese aggression.57 The rugged nature of the
topography, along with the continued paucity of infrastructure, means that even
though India forward-deploys a large number of conventional screening forces
along some of the most obvious axes of approach (the five main river valleys in
Arunachal Pradesh, for instance), these troops are relatively static and could be
outflanked by small detachments engaging in rapid lateral movements.58
Meanwhile, a large portion of the IA’s mechanized units still will be stationed
in the lowlands, with the expectation that they would be rushed to higher altitudes in the event of conflict. Not only would this prove logistically challenging
owing to the enduring deficits in India’s road and rail infrastructure; it also would
prove physically taxing.59 In contrast to the first wave of PLA troops flowing from
the heights of the Plateau of Tibet, Indian troops deployed from interior garrisons
would be surged into combat before having been acclimatized properly.60 Medical
studies have shown that a physically fit soldier requires about two weeks to adapt
progressively to a new altitude, and three weeks to conditions of extreme cold.61
In the absence of proper acclimatization, soldiers operating at extreme altitudes
can suffer from acute mountain sickness, severe sleep disorders, high-altitude
pulmonary edema, and cerebral edema.62
Second, such a manpower-centered approach to deterrence already has proved
to be prohibitively costly. In April 2015, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar
announced that the planned Mountain Strike Corps would be halved to approximately 35,000 troops for financial reasons, and that the formation budget for the
corps would be frozen at U.S.$6.1 billion, significantly less than the originally
sanctioned U.S.$13.8 billion.63 Scandal already had erupted a year earlier when
it was revealed that the IA had been compelled to dip into precious weapon and
ammunition reserves to equip its newly raised forces properly.64 While the Indian
defense minister appears to have reversed his prior decision, renewing assurances
that the Mountain Strike Corps would be resourced properly, India’s efforts to
add thousands more boots on the ground inevitably will prove onerous.65 Indeed,
India’s expansion of its ground forces has been accompanied by a rise in personnel costs, a trend that is slated to increase exponentially over time.66
Finally, the natural compartmentalization of much of the terrain—which often
does not allow large units to maneuver effectively—disincentivizes the massing of
force, especially when moving uphill.67 As India’s conventional forces wind their
way up narrow, mountain roads to higher elevations or are funneled through
mountain valleys, they could find themselves targeted by Chinese artillery barrages, missile strikes, and “shielding bombardment campaigns.” They might
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suffer disproportionate casualties when targeted by Chinese forces positioned
in height and depth or find their main axes of approach to certain remote areas
suddenly cut off.68
In short, India’s intense reliance on large, centralized, conventional forces—a
substantial portion of which are stationed at lower altitudes—would not be the
most operationally judicious approach in the event of a short, fast-moving, limited war launched from high elevations along the LAC.
One French study on mountain warfare notes that for conventional forces to
assail higher-altitude positions successfully, they must rely on a “different yet
complementary force,” that is, a force that is “decentralized, highly trained, and
optimized for heliborne assault and the neutralization of enemy positions located
at higher vantage points.”69 The next section of this article makes an argument
for providing the IA with a similarly “different yet complementary force”—one
that is forward deployed, distributed, and able to respond both rapidly and effectively to various contingencies. The candidate force—a mixture of SOFs and
locally raised scouting battalions—would be geared toward rapid reaction and
proactive defense.
The argument is not that large-scale conventional forces have no role to play
in the event of a Sino-Indian border contingency, or that India should rely exclusively on special operations for conventional deterrence along the border. Many
of the missions at the heart of India’s operational concepts—such as the seizure
of limited tracts of territory—are suited to mountain infantry, not SOFs.70 Rather,
the emphasis is on developing a better complementarity between these elements
rather than on clearly dissociating them. Indeed, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that modern militaries are at their most effective when they succeed
in integrating conventional and special operations within a common, clearly
defined, strategic framework.71
PROACTIVE DEFENSE AND THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES
This section evaluates the role of India’s SOFs within the framework of a more
proactive territorial defense strategy. India possesses a large number and variety
of elite units, some of which fall under the Home Affairs Ministry, such as the
National Security Guard (NSG), which focuses almost exclusively on counter
terrorism (CT) operations, and the Special Protection Group, a VIP-protection
unit. To add to the confusion, some units occasionally qualified as SOFs in India, such as the IA Ghatak platoons and the Sagar Prahari Bal—the latter a unit
formed following the 2008 Mumbai attacks to provide better coastal security—
are not so much special operators as specialized forces.
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The primary focus of this discussion is the SOF units most likely to play a
role in the event of a Sino-Indian border conflict: the SOF-qualified elements of
the IA’s Para Commando battalions and, to a lesser extent, the relatively newly
formed Garud unit of the Indian Air Force (IAF). At the time of this writing,
the IA possesses eight battalions of special operators (Para SFs), with plans for
future expansion, as well as five battalions (a brigade) of airborne paras, which
are more akin to airborne assault units.72 Each battalion nominally is pegged at
approximately seven hundred men, but many units reportedly are undermanned,
underequipped, and suffering from a 30 percent officer shortfall. The Garud,
which was formed in 2003, currently comprises about one thousand troops, and
their numbers will double in the aftermath of the attacks on Pathankot Air Base
in early 2016.73 The IAF has struggled to define the role of the Garud adequately,
beyond base protection. (While the Indian Navy’s SOF component, the Marine
Commando Force [MARCOS], has been stationed in small numbers at certain
high-altitude lakes in Jammu and Kashmir, its role would be minimal at best, and
therefore MARCOS will not be addressed further.)
Another unit, the fabled Special Frontier Force (SFF), will be discussed in addition to the Para SFs and the Garud.74 Formed in late 1962, following the SinoIndian War, the SFF is part of India’s external intelligence agency, the Research
and Analysis Wing (RAW), and answers directly to the Cabinet Secretariat.75
Modeled on the Kennedy-era Green Berets, the unit is rumored to contain about
ten thousand soldiers, trained to conduct operations behind enemy lines and engage in special warfare.76 There is some debate over whether this secretive force
has preserved its elite status as well as its original mandate.
The roles of these units will be examined along three axes: their utility in countering gray-zone aggression, their aptitude for engaging in direct action behind
enemy lines, and their ability to conduct special warfare in the TAR.77
COUNTERING GRAY-ZONE AGGRESSION
Over the past few years, numerous observers have drawn attention to the challenge that acts of creeping coercion pose to the international order. These concerns have been compounded by revisionist powers’ shared predilection for socalled gray-zone strategies, a combination of “salami-slicing” tactics, information
warfare, and military coercion.78
Certain aspects of gray-zone campaigns, such as the use of proxies, long have
been familiar to Indian security managers, who have had to contend with such
modes of Pakistani covert action since independence.79 China’s historic use of
infrastructure development as a means of cementing—literally—its claim over
contested territory is also well known in New Delhi. After all, many past episodes
of border tension have occurred following Indian forces’ belated discovery of
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Chinese road and basing development in remote border areas. Despite India’s
familiarity with such forms of great-power competition, its strategic community’s
literature on the challenges that gray-zone aggression poses is surprisingly sparse.
Moreover, when Indian strategic thinkers reflect on such issues, they tend to do
so with Pakistan in mind rather than China. Yet as demonstrated in the first section of this article, the threat of gray-zone aggression should not be perceived as
exclusive to Indo-Pakistani security dynamics.
Within U.S. strategic circles, it is the special operations community that perhaps has thought the longest and hardest about how to counter such forms of
territorial encroachment effectively. As one recent official document notes, democracies can face certain disadvantages when confronting authoritarian rivals
whose decision-making and civil-military structures can facilitate “unity of effort
in the gray zone.”80
For the same reasons that SOFs can prove immensely attractive to democracies when prosecuting CT operations overseas—their tactical agility, deniability,
and restricted oversight—they are emerging as the tools of choice in responding
to certain features of authoritarian aggression.81 For example, in the event of
Chinese operatives landing on the Senkaku Islands (claimed by both China and
Japan), disguised as fishermen, Japanese military planners view “advance parties” of heliborne special forces as forming one of their first lines of defense.82
Similarly, central and eastern European states envision rapid-reaction SOF units
as providing some of the most effective counters to any future Russian attempt to
replicate a Crimean “little green men” strategy on NATO soil.83
SOFs provide democratic policy makers with the capacity to respond rapidly,
effectively, and in a tailored manner to such acts of infiltration, subversion, or
sabotage.84 In India’s case, a wide variety of scenarios were mentioned in the
course of private conversations with the author, such as Chinese clandestine
operatives or SOFs entering Arunachal Pradesh or Sikkim disguised as Tibetan
refugees, nomadic herdsmen, or economic migrants from India’s troubled northeastern territories.85 Indian military officers also expressed concern over their
past inability to detect Chinese infrastructure development in a timely fashion
and mentioned the possibility of Chinese engineers discreetly constructing small
landing grounds, hidden ammunition depots, and SAM sites during the offseason when Indian soldiers no longer can gain access to certain areas close to
Chinese positions, owing to snow and the paucity of infrastructure on the Indian
side of the LAC.86
To respond with alacrity to such scenarios, Indian SOFs would need, first
and foremost, to be able to detect them. India’s advances in space-based surveillance, along with the planned introduction of a large number of surveillance
platforms—in the form of high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
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aerostats—promise to help in this regard, but the difficult nature of the terrain
imposes limitations.87 India has been contemplating erecting Israeli-type security
systems along certain portions of its border with Pakistan, complete with nightobservation cameras, long-range detection radars, motion sensors, and thermal
imaging.88 However, the deep valleys and craggy peaks that prevail across much
of the LAC—not to mention the prohibitive expense—preclude such ambitious
technological solutions.89 Radio, radar, and even satellite communications systems have difficulty operating around terrain folds, and the very fact that the
Sino-Indian border has not been delineated officially means that China would
view any large-scale Indian fencing effort as a severe provocation.90
As a result, human intelligence (HUMINT) would prove absolutely critical in
detecting Chinese gray-zone operations, whether the latter were in the form of
cross-border infiltrations, illicit infrastructure development, or attempts at sabotage and subversion. For decades, Indian intelligence services have depended on
the knowledge gleaned from nomadic herders, who frequently wander between
Indian- and Chinese-controlled territory along the LAC.91 Religious pilgrims
and resident tribal populations provide other valuable sources of information.
India should seek to sharpen its HUMINT capabilities further along the LAC,
by recognizing that the key to preserving long-term control lies in the degree of
influence it wields over the complex patchwork of border peoples. For example,
in Arunachal Pradesh alone there are more than twenty-six major tribes and one
hundred subtribes.92 India should focus on training more of its intelligence officers and SOFs in the languages and dialects of the many peoples along the border
and on fast-tracking the central government’s much-delayed Border Area Development Program (BADP), with a particular focus on the regions most likely to be
the targets of future Chinese incursions, i.e., Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh.93 A
less heavy-handed policing approach in certain areas also might prove constructive in terms of winning hearts and minds and might foster better information
sharing between local communities and Indian authorities.94
Finally, the addition of more tribal and local forces—in the vein of the Ladakh
Snow Tigers or the recently raised scout battalions from Sikkim and Arunachal—
would buttress considerably India’s conventional deterrent in its border regions.95
Not only does this constitute a low-cost approach to frontier policing; it also
provides Indian security managers with a year-round, forward-deployed, “trip
wire” force whose members are physiologically acclimatized to high altitudes and
mountain warfare and have an innate knowledge of the terrain and local conditions.96 Because of their familial ties with local villagers and herdsmen, these
scouts are better positioned to recognize signs of cross-border infiltration. Small
teams of Indian special forces—in the form of joint terminal attack controllers
(JTACs) or communications experts—could be attached to each battalion, much
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in the way the United States embedded small teams of SOFs among its Northern
Alliance partners during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.97 This would provide
lightly armed tribal and ethnic battalions with the ability to call on airpower or
follow-on conventional forces in the event of an encounter with a more formidable foe. Equipping select teams of Sikkim and Arunachal Scouts with antitank
guided missiles, light mortars, and shoulder-mounted rocket launchers, in the
vein of the Ghatak platoons that act as the spearheads of conventional IA units,
also could prove valuable.98 The goal should be to provide the IA not only with
lightly armed reconnaissance units but also with hybridized structures that can
help mount a Fabian defense of their respective home states in the event of a
larger-scale Chinese incursion, by delaying, harassing, and attriting PLA forces.99
DIRECT ACTION AND ENABLING OPERATIONS
India, albeit somewhat more belatedly than China, has begun to attach more
importance to airborne assault operations, especially their utility for targeting
Chinese transport and communications infrastructure in the TAR in the event of
conflict.100 There is also a growing realization among some military thinkers that
Indian SOFs could be called on to play a critical role behind enemy lines, conducting sabotage, reconnaissance, and direct-action operations. While one serving IA special forces colonel cautiously stated that “Indian SOFs would be used
for direct action operations primarily on Indian soil, with the occasional cross
border deployment in a limited manner,” another IA special forces brigadier was
less circumspect, observing that “India’s dissuasive posture being based in part
on the threat of horizontal escalation, SOF operations behind Chinese lines will
necessarily be part of the mix.”101 IA doctrine, for its part, defines special forces
as “specially selected troops who are trained, equipped, and organized to operate in hostile territory, isolated from the main combat forces. They may operate
independently or in conjunction with other forces at the operational level. They
are versatile, have a deep reach, and can make precision strikes at targets of critical importance.”102
It is this last function—the ability to strike at rear-based targets—that seems
to hold the most appeal for Indian military planners. There is a recognition that
the combat environment straddling the Sino-Indian border may morph progressively into something of a no-man’s-land for large clusters of ground forces and
high-signature platforms, owing to the growing ubiquity of extended-range,
precision-guided munitions. The PLA’s increased focus on transtheater mobility
and the ability to deploy SAMs, truck-mounted UAVs, and land-attack cruise
missile batteries rapidly along its side of the LAC has engendered particular
anxiety in New Delhi.103 Indian advanced landing grounds and air bases are increasingly vulnerable to missile and artillery bombardment.104 Furthermore, the
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government has yet to finalize the construction of hardened shelters for the IAF’s
squadrons of Su-30MKI aircraft.105 While Indian fighter pilots have begun to
train using sections of road and highway as dispersal runways, other passive defenses could be implemented, such as investing in large numbers of subterranean
shelters with large stockpiles of munitions, lubricants, and petroleum.106 Absent
such efforts, Indian airpower near the border effectively may be crippled in the
first phases of conflict, or could suffer from virtual attrition—devoting the bulk
of sorties to defensive counterair missions or to suppressing enemy air defenses,
rather than conducting precision strikes against enemy air bases and ground targets.107 This role, note some Indian military officials, may need to be entrusted to
small demolition teams of SOFs, which could carve “holes” in China’s reconnaissance strike complex and provide terminal guidance for standoff missile strikes
conducted from outside the range of China’s IADS networks. In some ways, this
resembles Soviet thinking on the deployment of Spetsnaz SOFs behind NATO
lines for sabotage and demolition missions against mobile missile batteries.108
This “penetrating role” is in line with the conceptualization by some U.S.
analysts of SOFs as low-signature entry forces within heavily denied or contested
environments.109 IAF doctrine specifies that the “destruction and degradation of
enemy air assets” constitute one of the core functions of its dedicated SOF unit,
the Garud.110 One retired IA brigadier confided the following:
In the conceptualized role of the mountain strike corps, the future Air Assault Division and Special Operations Forces will operate in tandem as part of India’s area
denial strategy. What is implied is, SOFs will be inserted up to and beyond an operational depth to disrupt the build-up of PLA forces, isolate and invest critical vulnerable points and areas. These isolated vulnerable points will then be attacked via air
assaults through heliborne and airborne forces. It is important to keep in mind that
the Tibetan plateau is a plane with little undulations, which allows for the application
of both air assault forces as well as air assault mechanized forces.111

The challenge, however, would be to succeed in inserting SOF guidance and
demolition teams in the absence of dedicated, stealthy airlifters.112 Advances in
air-defense systems and long-range surface-to-surface fires have raised new questions about how to conduct airborne operations without incurring large-scale,
potentially catastrophic losses.113 Large, high-signature transport aircraft, such as
India’s C-17 Globemasters or C-130J Hercules, would be vulnerable to Chinese
radar-guided SAMs—providing the latter had not been suppressed prior to the
air assault. More-discreet modes of airborne insertion, e.g., via low-flying heliborne strike forces, still could be put at risk by lower-altitude air-defense systems
and antiaircraft guns.114 Indian troops most likely would need to establish drop
zones at a distance from the densest thickets of Chinese low-altitude systems
and rely on airborne light armored vehicles (LAVs) to gain greater mobility and
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firepower and compensate for the distances separating their lodgments from
their target points.115 The U.S. Army has been developing a new family of LAVs
designed for this particular role and Indian SOF officers expressed interest in acquiring several such vehicles, with future airborne assault operations in mind.116
Once successfully inserted, Indian SOF teams may need to operate “blind”
within an environment characterized by the denial of command, control, communications, computers, and ISR (i.e., C4ISR) capabilities, particularly if India’s
fragile space-based communications architecture has been degraded or disabled
preemptively. Mindful of this, the IA has released an updated request for information (RFI) for mini battlefield UAVs, which senior officers have indicated
would enable two-man IA SOF teams to conduct over-the-hill surveillance behind enemy lines.117 The introduction of longer-range, high-altitude UAVs, when
combined with a more-robust satellite and airborne communications network,
also could improve IA ability to locate and direct fire at enemy targets situated at
greater distances as well as to preserve communications among dispersed units.118
Finally, if a Chinese offensive indeed proves to be air assault–intensive, small
teams of Indian SOFs equipped with shoulder-mounted SAMs could prove invaluable. Given the rough, mountainous terrain, limited avenues of approach,
and growing ability of China to target larger formations of conventional forces,
SOFs could provide a key comparative advantage in this more defensive role.119
WAGING SPECIAL WARFARE IN THE TAR
The Tibetan issue always has been at the heart of Sino-Indian tensions.120 For
New Delhi, the PLA’s absorption of the mountain territory in 1951 signified the
loss of a historic buffer zone, and the progressive hardening of Beijing’s Tibet policies has caused both anger and dismay. For China, India’s harboring of the Dalai
Lama and the Tibetan government in exile following the 1959 Tibetan uprising
amounted to an almost unforgivable affront. Throughout the late 1950s and up
to the 1962 border war, Chinese intelligence remained absolutely convinced that
India was attempting to foment unrest across the Plateau of Tibet.121
Following India’s defeat, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made the fateful
decision—long encouraged by certain of his intelligence czars—to aid and abet
insurgency movements within Tibet and to arm India’s sizable Tibetan refugee
community.122 A large paramilitary unit, the ITBP, was raised and entrusted with
patrolling forward areas along the LAC.
In addition, a much more secretive force was established: the SFF. Composed
of thousands of ethnic Tibetans, many of whom had been resistance fighters in
the TAR or part of the Dalai Lama’s bodyguard, the SFF was an elite unit of paratroopers trained in mountain warfare, sabotage, and demolition. Commanded
by IA officers on special assignment, the unit is “managed” by RAW and reports
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directly to the Prime Minister’s Office via the Directorate General of Security in
the Cabinet Secretariat. The CIA played an important role in shaping the SFF’s
development in its early years, providing training and instruction in guerrilla
warfare tactics.123 Doctrinally, the unit is inspired heavily by Kennedy-era U.S.
Army Special Forces, with the Green Berets’ intellectual predilection for special
warfare and operations deep behind enemy lines.124 In fact, this was the SFF’s
original mandate. Some claim that Nehru even went so far as to frame the SFF as
the potential vanguard of a future liberation of Tibet from Chinese rule.125 Since
its creation, the SFF has played an active role in India’s regional conflicts, fighting behind enemy lines in Bangladesh alongside Indian-sponsored militias—the
Mukti Bahini—in the war of 1971, detonating bridges, and suffering, according
to some accounts, dozens of casualties.126 Unconfirmed reports also have indicated that the SFF played a role in the Indian military assault against the Golden
Temple, Operation BLUESTAR, in 1984 and in the Kargil War of 1999.127
The current state of the SFF is difficult to ascertain. The unit continues to exist and is based in the hill town of Chakrata, in the state of Uttarakhand. Details
pertaining to its force structure, equipment, and operational mandate in the
event of a Sino-Indian confrontation are considered extraordinarily sensitive.
Even retired IA special forces officers were distinctly uncomfortable when questioned on the matter. Some claimed complete ignorance, stating that the SFF’s
operations and training regimen were strictly compartmentalized, with little to
no interaction with regular military SOFs. This is clearly not the case, as Para SFs
are seconded to SFF units frequently. When queried on its alleged elite status, one
former IA general dismissed the SFF as little more than a “rag tag force, poorly
equipped and no longer commando-trained.”128 A smattering of press reports has
drawn attention to troubling shortages in certain essential pieces of equipment,
such as parachutes.129 There is also uncertainty surrounding the force’s dedicated
air-transport assets, now that the Aviation Research Center, RAW’s private air
wing and border-surveillance unit, has been dissolved and split between the IAF
and the National Technical Research Organization, a signals-intelligence agency
created in 2004.130 Overall, however, other interviewees’ assessments were at odds
with those of the general. Many expressed a grudging admiration for the toughness of those “Tibetan boys,” as well as that of the Gurkhas and hill tribesmen
who have swollen the SFF’s ranks over the years.
The main question, however, relates to the contemporary role of what some
have referred to as India’s “secret Tibetan army.” Ever since the late 1970s and the
tentative beginnings of Sino-Indian rapprochement, a tacit quid pro quo arrangement has been observed. China agreed to end its support for insurgent groups in
India’s troubled northeast, while India subscribed to a one-China policy and officially abandoned its clandestine efforts across the Tibetan border.131 However, the
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reality is somewhat more complex. Although China no longer directly supports
militancy in places such as Nagaland, Mizoram, and Assam, Chinese middlemen have been known to funnel in weaponry via countries in Southeast Asia.132
Meanwhile, other countries, such as Pakistan, continue to play an active role in
the area, raising questions over whether China chooses to maintain close ties with
certain of these groups via a third party.133 When it comes to India and Tibet,
there is a similar sense that New Delhi could revert to older policies if it found
itself compelled.134
For this reason—for purposes of what might best be described as a form of
unconventional deterrence—it would appear that the SFF has remained true to
its special warfare roots. One former planner within India’s Integrated Defence
Staff commented that, in his opinion, “in light of current circumstances, I see no
reason to dilute the operational mandate.”135 A recently retired Para SF lieutenant general responded in a more oblique fashion, saying that “envisioning what
role the Tibetan boys would play does not require much imagination.”136 Serving
officers either refused to respond or simply suggested that there had been “no
change in their tasking.”137
One might question, however, whether the SFF would be able to prosecute
such a campaign successfully in today’s environment. First, such an effort most
probably would be far more isolated than if it had occurred during the early to
mid-1960s, when the SFF was established. During that period, both Nepal and
the United States played an active role, alongside India, in supporting Tibetan
militancy. In fact, for many years it was the ancient kingdom of Mustang, in Nepal, that served as the true epicenter and safe haven for Tibetan combatants.138 By
the end of that decade, however, China had succeeded in convincing Nepal to betray the Tibetan cause, while the United States had sacrificed its anticommunist
freedom fighters on the altar of Nixonian rapprochement with China.139 In the
event of another conflict, India essentially would find itself conducting the bulk
of its covert campaigns alone. Depending on the circumstances, one could envision the United States discreetly providing a modicum of intelligence support,
but not much more. Even if SFF task forces are inserted successfully, it might
prove extremely challenging to sustain them, given the contested nature of the
aerial environment over Tibet. Investment in systems such as the U.S.-developed
Joint Precision Airdrop System, which can be dropped from a height of 25,000
feet, might alleviate this challenge.140
Another key difference lies in the extent of China’s surveillance and control
over Tibet, which is far greater today than it was in 1962. Since the 2008 disturbances, in particular, Beijing has improved vastly its internal security apparatus
in the TAR. New, highly sophisticated frontier-monitoring systems, incorporating electro-optical devices, radars, unmanned aircraft, and tools for imagery
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analysis, have been put in place. Tibetan communities in India have registered a
sharp drop in the number of incoming refugees—many who seek to depart are
apprehended or shot while attempting to cross the border.141 China recently enacted a draconian new counterterror law that further curtails Tibetans’ freedom
of movement and expression, and Chinese intelligence officers have deeply penetrated Tibetan monasteries and refugee networks.142 Surveillance of neighborhoods has been amplified via the establishment of an intricate “grid system” and
facilitated by the forced sedentarization of historically nomadic populations.143
PAP forces, often formed from recently decommissioned PLA troops, have
grown ever more numerous in Tibet and increasingly militarized, incorporating heliborne rapid-reaction units and equipped with armored vehicles.144 Their
presence, in addition to the PLA element already stationed in the TAR, could
present a formidable challenge to Indian special warfare efforts. Moreover, it remains unclear whether the majority of the younger generation of Tibetans living
on the Indian side of the border would be as willing to take up arms alongside
their brethren as some have claimed.145 Finally, as we shall see in greater depth
in a later section, India’s political leaders might be reticent to deploy the SFF in
such a role, either because they viewed such a step as too escalatory or because it
would lead to protraction, thus impeding war termination.
THE CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY OF
PROACTIVE DEFENSE
Technical and Operational Hurdles
The first and most immediate set of hurdles resides in the technical and operational domain. Numerous observers, both within and outside India’s special
operations community, have drawn attention to chronic shortfalls in essential
equipment, such as parachutes, night vision devices, communications devices,
laser designators, and high-altitude clothing.146 U.S. SOFs, having observed their
Indian counterparts during training exercises, noticed that in many cases Indian
paratroopers preferred to discard their expensive Israeli-designed Tavor rifles—
which are ill suited for Himalayan conditions and occasionally jam—in favor of
the more reliable AK-47.147
Another common complaint was that the SOFs had expanded too rapidly in
size and in an ad hoc manner, without the benefit of careful, deliberate planning.148 As a result, noted one colonel, in numerous cases during the raising of
Para SF battalions existing equipment sourced from regular infantry regiments
was distributed among the new units, resulting in their soldiers having to make
do with inferior equipment.149 In some cases, observers pointed to seemingly
prosaic concerns as having genuine security implications. One example is the
continued absence of aluminum, belt-attachable water bottles. Indian Para SF
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personnel often are compelled to carry large, heavy, plastic bottles of potable water in their rucksacks. When removed, these reflect very far out into the sunshine
and off the snow—running the risk of revealing hidden positions.150
Another issue concerns officer manpower, especially declining retention rates.
Most Para SF units suffer from an estimated officer shortfall of 25–30 percent.151
As one brigadier general stationed at IA headquarters noted, a growing number
of Indian SOF officers are leaving the service to pursue more-lucrative careers in
the private sector, where they often specialize in VIP protection.152 It is important
to note, in passing, that this problem is not specific to India; the United States
faces a similar challenge.153 The net result, however, is that India’s SOFs are increasingly “bottom heavy,” with a large number of fresh, new recruits but too few
experienced officers and noncommissioned officers.
This overly rapid expansion also has exposed certain deficiencies in India’s
SOF training infrastructure. SOF officers warned in 2010 that it would take
“many years” for the IA’s Special Forces Training School (SFTS)—located in Nahan, 300 km to the north of Delhi—to catch up with the expanded force’s new
requirements.154 Foreign observers note that the SFTS still lacks key facilities,
such as vertical wind tunnels, next-generation simulators, and sufficient firing
ranges.155
Questions also were raised about the nature of certain aspects of the selection
and training processes, which often are delegated to each individual battalion,
and how to ensure consistent standards. Indian SOF officers, however, were of the
view that this more-decentralized system had its advantages, as it allowed units
to be highly specialized in certain niche competencies and to have “excellent area
and terrain specialization.”156
Organizational and Doctrinal Challenges
Perhaps the greatest set of challenges lies in the organizational domain. Absent a
restructuring of India’s special operations capability around a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), many of the more chronic problems affecting training,
procurement, and information sharing most likely will endure.157 Indian strategic
commentators long have called for the creation of a JSOC, via which India’s community of special operators could be provided with “fully fused” informational
support from the nation’s notoriously factionalized intelligence agencies.158 While
the formation of India’s Defence Intelligence Agency in 2002, following the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, has led to better integration
among the services’ respective intelligence wings, reportedly there is still much
scope for improvement.159 This would necessitate the permanent deputation
of civilian intelligence officers drawn from all the relevant agencies, including
the Intelligence Bureau, which, while theoretically domestically oriented, plays
an important role along certain tracts of the Sino-Indian border. Optimizing
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the functionality of India’s (future) JSOC also would require providing it with
its own budget, requirements-validation process, and streamlined acquisition
procedures. This would enable it to fast-track much-needed items, such as night
vision devices and parachutes, bypassing the traditionally cumbersome procurement process of the Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD).
The existence of a JSOC also would bring about greater strategic and doctrinal clarity, along with more institutionalized joint training. For the time being,
India’s Para SFs have no organic air wing, and the IA air arm as yet does not
possess its own ground-attack capability. After years of bitter wrangling among
services, the MOD arbitrated in favor of the IAF retaining control, for the time
being, over newly acquired heliborne platforms critical for special operations and
airborne assault, such as the Apaches and Chinooks purchased from the United
States.160 While this is projected to change in the near future, the process points
to the persistent dysfunctionality of interservice relations, which could affect
the effectiveness and reactivity of Indian SOFs in the event of a crisis. With each
service striving to create its own SOF unit, there also has been a certain amount
of duplication in terms of core competencies and a relative absence of profound
reflection on what some of these newly formed units could bring in terms of
added value—this despite the existence since 2008 of a (classified) Indian Joint
Doctrine for Special Operations.161 The IAF’s Garud, for example, has yet truly to
evolve beyond its primary objective of protecting air bases and installations, a
task that could be relegated to a force already designed for such a purpose: the
paramilitary Central Industrial Security Force. There is a broad consensus within
India’s SOF community that where the Garud truly needs to focus its efforts is
on developing a core of highly trained JTACs and forward-deployed air combat–
control teams.162 Another core objective would be to specialize in the emergency
extraction of downed IAF pilots or groups of SFFs or Para SFs isolated behind
enemy lines.163 Yet, according to most interviewees, until now not much progress
has been made on these fronts.
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi came into office in May 2014, there was
hope in a few quarters that some long-advocated defense reforms, such as the
creation of a chief of defense staff, an aerospace command, a cyber command,
and a JSOC, finally would materialize. As time has gone by, hopes of sudden
and major reform under this government—whether in the realm of economy
or defense—have begun to dwindle. This does not mean, however, that there is
no movement.164 The current defense minister, Manohar Parrikar, reportedly
has sought inspiration from both past U.S. defense reforms and Israel’s ongoing
efforts to fashion a “Depth Corps Force” that would operate in symbiosis with a
new Israeli JSOC.165 During a visit to U.S. Pacific Command in early December
2015, Parrikar allegedly also sought details on the conduct of U.S. Air Force
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special operations, with the goal of applying these insights to the future development of the Garud.166
Some Indian interviewees noted, rather pessimistically, that major organizational reform might occur only in the wake of some form of catastrophe. This was
the case, for example, for the United States, which created its Special Operations
Command in the wake of the humiliating debacle of 1980’s Operation EAGLE
CLAW.167
Special Operations and the Question of Political Sponsorship
In his detailed, empirical study of the efficacy of past special operations, Colin
Gray points to the fundamental importance of “permissive domestic conditions,
and a tolerant political and strategic culture.”168 Owing to the unorthodox nature
of SOF tactics and the politically sensitive missions with which SOFs are often
entrusted, their use implies a certain risk tolerance on the part of political decision makers.
In 2015, the Indian government signed off on a much-publicized, and
relatively successful, Para SF raid into Myanmar. That operation, however, was
undertaken against lightly armed insurgents and with the acquiescence of the
Myanmar government.169 Most recently, IA SOFs allegedly carried out punitive
strikes against “terror launchpads” in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, in response
to a bloody terrorist attack on Indian soil.170 At the time of this writing, the
specifics of the operation remain shrouded in uncertainty and subject to heated
speculation, particularly in the Indian and Pakistani press.171 According to some
of this author’s more-reliable sources, the operation was conducted by two units
of Para SFs (from the 4th and 9th Battalions), operating under cover of artillery
fire. Heliborne operations were limited to the drop-off and pickup points, from
which the SOFs proceeded on foot. Ghatak platoons drawn from regular army
units provided rear-area security, helping to ensure the safe extraction of the
Para SFs once their direct-action mission was completed.172 If this account is
accurate—and it may prove impossible to verify completely—it would not be the
first time India (or Pakistan) has deployed SOFs for shallow thrusts across the
Indo-Pakistani Line of Control.173 It is important to stress, however, the inherent
differences from employing SOFs in some of the China-related contingencies discussed in this paper. Deploying Indian SOF teams for more-prolonged missions,
deeper into contested territory, and against a far more capable adversary would
require a much greater willingness to embrace risk, friction, and uncertainty.174
On a broader level, successful covert action hinges on a clear intellectual understanding of the strategic value of special operations rather than a fixation on
short-term tactical gains.175 A previous section demonstrated that Indian security
managers have yet to develop a truly joint vision for special operations. Within
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the Indian media, for their part, commentary on SOF-related issues all too often
is confined narrowly to CT-related issues. A common refrain among Indian Para
SF officers is that India’s political leaders and public view special forces as “little
more than glorified infantry,” and through a narrow tactical lens rather than
strategically.176 What such statements imply is that SOFs frequently are reduced
to functioning as heavily armed substitutes for standard units, or are viewed as
shock troops—ancillary forces whose role is to support a wider war effort. While
there is certainly a danger in overly fetishizing special operations and in neglecting to integrate SOFs properly with conventional forces, there also are costs to
failing to appreciate the uniqueness of SOF attributes.177 As one U.S. study from
the 1990s eloquently articulated, “A military structured for linear, attritional
warfare gains little leverage from SOF operations. It correspondingly sees little
value in SOFs and would prefer that SOF assets be distributed broadly to the force
as a whole. By contrast, a force structured for thrusting along fault lines will use
SOF units to gain leverage by initiating the breach and by generating chaos in the
enemy’s rear.”178
A common criticism levied at the IA is precisely that it is structured for “linear,
attritional warfare,” not for “thrusting along fault lines.”179 Well-known South
Asianists have described India’s military strategy as one of restraint and as suffering from an absence of strategic initiative.180 While there may be some truth
to these characterizations, they are also far too sweeping.
Indeed, India’s very unique model of civil-military dysfunction, somewhat
paradoxically, has provided the armed services with a lot of leeway in the pursuit
of operational planning.181 As evidenced in the section detailing India’s strategy
of “offensive area denial” vis-à-vis its trans-Himalayan neighbor, the IA concept
of operations for a LAC-related contingency is far from passive or reactive. To
the contrary, it places a strong emphasis on regaining the initiative rapidly, on
conducting surgical strikes deep within the Chinese interior, and on horizontal
escalation across multiple sections of the border.
The question, however, is whether India’s political leadership would be willing
to sign off on these plans. Even though India’s current government seems intent
on signaling that it is less reticent to use force and risk escalation, much would
depend on the circumstances of the conflict and the exact nature of Chinese
aggression. A number of important questions remain open. Would India’s politicians be willing to accede to IA requests to extend the army’s operational ambit
far beyond the LAC? Would airpower be employed for standoff strikes across
the border, or would it remain confined to the Indian side, as during the Kargil
War?182 If some of the priority targets are communication and transportation
nodes within the TAR and the PLAAF and PLARF have not yet entered the fray,
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would India consider it more judicious to employ ground-based, deniable SOFs
rather than initiating a cycle of vertical escalation via targeted missile strikes and
the use of air-launched ordnance?
Perhaps most importantly, would India’s political leadership draw on its Tibet
“trump card” and exercise the special warfare option? New Delhi may be leery to
do so, for several reasons. First, it may fear a Chinese counterescalation in India’s
northeast, with all the attendant implications for India’s long-term stability and
its ability to secure the narrow Siliguri corridor that connects its northeastern
states to the Indian subcontinent.183 Second, such a move could encounter hostility from the current Tibetan government in exile, which officially has renounced
violence and historically has perceived Tibetan guerrilla movements as competing power structures within a heavily factionalized refugee community.184
Furthermore, within some segments of Indian society, sentiments toward the Tibetan community occasionally have verged on the hostile, and support for greater
Tibetan autonomy has not been uniformly robust.185 While the Modi government
has been more overtly supportive of the Tibetan cause than its predecessor, this
may not always be the case. Indian security managers may be unwilling to stoke
the flames of militancy for fear of inadvertently redirecting Tibetan nationalism
and thereby spawning yet another form of separatist movement on their own soil.
From a purely operational standpoint, an unconventional warfare campaign
would no doubt yield precious tactical dividends, by increasing Chinese rear-area
anxiety and compelling the PLA to tie down large numbers of troops in surveillance and garrison duties. If India’s goal in the event of conflict, however, is to
conclude hostilities rapidly on favorable terms, such a move could prove counterproductive, as it inevitably would lead to protraction, along with widespread
suffering among the Tibetan people, thus impeding war termination. In effect,
the wisest posture might be to maintain such a capability as a form of deterrent
and as part of a broader competitive strategy, and to resort to special warfare only
in the event of significant escalation on the part of China.186
The LAC constitutes the longest disputed land border in the world. For close to
six decades, the lack of resolution has served as a vivid reminder of the tensions
that linger at the heart of the Sino-Indian relationship. For New Delhi, the preservation of local superiority along the Himalayan belt is of paramount importance
and continues to inform its defense planning and force-structure plans.
This article has summarized the various correlations of military force along
the Sino-Indian border and has charted the changes in New Delhi’s operational
concepts and attitudes toward territorial defense. While Indian planners have
moved toward adopting a more-offensive form of area denial, they continue to
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rely, for the most part, on conventional forces that could be overcome or circumvented in the event of a fast-moving, localized, and limited border confrontation
launched from higher elevations. Taking into account the rugged nature of the
terrain and the continued paucity of infrastructure, a case has been made here
for a more reactive, distributed, and mobile force structure and for greater reliance on special forces, working in tandem with locally raised battalions of scouts.
Despite the existence of a large number of SOFs, along with plans for further
expansion, India has yet to articulate their role clearly and continues to view such
units as ancillaries to conventional troops rather than as potential force multipliers. While warning against an overreliance on special operators, this article has
laid out the operational benefits to be accrued from their tailored employment in
a number of potential Sino-Indian contingencies, ranging across a broad spectrum of conflict.
Before India is able to envisage such ambitiously minded concepts of operations, however, steps will need to be taken and reforms will need to be enacted.
These extend well beyond issues of equipment, training, and procurement;
defense management, political vision, and doctrinal definition will need to be
addressed. The long-discussed creation of a triservice JSOC would constitute
an important step forward. Perhaps most importantly, India’s security managers
will need to embrace an operational philosophy that places a greater emphasis
on rapidly regaining the initiative and on high-end asymmetric warfare. In short,
their mode of thinking may need to become more Chinese.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIETNAM’S
SEA-DENIAL STR ATEGY
Shang-su Wu

I

n the past two decades, Vietnam’s military investment has manifested a strategic
shift of national interest from land to the maritime sphere, especially since 2000.
This evolution reflects the country’s altered external environment and its economic transformation.
During the Cold War, Hanoi focused on land warfare. Despite the existence of
a small navy since the 1960s, land warfare represented the main security issue for
Vietnamese decision makers, whether it concerned the Vietnam War against the
United States and its allies, military intervention in Cambodia, or border defense
against China.
Subsequently the normalization of relations with neighboring countries,
particularly China, as well as a pivot toward a more trade-oriented economy,
altered Hanoi’s strategic circumstances. Whereas all of Vietnam’s land borders
have been accepted mutually in a series of treaties, Vietnam’s water territory is
still vulnerable, especially in the face of China’s rising maritime power, because
the maritime boundaries are unsettled. This threat affects not only Vietnam’s
management of its maritime resources but also the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), a critical factor in international trade.1 Given the large
gap in naval and air military capabilities between
Shang-su Wu is a research fellow in the military
studies program of the S. Rajaratnam School of In- Hanoi and Beijing, the former’s projects in pursuit
ternational Studies, Nanyang Technological Univerof military modernization reflect a clear strategic
sity, Singapore. After acquiring his PhD at the Uni2
versity of New South Wales, Australia, he worked in focus on sea denial.
the Legislative Yuan in Taipei, Taiwan.
However, a series of questions concerning Vietnam’s sea-denial capabilities present themselves,
© 2017 by Shang-su Wu
Naval War College Review, Winter 2017, Vol. 70, No. 1
and those questions cannot be answered fully yet.
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Why did Hanoi adopt a sea-denial strategy? What are the characteristics of that
strategy? How much does Vietnam’s sea-denial strategy serve its national interests? This article examines Vietnam’s geostrategic circumstances to understand
better its choice of a sea-denial strategy. Hanoi’s current achievements in building its sea-denial capability, as well as the characteristics and limitations of that
capability, are reviewed. Finally, as the United States and its allies vis-à-vis China
increase their military presence in the South China Sea, the article discusses the
effects of Vietnam’s sea-denial strategy and the country’s relevant military capabilities on the geostrategic situation.
VIETNAM’S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND
NATIONAL INTERESTS
In Vietnam’s geostrategic environment, Beijing poses the greatest threat to
Hanoi’s maritime interests. Other countries are unable or unlikely to pose any
significant challenge.
A number of regional states, e.g., the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, claim particular territories in the South China Sea, but their limited naval
capabilities do not pose a credible threat to Vietnam. Given geographic adjacency, Cambodia and Thailand might be thought to have the potential for conflict
with Vietnam over maritime interests, but in fact these countries cooperate on
maritime and military issues.3 With regard to capability, no country in the region
possesses a navy strong enough to threaten Vietnam’s. As for the great powers,
only China has territorial disputes with Vietnam.
Despite several cases of bilateral cooperation, such as during the Vietnam War,
Chinese geopolitical pressure on Vietnam goes back more than a thousand years.
In the past, the countries’ shared land borders presented natural points of access
for projecting force, as evidenced in the war between them of 1979.4 Therefore,
history forms an indispensable part of Vietnam’s strategic culture, and resisting
China’s dominance remains important.5 Since the normalization of bilateral relations in 1991, Hanoi pragmatically has hedged its bets in relations with Beijing
in the economic and political areas. In parallel, the countries have concluded
bilateral agreements on land borders, which tends to reduce the risk of territorial
disputes, a common cause of warfare.
However, the theater for bilateral territorial disputes has moved to sea areas.
Since 2009, various events have confirmed some serious security concerns, such
as Beijing’s nine-dash line; its assertive attitude toward its territorial claims,
backed by its strengthening military capability; and a series of maritime territorial conflicts employing violent means—Beijing’s so-called salami strategy.6 Since
Vietnam’s 2007 launch of its strategy to develop its maritime industries for greater
contribution to its economy, followed by the introduction of a range of related
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legislation and policy, the conflicts with China on territorial waters have become
even more pressing.7
Given the geostrategic conditions and the nature of maritime conflict in
general, three levels of possible scenarios for a conflict between Vietnam and
China suggest themselves: low-intensity conflicts, medium armed conflicts, and a
blockade conducted by China. (Higher-level scenarios, such as attacking onshore
targets and conducting land warfare, would not be purely maritime conflicts, and
thus are not covered in this article.)
Low-intensity conflict mainly would involve coast guards or other paramilitary forces. Military units might be involved, but without applying most weapon
systems.8 The category of medium armed conflicts covers a wide spectrum of
military engagements; protecting or restoring control of an island and exchanging fire are two prospective scenarios. Instituting a blockade is classified as a major act of war because of the magnitude of the sphere of battle affected. Whereas
an armed conflict that occurred in water territory might not endanger major
economic activities or populations, both Hanoi and Beijing nonetheless might
view it as an intense territorial collision. A naval blockade, having a broader and
greater impact, in particular economically, would be seen as escalation, because it
would represent a greater application of strategic pressure, or even a challenge to
survival—which Vietnam’s political leaders could neither ignore nor downplay.
Since a considerable portion of the Vietnamese economy is based in the north
and China’s adjacent Hainan Island makes the Gulf of Tonkin a semiclosed body
of water, even blockading only northern Vietnam would have significant effects.
Blockading the entire Vietnamese coastline may not be impossible for China’s
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN), but an operation of that scale
would be more challenging.
Low-Intensity Conflict
As the maritime collisions that have occurred in the South China Sea in recent
years have demonstrated, both Hanoi and Beijing use their coast guards, maritime police forces, and other law-enforcement entities to attempt to establish the
legitimacy of their claims over territories while avoiding military engagement.
Notwithstanding this, they do carry out aggressive actions such as deliberate
collisions and ramming, the shooting of flares, and water cannoning.9 In such
scenarios, the direct involvement of Vietnam’s military capabilities, such as
fighter-bombers or submarines, is unsuitable. This leaves Hanoi with surveillance
systems as the only support available to its coast guard operations. However,
attempts to maintain control of islands or direct attacks on vessels and aircraft
might escalate into armed conflict.
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Vietnam’s military deployments to a number of islands, particularly the
Spratlys, are vulnerable to blockade, raid, and invasion owing to their isolation
and limited firepower. According to satellite images, the Vietnamese posts in the
South China Sea are too small to contain sophisticated weapon systems or related
surveillance equipment.10 Therefore, the Vietnamese troops at best may be armed
with short-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but likely only with light arms
and antitank weapons.
As long as Chinese armed forces did not succeed in bringing about a fait accompli, i.e., accomplishing a takeover in one fell swoop, the Vietnam People’s
Army (VPA) Navy (VPAN) and the VPA Air Force (VPAAF) might focus profitably on denying Chinese access. Once an island was captured, Vietnam would
experience considerable difficulty in retaking it by force, as doing so most likely
would involve a joint operation. If Vietnamese forces were unable to retake such
an island, they could isolate it by denying its SLOCs. However, this kind of
siege tactic would take time to work, and the situation would turn into a war of
attrition—which would be unfavorable for Vietnam. In a war of attrition, the
small numbers of Vietnamese combat aircraft, surface vessels, and submarines
likely could not sustain a blockade in the face of their superior Chinese counterparts. (A later portion of this article is given over to a comparison of the respective forces.)
Medium Conflict
Exchange of fire, either accidental or intentional, could occur in the South China
Sea. Escalation is the key factor: no matter which side loses in the first round of
combat, the subsequent response is critical. If one side sends in reinforcements,
the other may do so as well. If an increasingly intense spiral of response develops,
the situation may evolve into a war of attrition—again, a situation unfavorable
to Vietnam.
However, unlike in the previous scenario (protecting or retaking an island,
which involves concentration on a specific location), in an exchange-of-fire
scenario Hanoi could apply guerrilla tactics by moving aircraft or vessels or both
into other sea areas where Beijing has concerns. Although China’s maritime
forces are superior to Vietnam’s, they cannot deploy everywhere. Thus, Hanoi
could make use of any weaknesses in Beijing’s military presence to launch attacks
for tactical advantage.
Blockade
A Chinese blockade of Vietnam’s SLOCs would constitute an intermediate scenario, representing an escalation above small-scale armed conflict but not yet
reaching the level of an attack on the mainland.
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Although it would not be easy for the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet alone to achieve
a full blockade of Vietnam’s long coastlines, its submarines plus its surface combatants, supported by maritime patrol aircraft and satellites, have the potential
to interfere with Vietnam’s SLOCs from a distance. Given the ability to move
reinforcements from its other fleets, the PLAN might be able to establish a neartotal blockade.
Hanoi could negotiate land transport through Cambodia, via something like
the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail, or use the ports in Rach Gia on the Gulf of Thailand to make sea-transportation connections via the water territories of Cambodia, Thailand, and Malaysia. However, since such alternative arrangements would
involve foreign countries, their viability remains uncertain. In any case, the minor ports in Rach Gia would be insufficient to replace the existing major ones.11
VIETNAM’S SEA-DENIAL STRATEGY
In most scenarios—other than low-intensity conflicts that involve few or no military forces—the VPAN generally faces asymmetrical challenges from its Chinese
counterpart. In such circumstances, a sea-denial strategy is appropriate, in contrast to sea control or a postmodern navy. Although sea denial is not mentioned
in Vietnam’s official publications, its practices demonstrate a preference for such
an approach.
Sea Control
Sea control refers to fleets controlling a specific body of water at a certain time.
This demands a broad formation of surface fleets incorporating comprehensive
air/missile defense, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antiship capabilities,
and additional assistance from aircraft and submarines. A navy exercising sea
control intends to be able not only to expel hostile naval forces but to protect its
country’s maritime activities. However, implementation of a sea-control strategy
is expensive, requiring the building of various vessels and aircraft, especially
surface combatants equipped with excellent capabilities against air, surface, and
underwater targets.12
In Southeast Asia, even Singapore, with its great financial capacity and its
willingness to invest in defense, has only six Formidable-class frigates, which have
some sea-control capability.13 In the asymmetrical naval relationship between
Vietnam and China, even if the former were able to muster defense expenditures
similar to Singapore’s, six to ten surface combatants would not rival any one of
the latter’s three major fleets, each of which has more than twenty major surface
vessels.14 Operationally, Hanoi’s sea-control navy would be vulnerable to Beijing’s
sea-denial capabilities in the air, on the surface, and underwater. (The latter is
also known as an antiaccess/area-denial [A2/AD] strategy.)
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Postmodern Navy
A postmodern naval strategy is aimed at threats from nonstate actors such as
pirates, terrorists, and criminals rather than at other states’ navies. Such a navy
concentrates on sea control, expeditionary operations, keeping order at sea, stability, humanitarian assistance, and cooperative naval diplomacy.15
Note that sea control is listed above as a major goal. However, vessels developed to counter nonstate actors lacking sophisticated military technology—such
as the U.S. Navy littoral combat ships, which provide flexibility, maneuverability,
and speed at relatively low cost—bring only limited capability to a conventional
naval battle.16 Given the present incidence of low-intensity conflicts in the South
China Sea, a postmodern navy might have a role to play, and its relatively cheap
assets would be affordable. However, neglecting conventional naval combat capability likely would leave a postmodern navy, with its limited firepower, unable
to support escalation. Following this naval strategy would leave Vietnam with
limited options by which to respond to maritime challenges from China.
Sea Denial
Sea denial refers to the prevention or disturbance of an enemy’s use of the sea,
particularly in areas adjacent to the defender’s coast. This strategy has been
applied widely by states lacking sufficient capacity or capability to exercise sea
control.
The concept of sea-denial strategy has experienced evolution and enrichment as a result of the development of modern defense technology. Owing to
the invention of torpedoes, then of antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), as well as
the various platforms on which each of these can be deployed, the strike range
of sea denial underwent a gradual expansion, from distances in the visible range
to hundreds of nautical miles. The importance of surveillance and targeting
increased accordingly. Thus, a variety of platforms (e.g., land-based reconnaissance and strike aircraft, over-the-horizon [OTH] radars, ocean-reconnaissance
satellites, ASCMs) have been applied to the problem, gradually enabling a multidimensional and networked system for sea denial.17
This result mainly flowed from the Soviet navy’s efforts during the Cold War.18
With its similarly asymmetrically limited resources, Vietnam might find that
a variety of sea-denial technologies would present an economical solution by
which it could counter China in the maritime environment. The building of submarines, missile boats, maritime strike aircraft, ASCMs, moderate surveillance
capability (the South China Sea is relatively small), and other sea denial–oriented
technologies is in fact the approach Vietnam has taken in its recent military
buildup. Furthermore, a sea-denial strategy usually is constrained to a specific
space, which presents it as a less-offensive posture; this fits well with Hanoi’s official principle of self-defense.19
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Vietnam’s sea-denial strategy would focus on Chinese surface vessels—the
main platforms for most maritime activities—in the South China Sea. Chinese
submarines and aircraft are also valuable targets, but the stealth of submarines
and the mobility of aircraft make them less feasible targets than surface vessels,
which are comparatively slow and detectable.20 Furthermore, most maritime activities, such as mining and fishing, are conducted using surface platforms, rather
than aerial or underwater ones.
A Vietnamese sea-denial strategy might be conceptualized and executed as
follows:
• The relatively small size of the South China Sea would allow Vietnamese
reconnaissance aircraft, as well as other reconnaissance facilities such as
satellites, to locate targets for the command center and the strike forces.
• Then Vietnamese combat aircraft, equipped with airborne ASCMs, would
constitute a major strike force capable of covering the greater part of the
South China Sea.
• Despite their slow speed, submarines would be the best platforms for antiship missions owing to their stealth and lack of need for air cover.
• Small surface vessels, such as missile boats, are valuable in defending coastal
areas, as they are easy to hide and wield the considerable firepower of ASCMs.
However, their narrow range in detecting targets, especially beyond the horizon, and their low durability would restrict them in such a large theater.
• Although major surface vessels, such as frigates, have better surveillance
capability because of their larger space for equipment and shipboard helicopters, which might enable them to make a greater contribution to sea
denial, their vulnerability to a saturated attack by ASCMs and their high cost
constrain their use for sea-denial operations.
In addition to the sea surface, airspace is essential to sea denial. If the VPAAF
is able to establish air superiority, or at least to constrain its Chinese counterpart’s
activities, it would make a sea-denial strategy more effective.
VIETNAM’S DEVELOPMENT OF SEA-DENIAL CAPABILITY
So far, Hanoi’s recent military procurements generally have reflected the sort of
strategy laid out above. Vietnam practiced a sea-denial strategy previously, during the Indochina War. As far back as the early 1960s, it acquired a number of
Soviet P-4 and P-6 torpedo boats, and later introduced Project 183 and Project
206 missile boats armed with P-15 ASCMs. However, as most battles in that war
occurred on land, Hanoi paid more attention to denying American airpower using numerous Soviet SAMs, such as the S-75, S-125, and 2K-12, as well as a range
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

Printer_Winter2017Review.indb 149

155

12/15/16 1:53 PM

150

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 1, Art. 11

of fighters, mainly MiG-21s. After unification in 1975, Moscow supplied a range
of sea-denial weapon systems, such as Su-22 attacker aircraft equipped with
airborne Kh-23, Kh-25, and Kh-28 air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), more missile
boats, and S-35 coastal ASCMs, supported by better surveillance systems such as
Be-12 flying boats and Ka-25/27 helicopters.21
However, following the political reforms of 1986, the rapprochement with
China, Vietnam’s withdrawal from its military interventions in neighboring
countries, and the easing of international tensions overall at the close of the Cold
War, Vietnam dramatically shifted application of its national resources toward
economic development. This decreased military preparation, and therefore the
country’s sea-denial capability. In particular, the decrease in operational strike
aircraft such as Su-22s significantly reduced Vietnam’s sea-denial radius.22
After the Soviet Union collapsed, Hanoi lost financial and logistical support
from that source. This led to a period of stagnation for the VPAN and the VPAAF,
at the same time as their Chinese counterparts were increasing their modernization projects. After surviving the most difficult years in the early 1990s, Vietnam
made minor efforts in the later 1990s to resume a slight buildup of its naval and
aerial capabilities. It introduced two BPS-500 missile boats, four Project 1241
missile boats, and twelve Su-27SK fighters with Kh-35 ASCMs, all from Russia.23
However, such small-scale projects constituted the VPAN and the VPAAF merely
keeping up with progress in military technology rather than providing a strong
response to the regional arms dynamic.
In the latter part of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Vietnam’s
improving financial capacity eventually allowed a large-scale military procurement. Since the end of the Cold War, Hanoi has maintained a gross domestic
product (GDP) growth rate of more than 5 percent, except in 1999, and late in
the following decade it increased its defense budget significantly, to an amount
three times larger than it was in 1991.24 For strategic and operational reasons,
the increase in investment mainly went into maritime capability. However, the
VPAN’s Cold War legacy of Soviet vessels remains small and aging, and thus the
service is incapable of properly protecting Vietnam’s maritime activities within its
water territory.25 The recent increase in procurement reflects Vietnam’s security
concerns regarding China, especially the latter’s increasingly tough approach to
territorial disputes since 2007, as seen in a variety of bilateral conflicts at sea.26
In this strategic environment, the VPAN and the VPAAF have been considered
strategic priorities—despite the VPA’s superiority in the Vietnamese military
structure and its political influence—and their military procurement projects
have been oriented toward denial.
The country’s determination to improve maritime and aerial defense is
evident.27 The maritime buildups comprise ten additional Project 1241 missile
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boats armed with Kh-35 ASCMs, thirty-six Su-30MKK fighter-bombers with
Kh-29 and Kh-31 ASMs and KAB-500/1500 guided bombs, thirteen used Su22M attackers from the Czech Republic and Ukraine, six Project 636 dieselelectric submarines (SSKs) equipped with fifty 3M-54 ASCMs, two Bastion-P
coastal defense systems with forty P-800 supersonic ASCMs, four to six
Gepard-3 frigates, two Dutch Sigma 9814-class corvettes, eight Project 10412
patrol vessels, and six Canadian DHC-6-400 and two Polish M-28B maritime
patrol aircraft.28 As fourth-generation fighters, the Su-30MKKs—with new
avionics and an eight-ton payload for ground-attack munitions, especially for
Kh-31 supersonic ASMs—form a considerable strike capability, in particular
against surface vessels. Despite their old design, modernized Su-22 aircraft still
can provide platforms for some ASMs, to supplement the Su-30s in sea-denial
missions.29 Hanoi also has shown an interest in purchasing non-Russian combat aircraft.30 Russian Kh-35, 3M-54, and P-800 missiles also are used to deny
adversary surface vessels beyond the horizon, with maritime patrol aircraft assisting in finding targets.31 Vietnam’s procurement of two S-300PMU-1 SAM
systems (maximum range: 150 km) and its procurement in the near future of
S-400 SAMs (maximum range: 400 km) may provide the capability to deny Chinese aerial activity in some offshore areas.32 In contrast to other Association of
Southeast Asian Nations countries, Vietnam’s efforts in military modernization
are outstanding. And they are concentrated fully on the maritime field—the
VPA has received no major project.33 The predominance of Russian equipment
probably reflects the legacy of the Soviet sea-denial strategy that somewhat fit
Vietnam’s needs, as well as the tight bilateral relations.34 However, the Russian
dominance in Hanoi’s arsenal may present operational and logistical obstacles
for several non-Russian systems.
Sufficient training is an indispensable factor in the efficient use of military
assets, and Hanoi is making improvements in this area. For decades, limited
budgets constrained training of VPAN and VPAAF forces, but the new projects
are bringing in additional capacity. Weapon systems from foreign suppliers come
with the provision of training in operation, maintenance, and repair, as well
as simulation facilities. In addition, joint exercises with foreign countries can
strengthen training.35 Internally, the personnel interchange program between
the VPAN and the VPAAF that began in 2009 also may strengthen their ability
to conduct joint operations.36 However, the VPAN is still rather inexperienced in
operating and maintaining sophisticated naval weapon systems and operations,
especially those for submarines.37
Despite its lack of mention in official Vietnamese materials, such as the defense white paper, Vietnam’s enhancement of its naval and aviation assets may
represent Hanoi’s intention to prepare for multilevel conflicts. As the economic
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importance of maritime resources grows, the naval and aviation buildups indicate some concern about control of the Vietnamese exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). The patrol vessels, corvettes, frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, and fighters
are designated to protect the EEZ in an armed conflict up to a medium level. In
other words, Vietnam’s military buildups suggest that Hanoi is concerned about
more than just sea denial. In the case of larger-scope warfare scenarios involving China’s massed forces, the VPAN and the VPAAF likely would be ineffective
at protecting aerial and maritime activities, or even simply providing escorts,
so they would concentrate on denial operations. The Vietnamese missile boats,
SSKs, coastal ASCMs, and SAMs are intended specifically to deny particular
aerial and maritime targets.
However, in contrast to their earlier capabilities, the VPAN and the VPAAF
now can extend their denial power by using longer-range arms with greater destructive capability. For example, the maximum range of the 3M-54 ASCMs is
at least 220 km, a figure that could be multiplied depending on the mobility of
their submarine platforms. The supersonic P-800 ASCMs with 300 km range are
less likely to be intercepted than the older subsonic ASCMs.38 The S-300PMU-1
SAMs have the potential to cover a range of airspace over some coastal waters,
while the Su-30MK2’s wide combat radius and beyond-vision-range capability
can extend the range of engagement.39
Moreover, the longer-range weapon systems not only enable Hanoi to deny
hostile aerial and maritime activities beyond its EEZ but also present opportunities to strike certain Chinese military facilities. A prime candidate would be Yulin
on Hainan Island, the home base of the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet—a major facility
less than 300 km from Vietnam’s coastline.40 Hanoi’s R-17 and 3M-54 missiles
could reach the Chinese naval base, and the act of striking its vessels and facilities
could be seen as part of a sea-denial strategy.41 However, as previously discussed,
attacking onshore targets almost certainly would be classified as escalation, and
Vietnam would face even greater retaliation from China. Furthermore, the shortness of the distance between the Vietnamese coastline and Hainan Island would
be convenient in turn for the PLAN and other Chinese military units to launch
retaliatory attacks, thus leaving Vietnamese facilities vulnerable. Therefore, while
such threats may help in deterrence, they may be disadvantageous to carry out.
THE CAPABILITY GAP
Despite considerable investment, several factors constrain Vietnam’s current
capability to achieve fully its strategic goal—denial of China’s maritime activities
in the South China Sea.
First, Vietnam’s surveillance capability may be insufficient, or at least weak.
Long-range weapon systems rely on targeting; the platforms themselves, whether
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vessels or aircraft, may have limited detection capability. Vietnamese surveillance
currently relies on the country’s VNREDSat-1 natural resource satellite, which
uses French technology, and several aerial platforms such as the VPAN M-28,
DHC-6 maritime patrol aircraft, and Vietnamese Coast Guard C-212 maritime
patrol aircraft. Strike aircraft such as the Su-22, -27, and -30 add limited detection
capability.42 Hanoi’s current remote-sensing cooperative effort with New Delhi
may contribute to surveillance as well.43 Land-based radars, signal-collection
facilities, and surface vessels also may be important for Vietnam, although
little information is available on Hanoi’s planning in this regard. A central and
networked command system could be established, as long as the VPAN takes
significant lessons from the Soviet sea-denial strategy.44
Given the above, Vietnam may be able to observe the whole South China Sea
area. However, several questions arise regarding this surveillance arrangement,
relating to integration and survivability.
Integrating and sharing the collected intelligence among various aerial platforms, the command chain, and strike units would not be easy. Owing to its
earth-observation function and foreign management, the VNREDSat-1 might
not provide real-time information. A similar situation might occur regarding the
Vietnam-India space cooperative venture.45 Because Vietnam’s existing aerialsurveillance platforms come from various sources, such as Russia and Israel, their
integration would present another challenge.46
With regard to survivability, Vietnamese propeller-driven maritime patrol
aircraft lacking VPAAF escort would be vulnerable in the air to Chinese fighters;
and even when escorts were available, VPAAF fighters would be outnumbered by
their Chinese counterparts. In the Guangzhou Military Region alone, the PLAN
Air Force and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) deploy four times as many fourthgeneration fighters as the VPAAF, not to mention potential reinforcements from
other areas in China (see table 1).47 The recent formation of the Chinese Southern
Theater Command, which has broader coverage than the Guangzhou Military
Region, may allow its commander to concentrate even more assets.48 China’s
air superiority also includes better intelligence and command, accommodated
by its airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and longer-range
air-refueling aircraft.49 In addition, in the near future PLAN fighters based on
aircraft carrier(s) or on forward bases on some of the Spratly Islands may pre
sent a further feasible option.50 This would mean that the VPAAF’s surveillance
capability could be decreased significantly, if not neutralized, during wartime.
Ground facilities in Vietnam also may be exposed to Chinese strikes, particularly
from ASMs.51 The Vietnamese Suhkoi Flanker aircraft, with their high mobility
and air-to-air combat ability, may be more likely to survive, but they likely would
be occupied with various other missions, such as aerial combat, rather than with
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF AIRPOWER BETWEEN VIETNAM AND CHINA
Fighter Generation

Vietnam

Guangzhou Military Region, China (combined PLAAF and PLANAF units)

3rd

MiG-21Bis/UM: 33; Su-22M/UM: 28

J-7s: 3 regiments and 1 brigade, about 120;
J-8s: 1 regiment, about 24

4th

Su-27SK/UBK: 11; Su-30MK2: 36 (29
delivered)

J-11/B (Su-27): 4 regiments, about 96; J-10: 2
regiments and 1 brigade, about 72; Su-30MKK:
1 regiment, about 24

Note: PLANAF = PLA Naval Air Force
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2016, pp. 244–45, 248, 298; van Creveld, The Age of Airpower, pp. 198–204.

detecting maritime targets. Without aerial intelligence from fixed-wing aircraft,
the VPAN would be dependent on its Ka-27 helicopters and sonars alone to
detect targets beyond the horizon. But those helicopters easily could fall prey to
attack by China’s fighters, and the availability and quality of information from
sonar are sometimes unstable owing to fluctuations in maritime conditions.
In short, the VPAN and other forces may not be able to provide sufficient
information on targets beyond the horizon.
Second, the majority of Vietnamese weapon systems share the same Russian
origins as their Chinese counterparts. For example, both Hanoi and Beijing
purchase the Su-30MK2 and Project 636 SSKs, although the former’s submarines may be more advanced than the latter’s.52 Thus, the general technological
characteristics and even the details of Vietnam’s supposed “trump cards” may
be transparent to China already. The Vietnamese crews may learn different
doctrines and tactics as a result of training in India; however, the Chinese operators of those Russian aircraft and submarines have had more time than their
Vietnamese counterparts—owing to earlier procurement and perhaps to reverse
engineering—to master similar weapon systems.53 Besides the fighters and submarines, the VPAAF’s Kh-31P antiradar missile is valuable in destroying enemy
radars, AWACS, and other surveillance systems, or threatening to shut them off,
but it would not be as formidable against the PLAN or the PLAAF, again owing to
China’s earlier procurement advantage.54 Although Hanoi has begun to purchase
non-Russian arms unavailable to Beijing, such as the Dutch Sigma corvettes, it
will be difficult for it to change the Russian-dominant nature of its military in
the near future.
Finally, quantitative inferiority would constrain the durability and credibility of Vietnam’s A2/AD strategy, and Vietnam’s limited logistical facilities and
training may not help the situation. As most modern sea-denial platforms, such
as submarines and fighter-bombers, require intensive maintenance as well as
excellent training to retain their operability, even Hanoi’s increased investment
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/11

Printer_Winter2017Review.indb 154

160

12/15/16 1:53 PM

WU

War College: Winter 2017 Full Issue

155

TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF NAVAL POWER BETWEEN VIETNAM AND
CHINA’S SOUTH SEA FLEET
Type of Vessel

Vietnam

South Sea Fleet, China

Surface combatants

Frigates: 2 (total of 8 involved in current deals)

Destroyers: 7; frigates: 20

Submarines

SSKs: 6

SSNs: 2; SSKs: 16

Note: SSN = nuclear attack submarine
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2016, pp. 248, 298.

to date may not be sufficient.55 Although Russia is assisting Vietnam with missile manufacture and shipbuilding, Vietnam remains restricted by its limited
defense industry and its resultant dependence on foreign supply for some critical
parts, such as engines. Most VPAN and VPAAF weapon systems, especially nonRussian ones, also would face supply issues during conflict.56 Apart from the
above-mentioned quantitative gap in the number of combat aircraft, the numbers
of Vietnamese major surface vessels and submarines are much lower than those
of the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet (see table 2).57 Despite the sometimes advantageous asymmetrical nature of Hanoi’s sea-denial strategy, Beijing’s sheer numerical superiority may allow it to absorb losses Hanoi would inflict during warfare,
and eventually to coerce the latter toward the former’s strategic goals.
Vietnam might achieve a tactical or operational victory in the initial phase of
a conflict. However, owing to integration issues, dependence on Russian arms,
and quantitative inferiority, it is doubtful that Vietnam could sustain that victory
in the face of China’s superior military capability.
In cases of protecting or restoring control of an island and exchanges of fire,
Beijing easily could reinforce its Guangzhou Military Region from other regions
with more vessels and aircraft to prolong the war, and even to transform it into
a war of attrition. A positive outcome for Vietnam would be a decisive victory
that caused China to withdraw because of serious damage to either its military
capability or its international reputation. With regard to achieving this strategic
goal, the VPAN’s Project 636 SSKs, with their stealth characteristics and longrange ASCMs, would be most likely to survive and might succeed in launching
several waves of attacks on the surface vessels of the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet.
The Sukhoi aircraft and surface vessels also could contribute their respective
ASCMs to sea-denial strikes. Since major surface vessels are a significant—and
expensive—component of China’s sea power, the sinking of a number of frigates
and destroyers, or even an aircraft carrier, might force Chinese decision makers
to cease fire. However, the South Sea Fleet’s sixteen SSKs plus two nuclear attack
submarines might constrain or even neutralize the Vietnamese SSKs’ tactical
advantages, as submarines often make effective ASW platforms.58 By the same
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token, Vietnamese aircraft and vessels may bear considerable losses in the face
of dominant Chinese countermeasures, especially if the latter can attack the former’s bases ashore.
In a blockade scenario, the VPAN—limited in ASW capacity, frigates, helicopters, and aircraft—would be unlikely to neutralize or expel the PLAN’s numerous
submarines or to be able to escort merchant vessels through the SLOCs to a safe
area. VPAN and VPAAF ASCMs could keep the PLAN’s surface vessels at some
distance from the Vietnamese coastline, but Vietnam might fail to deal effectively
with a blockade established at a greater distance, owing to its inadequate surveillance capability and the limited ranges of its surface vessels and strike aircraft.
The VPAN’s small flotilla of Project 636 SSKs would pose a considerable threat
against major Chinese surface ships, but their number may be too small to create a real impediment to China’s access to SLOCs, given their limited long-term
durability, the narrow margin for loss, and the risk of attacking vessels from
other countries. In other words, Beijing would be likely to press Hanoi through
blockade, and the latter’s countermeasures might not be enough to neutralize the
former’s operation.
In summation, the VPAN and the VPAAF, using an asymmetrical approach
and employing their denial capabilities, may not achieve their strategic goals in
all wartime scenarios by fully neutralizing their Chinese counterparts’ superiority. With Hanoi’s cautious attitude on defense expenditure—allocating roughly
2.5 percent of GDP to the defense budget—it will take a few years to complete its
recent procurements, making future projects rather unlikely, or at least likely to
be of smaller scale.59
It can be deduced from the scenarios outlined that Vietnam faces limited
chances of overall military success, but nonetheless has strengthened its deterrence against China. Given the inherently asymmetrical nature of bilateral
relations between Hanoi and Beijing, the former’s deterrence helps its “hedging
engagement” with the latter by adding considerably to the costs of using force.60
Compared with a decade ago, the cost to China of conducting armed conflict
against Vietnam has become higher, and the outcomes have become less certain.
Before the VPAN and the VPAAF acquired additional assets, Hanoi only had a
declining number of aging Su-22M attacker aircraft to react to any contingency
on the islands it has occupied or the water territories it claims. Although the gap
between the military capabilities of the two sides remains wide, Hanoi now has
expanded its options compared with previous periods. This means the PLAN
and the PLAAF now need to deploy more units in any operation against Vietnam if they are to maintain superiority. This both increases the preparation time
and effort needed, thus reducing the possibility of a surprise attack, and potentially paints China with the more aggressive image on the international stage.
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Tactically, this may make Beijing less likely to use its military units to provoke
small-scale conflicts, especially in cases that involve an unnecessary risk of loss
or defeat.
Since China is involved in other territorial conflicts, such as those relating to
Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands, concerns over any one of them may prevent
Beijing from concentrating enough force to achieve absolute superiority over Hanoi. Without sufficient Chinese superiority, Vietnam’s sea-denial strategy would
prove especially effective, or at least influential, within the broader regional
geostrategic picture, as opposed to the purely bilateral relationship. In this way,
Vietnam’s military investment may contribute to stabilizing or ameliorating the
changing maritime balance of power currently being driven by China’s increasing
naval might.
Hanoi’s sea-denial strategy had its foundation in the Cold War era. The current
version can be interpreted as a moderate form of military modernization and a
reasonable, asymmetrical response to Beijing’s superior military power.
Vietnam’s beefed-up denial capability may mean that China would not perceive it to be the “easiest prey” in the South China Sea; in terms of pure military
capability, the VPAN and the VPAAF are indeed much stronger than their
Philippine counterparts. However, Manila can rely on extended deterrence by
strengthening its alliance mechanisms with the United States, such as the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), and with other countries,
such as Japan. As the Philippines and Vietnam are two frontline states facing
China’s expanding sea power, once the Philippines achieves better deterrence, or
even if Chinese decision makers simply perceive this to be the case, Vietnam may
suffer heavier strategic pressure because of its nonallied international stance.61 In
this context, Hanoi’s pursuit of a sea-denial strategy helps to ensure that, overall,
it is not weaker than Manila when facing Beijing.
Vietnam’s denial capability serves as a diplomatic bargaining chip. During
peacetime, Hanoi’s military investment demonstrates its commitment to security and serves as a form of defense diplomacy. Commitment to defense is a sign
of shouldering responsibility rather than free riding, a matter of importance to
countries considering forming alliances, other cooperative security efforts, or
both with Vietnam. Defense diplomacy (e.g., joint exercises and friendly visits)
represents an effective means by which the VPAN and VPAAF can strengthen
relations with their foreign counterparts.62
If Vietnam had no substantial defense capability, an external third power
would face relatively high costs of intervention, especially in the case of a direct confrontation with China; those costs might be so high that the power
would refrain from taking any substantial action. Since Hanoi is developing the
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capability to take its own steps to resist Beijing’s military initiative during an initial period, a third party—which most likely would be Washington—would have
more options, including providing arms or putting military pressure on Beijing’s
other fronts, such as in the East China Sea. Additionally, if China succeeded in
presenting the world with a fait accompli it would render subsequent external
intervention less meaningful, but Vietnam’s resistance might prevent this. However, despite improving Vietnamese-U.S. military ties, as demonstrated by some
partnering and cooperation, U.S. intervention may remain uncertain owing to
the lack of a formal alliance like that with the Philippines. In this context, Vietnam’s sea-denial capability would be a critical factor for decision makers in the
United States.63 Such a strategy would provide Hanoi with some breathing space
to wait for changes to occur on a domestic or international level, as influenced
by third parties.
The similarity between the Russian-originated weapon systems that Vietnam
and China both use, Vietnam’s quantitative inferiority, and its limited surveillance capability make it unlikely that Vietnam’s denial-oriented military strategy
will be able to counter fully the might even of China’s Guangzhou Military Region
alone. Thus—unless the VPAN and the VPAAF develop some new tactics that
would constitute a significant surprise to their Chinese counterparts—Hanoi’s
present military assets likely are insufficient to achieve the asymmetrical effects
at which its sea-denial strategy aims. Strengthening that deterrence at least would
ameliorate Vietnam’s situation in the geostrategic landscape, including in its bilateral relations with China.
When considering the development of Vietnam’s sea-denial strategy, three
points are worth further discussion: the country’s alliance or defense diplomacy,
further procurement, and political leadership.
Despite an official emphasis on nonalliance, Hanoi is not bound by any treaty
to remain neutral, leaving it free to change its diplomatic policy. In a fashion
similar to the Philippines’ use of the EDCA to strengthen its deterrence against
China, Vietnam also can set up some type of security arrangement with a thirdparty power, whether it be an alliance in name or not. There might be some future
breakthrough in Vietnamese-U.S. relations, although Vietnam’s long relationship
with Russia in defense and economic matters may affect such a process.64 Once
any alliance is formed, the role of Vietnam’s sea-denial strategy may be adjusted
accordingly. Even at a level below an alliance, joint exercises and other forms of
military cooperation also may affect Hanoi’s sea-denial strategy, in addition to
increasing Beijing’s uncertainty about its strategic calculation regarding Hanoi.
As for further procurement, the means by which Vietnam deals with the
weak points in its sea-denial capability will be crucial. Adding surveillance
systems, whether OTH radar, maritime patrol aircraft, or maritime satellites,
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would improve targeting and the organization of attack and command, thereby
strengthening the overall efficiency of sea-denial operations. A more integrated
chain of command would enhance sea-denial capability immediately. Regarding
means used for strikes, ASCMs and aerial platforms would be preferable because
of their high mobility and lower costs of procurement and training compared
with submarines. If financial capacity is limited, land-based ASCMs present an
economical solution.
Finally, it is possible that the new Vietnamese leadership, given its pro-China
record, may adjust the pace and content of military modernization to stabilize
bilateral relations.65 Such a development would require time to manifest itself, because Hanoi’s present arms contracts have not been filled yet, and the situation will
not become clearer until Vietnam launches a new wave of military procurement
—or does not. As deterrence is an indispensable part of Vietnam’s current
China policy, investment in defense is not likely to be dropped entirely from the
country’s list of priorities; but if Vietnam achieves relatively stable relations with
China, it may pay greater attention to economic or other issues, and the pace of
building a sea-denial strategy for Vietnam might slow down.
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what is victory?

John B. Hattendorf

The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of
Modern War, by James Q. Whitman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2012. 336 pages. $19.95 (paperback; e-book
$29.95).
Understanding Victory: Naval Operations from Trafalgar to the
Falklands, by Geoffrey Till. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014.
248 pages. $60 (e-book $60).

How does one measure victory in combat operations? Is there a difference
between victory ashore and victory at sea? These are certainly two fundamental questions about the nature and character of war that are worthy of careful
reflection, but too often they become lost among vague assumptions. The two
scholars who have taken up the challenge in these two volumes represent different academic disciplines and each looks at the subject through quite a different
lens. While each volume makes a substantial contribution to the literature by
itself, when read together they provide an even more interesting and provocative
basis for the readers of this journal to think about victory, both in the past and
in the future.
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historian and historian of modern strategic thought. His book is a set of four case
studies from naval history that focus on single-warship operations in the context
of four major naval events: the battle of Trafalgar in 1805, the battle of Jutland in
1916, the battle of Malaya in 1941, and the Falklands campaign in 1982.
It is useful to start with Whitman’s book. Harvard University Press provocatively
describes his volume as “an iconoclastic tour de force.” Whitman shows that the
concept of victory in battle has changed dramatically over time. He introduces his
topic by quoting the description of the aftermath of the 1859 battle of Solferino
written by Henri Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross and recipient of the first
Nobel Peace Prize: “Anyone crossing the vast theatre of the previous day’s fighting
could see at every step, in the midst of chaotic disorder, despair unspeakable and
misery of every kind” (p. 2).
Whitman then goes on to show that this mid-nineteenth-century pacifist’s
view of the pointless slaughter and misery of battle contrasts sharply with the
view more widely held in history: that death in battle was a profoundly meaningful sacrifice in the process of larger contexts and struggles. Such efforts included
maintaining principles of religion or law and order, redrawing borders, preserving hereditary legal rights, overthrowing regimes, or maintaining national or
imperial survival. Whitman reminds his readers that in the past many writers
described a pitched battle as a type of trial or legal proceeding—a lawful way to
settle disagreements. In ancient times, battles could be fought separately from
society—a farmer could be tending his fields peacefully while a battle took place
nearby. In European medieval history, the result of a battle was seen as the judgment of God. Battle was viewed as a kind of legal ordeal staged to summon God
to judge cases that humans were incapable of deciding on their own. This, Whitman points out, now seems utterly bizarre, when in the modern world we have
come to view legal proceedings as a means to avoid violence. By the eighteenth
century, the medieval view had developed into a concept of contractual settlement: solving international differences through the chance outcome that battle
involved. Under this interpretation, a pitched battle was a way of limiting violence in war and preventing warfare from spilling over into the broader aspects
of society. Although pitched battles involved the savage slaughter of hundreds or
thousands of young men, limiting conflict to such crucibles of violence protected
societies from worse forms of unlimited warfare. In this way, pitched battles
avoided the attacks on general society involved in the indiscriminate violence
of systematic pillaging, scorched-earth campaigns, carpet bombing, terrorist attacks, guerrilla warfare, and the like. The concept of the pitched battle, Whitman
argues, was a more effective means of civilizing warfare than what is available to
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us today, when lawyers argue about jus ad bellum and jus in bello. While these
modern concepts are intended to humanize warfare, they strictly forbid limiting
war by consensual battle, providing for the use of war only in cases of self-defense
and extreme necessity.
Whitman deals with his subject in six chapters.
• In “Why Battles Matter,” he establishes that eighteenth-century pitched
battles were a meaningful and lawful means of establishing rights and settling disputes. This concept broke down in the mid-nineteenth century in
the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War, when its eighteenthcentury legal meaning became lost.
• In “Accepting the Wager of Battle,” he argues that the eighteenth-century
concept had nothing to do with Clausewitzian concepts of battle or with the
culture of dueling, but rather with the minds of eighteenth-century kings—a
battle could gain or lose a kingdom.
• In “Laying Just Claim to the Profits of War,” Whitman shows that warfare in
the eighteenth century, as in earlier times, was about dividing up claims to
territory in the tradition of the ancient just war theorists and insisting that a
legal pretext be given for war. What was different in the eighteenth century
was that only kings retained the practical power to go to war to settle their
differences.
• In “The Monarchical Monopolization of Military Violence,” Whitman
explains that often in history wars have been waged to assert or deny legitimacy to political powers. Agreeing with Max Weber, Whitman writes
that “the sovereign is one who can succeed in claiming the right to exercise
unrestrained violence” (p. 171).
• In “Were There Really Rules?,” Whitman agrees that the eighteenth century
was an era of exceptionally restrained warfare, although it saw actions such
as the unusually bloody battle of Malplaquet in 1709 during the War of the
Spanish Succession; the clash produced some 32,000 casualties. Although
the Duke of Marlborough and his allies lost nearly twice as many men as the
French, contemporaries judged the former the victors because they retained
possession and full control of the battlefield, which their enemies ceded.
In making his point, Whitman points out that the analogy of wars to games,
while an attractive one, is highly misleading. Games have rules that must
be obeyed; war does not. In looking at the eighteenth century, Whitman
concludes that the practice of limited warfare in that era showed that victory
in warfare succeeded in shaping the conduct of war and its results in a way
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that the simple implementation of force did not. The law of victory is seen
in battles such as Chotusitz in 1742 and Yorktown in 1781, making warfare
more controlled and decisive than what came before or after.
• In Whitman’s final chapter, “The Death of Pitched Battle,” leading up to his
conclusion, he discusses the rise of the “great battle” theory and the way in
which it eclipsed the earlier idea that God, fortune, or chance ruled human
events. In the romantic era of the early nineteenth century, chance became
a factor that a genius could control, rather than being the basis for a legal
doctrine of war. In this context, the idea of battles as grandiose pivotal events
in world history gained traction, eclipsing the concept at work during the
eighteenth century.
There is much to learn from understanding the changed conceptions of victory in warfare. Today it is not victories in battle that are seen as world-changing
events; instead, change is created by broader underlying structural forces, such
as economics. Pitched battles do not often occur in the modern world; but as a
result, Whitman notes, it has become hard to bring our wars to an accepted conclusion. The modern victors tend to make claims to limitless rights. Reflecting
on the issues of our time, Whitman concludes: “We need a law of victory that can
help us cut deals and end wars without insisting that every victory must end in a
great triumph for the historic cause of democracy” (p. 260). At the same time, he
cautions: “Wars enter their most dangerous territory when they aim to remake
the world, and the same is true of lawyers” (p. 262).
Geoffrey Till takes a completely different approach to understanding naval victory. His objective is to analyze what has changed and what has not changed in
the successful conduct of naval warfare over the past two hundred years. In examining his four chosen naval battles or campaigns, he concentrates on the role
of a particular ship in each campaign, purposefully selecting a ship that does not
come to mind immediately when one recalls the battle. In doing so, he is well
aware that a superficial glance at his book might lead an observer to conclude that
his focus on battle and little-known individual ships might be considered passé
or even perversely antiquarian.
For that reason, he takes time to explain that his approach is a multilayered
one that presents his subject in a manner that provides an unusual, but highly effective, light on the changing character of naval warfare. In doing this, Till points
out factors that are very useful for modern naval planners to consider regarding
what generally has worked and what has not worked out over time and in differing technological circumstances. To make his point, he systematically applies
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a set of eleven perspectives to use in evaluating each of the cases: (1) strategic
design, (2) technological advantage, (3) command and leadership, (4) organizational efficiency, (5) training, (6) intelligence, (7) concept of operations, (8) battle
awareness, (9) maneuverability, (10) firepower, and (11) resilience.
Using these criteria, Till produces a set of superb, detailed analyses of the
actions. The four studies vary in length from thirty-four to fifty pages and are
based on careful examination of the detailed literature on each topic. Each study
stands alone as a separate battle analysis. “On the face of it, these four ship battles
were very different because of their unique circumstances, their very different
technologies, and their disparate geographic and chronological settings. But they
did have things in common, most obviously, in that they mattered. . . . [They]
conveyed important messages and had important consequences. These battles
had decisive effects, for good or ill” (p. 189).
In a most interesting section of his conclusions, the author reveals that the
book had its origins in the late-1990s era of “transformation” and the concept of
the revolution in military affairs that went along with it. He reminds readers that
the most vocal proponents of that concept often gave the impression that nothing
in the past held any relevance for the future; however, their own statement in Joint
Vision 2020 suggested that there was much more to transformation and to the
ability to prevail in combat than mere technological advantage. Till agrees that
naval operations are much more complicated than a matter of mere technological
advantage, and this explains the long gestation period for this book.
With the thought in mind that naval operations are so highly complex, Till
modestly hesitates to make any simple generalization about the factors that led
to naval victory in the four cases at hand; he leaves it up to his readers to reach
their own conclusions. But he does offer great insight.
While each battle encounter is unique in its own way, two general factors
must be kept in mind. Technological advantage is important, but faulty strategic
design clearly can shift the balance and lead to operational and tactical defeat.
At the level of operational enablers, technological advantage also plays a role, but
at this level it can also be undercut by faulty command and leadership capacity;
while styles in leadership may differ, clarity in aim and in relative responsibility
is essential. There is also a critical need to strike a balance between centralized
direction and delegated control. In this, modern communications need to ensure
that subordinates in the thick of a fight can make their needs known to their
superiors. Furthermore, military success is dependent on effective organization
and efficient supply, which, in turn, are reflections of national economic strength,
industrial capacity, and military support systems. Effective training for combat
operations is always a critical factor, but the historical examples studied here lead
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one to wonder why training levels can vary so much, even within a fleet. A reader
may well conclude that this turns on both leadership and the opportunities that
are made available at the individual ship and unit level.
Till points out that a “commander’s concept of operations translates strategic
enablers into battle deliverables. To be effective, the concept needs to be consistent with, and supportive of, national aims; realistic in terms of means available
. . . and effectively implementable by the commander’s subordinates” (p. 194).
Battle awareness, he points out, is simply the tactical expression of strategic and
operational intelligence, but intelligence is the key element in achieving surprise,
whether it be tactical, operational, or strategic. Thus, an effective concept of operations is an essential precondition to success in naval warfare.
In his final analysis, Till concludes that, among his eleven perspectives, no
single one is paramount in importance; all contribute to and are affected by the
others in varying degrees that depend on the situation.
These books by James Whitman and Geoffrey Till look at different issues in their
examination of the meaning of victory and military success, but both are very fine
examples of the varying ways in which the study of history can bring enormous
insight and understanding to the changing nature and character of war while also
being a corrective to an overreliance on new technology. Both provide us with a
balanced understanding based on a deeper perspective on what has changed and
what has not changed in warfare. As Till eloquently concludes his volume, “To be
useful, history needs to be accurate, objective, dispassionate, and scientific in its
pursuit of truth, rather than merely a past invented to provide cohesiveness and
purpose to its inheritors” (p. 199). This reviewer wholeheartedly agrees.
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WHY? AND OTHER THIRTY-FIVE-YEAR QUESTIONS
Pussycats: Why the Rest Keeps Beating the West and What Can Be Done about It, by Martin van
Creveld. Mevasseret Zion, Isr.: DLVC Enterprises, 2016. 249 pages. $11.95.

Martin van Creveld is one of the
foremost—and most controversial—
contemporary students of warfare. He
has authored over two dozen books
exploring various facets of strategy, the
future of warfare, and military operations and organization, including such
works as The Rise and Decline of the
State, The Transformation of War, Technology and War, Command in War, Supplying War, and The Training of Officers.
In this book, van Creveld notes that,
despite their overwhelming superiority
in virtually every facet of military power,
Western militaries since 1953 deployed
abroad to fight non-Westerners almost
always have been defeated and forced to
withdraw. He poses the question, “How
did the world’s best and most ferocious
soldiers, who for centuries fought and
defeated anybody and everybody until
they dominated the entire world, turn
into pussycats?” Van Creveld suggests
five broad categories of causes that
individually and collectively over
time have eroded greatly the basis for
effective Western military superiority:

• Subduing the young
• Defanging the troops
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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• Feminizing the forces
• Constructing post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD)

• Delegitimizing war
The first refers to the ever-growing
restrictions most Western countries have
placed on young people, ostensibly on
grounds of their safety and welfare. The
author declares that “the move to impose
more and more restrictions on young
people is a manifestation, if not to say
disease, typical of modern life in general
and Western life in particular.” The entry
into adulthood becomes ever more extended, reinforced by phenomena such
as “helicopter parenting,” “safe spaces”
and “trigger warnings” on campus, and
strict limits on work that minors are
permitted to do. This is complemented
by an excessive emphasis on unearned
“self-esteem,” a strong desire to avoid
“traumatizing” the young by criticizing
or reprimanding them, a de-emphasis
on assuming individual responsibility,
and the devaluation of competition
for fear of hurting those who do not
perform as well as others. The cumulative effect, van Creveld argues, is to
infantilize the young, undercut the
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motivation to excel, and steadily reduce
individual and societal willingness to
take risks—thus, “scant wonder that
a great many young people no longer
know how to cope with anything.” Yet
this is the pool from which Western
militaries must draw their troops.
Van Creveld asserts that many factors
have contributed to “defanging the
troops.” He notes the vast increase since
Vietnam in the proportion of senior
officers in the U.S. military. This rank
inflation has resulted in ever more decisions being pushed to higher levels, with
a seriously negative impact on the speed
of decision making and a mounting risk
aversion at all levels. Another problem
is the spread of civilian attitudes into
and imposition of civilian norms on the
military. War is a deadly business, yet
Western, especially U.S., military forces
have been hobbled by “exquisite” rules of
engagement that often impede mission
accomplishment at excessive risk to
friendly forces. One side cannot play by
“Marquess of Queensberry rules” alone.
At the same time, there is a growing
trend of senior officers “treating their
troops as if they were rowdies and/or
babies unable to look after themselves,
and/or ‘pussycats.’” The recurrent bouts
of drastic liberty restrictions on U.S.
forces in Japan are a prime example. The
author writes that “in today’s politically
correct world it is no longer enough
to kill those who would kill you”; the
enemy must not be disrespected, let
alone humiliated after his defeat—no
battlefield souvenirs taken. Male aggressiveness, historically quintessential
to battlefield success, is now a problem
for leadership to deal with, particularly
with regard to matters such as pornography and allegedly rampant sexual
misconduct in the military, which have
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nothing to do with combat effectiveness.
The proliferation of military lawyers on
staffs means that commanders or squad
leaders now must keep potential legal
ramifications constantly in mind, on top
of all the other battlefield imperatives.
But even worse, posits van Creveld, is
the “de-Militarized Military.” While it is
undeniable that “war is the most terrible
of all activities we humans engage
in,” there always has been a sense of
satisfaction, even enjoyment, in it. But
“in the prevailing attitude of political
correctness [to proclaim that] invites attack.” For example, when Marine general
Jim Mattis noted that shooting some
people who merited it was “a hell of a
lot of fun,” he was roundly condemned
and “counseled” to shut up. Similarly,
the notions of “hero” and “heroism” that
traditionally underpinned a military’s
fighting spirit and its “culture of war”
have been devalued systematically in
Western societies as they pertain to
combat, whereas they once were associated closely with pride. But the author
warns that “any attempt to tamper with
[the culture of war], even if laudable
in terms of a progressive country’s
instincts, is dangerous and should only
be undertaken with the greatest caution.
What has been demolished can never
be restored.” Thus, he concludes, “scant
wonder that . . . the willingness to
serve has been declining for decades.”
Van Creveld’s third category, “feminizing the forces,” is no doubt the most
controversial. He starts by stating flatly
that “currently Western countries are
embarked on a social experiment that
has no precedent in history.” He further
asserts that “whatever feminists may
claim and the statute books may say,
women and men are only equal in
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certain respects but not in others. Hence
the attempt to treat them as if they were
was bound to cause as many problems as
it solved.” There are two principal physical differences between the two sexes,
namely, physical strength/endurance
and pregnancy/motherhood. The author
goes into some detail on how these
impact individual and unit performance.
More importantly, van Creveld notes
that the sustained, intensive effort to create a “unisex” military has had serious
second-order consequences. Measures
such as putting men and women
through separate courses with different
physical performance requirements
and “gender norming” are inherently
suspect from a combat-effectiveness
perspective. The problem is that fair
treatment implies equality, meaning
that unit members essentially must be
interchangeable, because “cohesion, the
ability to stick together and stay together
even when—particularly when—things
go disastrously wrong, is the most
important quality any military formation must have.” Writes van Creveld,
“since men and women are not identical,
treating them as if they were is unfair.
But treating them as if they were not is
also unfair, though in a different way.”
The contribution to a climate of
intellectual dishonesty within the U.S.
military is a more serious second-order
effect. Van Creveld suggests that female
service members actually receive
preferential treatment, including
higher promotion rates and more lenient
treatment during disciplinary proceedings, and in connection with pregnancy.
What is more dishonest is that “service
personnel are prohibited from saying
that such privileges exist,” or, for that
matter, from writing or commenting
in any way that might suggest there
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are problems or challenges associated
with full integration of women into all
military fields. “The accusation of being
‘hostile to women’ will follow almost
automatically,” and being branded as
such “can easily bring about the end
of one’s career.” One other form of
dishonesty concerns charges of sexual
harassment; as one female U.S. pilot
told the author, “sexual harassment is
what I decide to report to my superiors.”
Whether that is an accurate reflection
of reality or not, it is widely perceived
that way among many men in the U.S.
military. As a result, van Creveld notes
that “to avoid trouble, men, military
men more than most, are expected
to believe—or at least conceal their
disbelief in—two contradictory things.
The first is that military women can
serve and fight just as well as men can
and that they therefore deserve the kind
of equality they and their supporters are
demanding. The second is that, being
equal, they do not enjoy privileges of
any kind.” These contradictory ideas are
“precisely the kind of thing that George
Orwell in 1984 called ‘double-think.’”
The author concludes this discussion
with one final point. “Feminizing
the forces and having women take
an active part in war and combat
threatens to take away one of the most
important reasons, sometimes even
the most important reason, why many
men enlist and fight: namely, to prove
their masculinity to themselves and to
others.” The “end of masculinity” as
a desideratum for a military force is
bound to undermine its “culture of war.”
With regard to “constructing PTSD,”
historically there is little record of it as a
widespread phenomenon. Van Creveld
suggests that this was in part because
war from ancient times had been
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associated with notions of aretē (excellence) and virtus (prowess), and more
recently with “honor” and “pride,” all of
which helped to forestall or suppress it.
But over the last century, “what changed
was the way [war] was perceived and understood. From a revelatory experience
akin to a religious one, it was turned
into a thoroughly rotten business [that]
was without either virtue or honor or
knowledge of any sort, merely a process
whereby obtuse generals sent millions
to be slaughtered. . . . As a result, almost
anybody who spent enough time
fighting was bound to suffer psychological damage.” Or so it was claimed.
Western militaries in the world wars
came to accept notions of “shell shock”
and “combat fatigue.” What is notable,
however, is that U.S. forces suffered
proportionately ten times the rate
of such psychiatric casualties as did
the German Wehrmacht, which was
accepted generally as having displayed
far greater cohesion and fighting
power than its Western counterparts
throughout the second war. Interestingly, postwar East Germany saw far
lower rates of such conditions than West
Germany, although both were treating
the same ex-soldiers. This suggests
that “there can be no doubt that social
factors—politics, culture, organization,
leadership, what have you—do much to
determine the way PTSD is treated. The
same seems to apply to its frequency
and, perhaps, even to its very existence.”
Psychiatric cases spiked in Vietnam
and PTSD claims remain at high levels.
Various causes are postulated: concussion; “the sheer terror of modern war”;
guilt feelings from surviving while
comrades died; guilt feelings from
killing others, especially in close combat.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/11

Printer_Winter2017Review.indb 172

But as van Creveld demonstrates, many
of those factors were always present in
war, yet did not manifest themselves
in large-scale PTSD. In more-recent
conflicts, van Creveld notes that there
was a far lower incidence of PTSD
among North Vietnamese than among
U.S. veterans, suggesting that “victory
is the best cure for the soul.” Nor is
defeat linked to widespread PTSD, as
evidenced by the German experience
in two world wars or, more recently,
that of Serbs after the Yugoslav wars—a
Serbian attaché informed the author
that “PTSD is not a hot topic” in Serbia.
So why is the PTSD rate in the United
States so high today? “Is it really war that
is generating PTSD? Or is it present-day
society’s idée fixe that war is bad both
in itself and for the soul of those who
participate in it, so that over enough
time anybody who does so must break
down,” in which case there is no disgrace
involved? Van Creveld suggests that
the cure may be driving the disease;
there may be perverse incentives to
overdiagnose PTSD, with the fear of
liability at the societal level driving
the process. There are large numbers
of claims and claimants, and medical
specialists, mental health workers, and
lawyers all have strong incentives to
keep the process going at full speed. Van
Creveld poses the difficult question: “Is
it conceivable that the compensations
and pensions are providing at least some
soldiers with an incentive to invent or
exaggerate symptoms and retain them
for as long as they can?” He concludes
by quoting a speech by General Mattis:
“I would just say there is one misperception of our veterans and that is they are
somehow damaged goods. I don’t buy it.
If we tell our veterans enough that this
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is what is wrong with them they may
actually start believing it. While victimhood in America is exalted I don’t think
our veterans should join those ranks.”
Van Creveld then segues to his fifth
category, “delegitimizing war,” by noting
that “to wage war two things are indispensable: armed force and legitimacy.”
He briefly reviews various notions of
legitimacy, including war as civic duty in
ancient times, defense of the sovereign
power of the state, doctrines such as jus
ad bellum and jus in bello, war as the
“school of the nation,” and finally the
linking of war to Darwinian theories
regarding natural selection, survival of
the fittest, and nations’ “will to live.”
The rise of powerful antimilitarist
feelings after the world wars deeply
eroded the idea of duty to the nation,
even while “the language of rights now
dominates political debate in the United
States.” The post-Vietnam shift to an
all-volunteer force further diminished
the sense of individual obligation to the
whole, while military service often came
to be seen as being only for those with
no better prospects. Van Creveld notes
darkly that “where rights reign supreme
and duty has become an object of neglect, suspicion, and even derision—as it
has in most Western societies—whether,
if and when the test comes, they will
be sufficient is anybody’s guess.”
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions
initiated the idea that there were,
or should be, better ways to settle
international disputes than by war.
This trend was reinforced strongly after
the ruinous world wars by numerous
subsequent conventions and treaties
and the establishment of the United
Nations. In parallel, concepts of “war
guilt” and rejections of the national use
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of force except strictly in self-defense
supplanted older notions of “the right of
conquest” and have tended increasingly
to delegitimize war, at least in the West.
Thus, for many Western thinkers, the
search for a replacement for war ought
to favor nonmilitary alternatives, such
as police training teams, mediators, and
“dialogs.” In van Creveld’s view, “both
intellectuals and politicians keep promising their audiences security without
sacrifice, privilege without responsibility. But what if terrorists/guerrillas/
insurgents/freedom fighters refuse to
answer empathy with empathy?”
In van Creveld’s view, these five trends
collectively have deeply undermined
Western military effectiveness and
societal resilience, aggravated by the
inability or unwillingness to examine
the underlying causal factors rigorously
and honestly. He closes by asserting
that the bedrock cause is that “large
parts of both European and American
societies, each in its own way, have come
to see war not simply as an evil that is
sometimes made absolutely necessary
by circumstances but as the ultimate
one that almost nothing can justify.
This will have to change. Or else.”
Many readers will reject various of the
author’s arguments as anachronistic
or, in any event, “overcome by events,”
hence not of interest or worthy of further debate or assessment. However, that
at least some of them represent significant threats to contemporary policies or
agendas is suggested by the ruthless de
facto suppression of vigorous debate on
sensitive topics by senior officers and top
civilian leaders (which invariably leads
to self-censorship, particularly among
ambitious officers). Such intimidation is
pure intellectual thuggery, which in itself
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is a great institutional danger, especially
in the military profession, where free
thinking, combined with robust debate,
is the essential prerequisite for not being
outthought and outfought by future foes.
Almost as dangerous as intellectual
thuggery is willful ignorance of “unpleasant truths” or empirical evidence.
This was illustrated most notoriously
by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus’s
recent a priori policy decision, made
in the fashion of Alice in Wonderland’s
Red Queen (“Sentence first, verdict
afterwards!”), to open all ground combat
positions to women regardless of any
data that might result subsequently
from the Marine Corps’s rigorous
yearlong study regarding the performance of mixed-gender units. That
sort of thing corrosively undermines
the institutional trust essential to the
success of any military organization.
Pussycats doubtless is controversial.
However, van Creveld’s arguments are
coherent and intellectually substantive,
even if one may disagree with some of
the assumptions he makes to support
them. Because they explicitly address
the most fundamental criterion for
assessing military forces—their combat
effectiveness—they are very worth
pondering by serving military officers
and civilian policy makers, especially
those more senior. Certainly the question of why Western military might, in
conjunction with the other elements
of state power, has not been more
effective during the past half-century
is a crucial one, given the multiple
dangerous challenges the West confronts
both today and over the longer term.
JAN VAN TOL
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Assessing China’s Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications, by Sarah Kirchberger. Berlin: SpringerVerlag, 2015. 318 pages. $129.

Few recent works on the Chinese navy
have arrived with a more intriguing pedigree than this volume. It is
unusual to find any in-depth work on
the Chinese military being done by
European researchers. Assessing China’s
Naval Power, the product of a German
academic and released by a respected
European publisher, is essentially unique
in the field. Further, the author comes
at the problem with a diverse résumé,
having applied her academic training
in East Asian politics as an analyst with
the German shipbuilder Blohm + Voss.
Despite these selling points, the work
fails to deliver an original or compelling
view of the fast-changing Chinese
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
Dr. Kirchberger sets out to create
an objective and largely materialist
yardstick by which to measure Chinese
naval development. While dealing
briefly with issues of policy and strategy,
she notes that matériel “defines the upper limit of what is achievable through
naval strategy.” As she seeks objective
comparisons, Kirchberger uses other
Asian and the so-called BRIC (Brazil,
Russia, India, China) navies as the
benchmark for “normal” naval development. While interesting, this effort to
quantify the analysis results in a strained
attempt to extract meaning from what
is quantifiable from available sources.
As an example, in one vignette Kirchberger compares Asian naval forces
with the total areas of the exclusive
economic zones (EEZs) their nations
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claim. The result suggests that China has
an average level of patrol-capable vessels,
but that the PLAN submarine force, at
one submarine per 35,716.75 square
kilometers of EEZ, is comparatively
large. It is tempting to critique such an
approach on the details: the figure used
for China’s EEZ is smaller than the scope
of its expansive maritime claims; and
administration of maritime claims in
China is a function of its rapidly growing
coast guard and maritime militia (not
explicitly included), whereas for many
of the other nations analyzed the navy
performs law-enforcement functions.
More significant is the irrelevance of the
figures themselves. By that yardstick,
the U.S. Navy (not included in this
analysis) defends one of the world’s
largest EEZs with a paltry one submarine per 210,000 square kilometers of
EEZ. Navies are developed for strategic
purposes, which vary from case to case.
Additionally, the focus on comparing
the PLAN with developing nations’
navies ignores the fact that one of the
driving combat tasks for the PLAN
is countering USN presence in Asia.
Taking the U.S. Navy as a yardstick for
Chinese naval development matters
because it is the yardstick the Chinese
themselves have set. That does not mean
the PLAN needs or desires to emulate
USN force structure in detail, but
considering both sides of a two-sided
interaction is critical to understanding.
More interesting is Kirchberger’s analysis
of China’s shipbuilding capabilities.
Drawing on her experience in the
shipbuilding industry, Kirchberger
assesses that the Chinese civil shipbuilding industry, though massive, offers few
advantages in the production of naval
combatants. In the critical maritime
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electronic sector, the book argues
that the European arms embargo and
centralized Chinese state control have
stymied most meaningful innovation.
Chinese combatants are presented as
collections of imported and copied
systems, with the assumption that the
systems-integration problems such a
model implies significantly hamper
their combat performance. The Chinese
decision to purchase the Russian-made
Sovremenny-class destroyer and
Kilo-class submarine in the middle of
the previous decade is seen as a tacit
admission of systemic deficiencies in
Chinese maritime systems development. However, Kirchberger arguably
underestimates China’s success at both
systems integration and adaptation
of foreign technologies. For example,
China received limited numbers of
Russian-manufactured MINERAL
ME radars and reverse engineered
them with enough success that they
now are deployed on every Jiangkai
II frigate produced. Kirchberger
dismisses these systems as poor copies.
While an earnest effort, at its heart this
volume fails on its sources. Dependent
on other secondary, primarily Englishlanguage, works, it contains few if any
references to Chinese-language sources.
As the volume was published in 2015,
most of these sources are from 2013
and prior. For example, Kirchberger’s
most consequential conclusions about
the PLAN submarine force hinge on a
2007 analysis of PLAN patrol activity
during the prior decade. The result
is a view of the Chinese navy that
arguably is accurate as of about 2010,
but that does not account for the rapid
changes in the scope and complexity
of PLAN platforms, capabilities, and
operations in the intervening years.
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Given the relatively small number of
academics doing serious analysis of the
PLAN, the introduction of a new point
of view is always to be welcomed. In
this case, however, naval professionals
interested in Chinese naval development
would be served better by going directly
to the sources behind this volume.
DALE C. RIELAGE

Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991, by
Xiaoming Zhang. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North
Carolina Press, 2015. 296 pages. $34.95 (e-book
$33.99).

This book will be welcomed equally
by historians, political scientists, and
international relations specialists. It is
a worthy addition to existing literature
and belongs on any bookshelf dedicated
to understanding modern China and
Southeast Asia. Xiaoming Zhang, an
associate professor in the Department
of Strategy at the Air War College, has
provided valuable additional information and analysis concerning the People’s
Republic of China’s invasion of Vietnam
in 1979. The Chinese invasion was
planned deliberately and analytically,
then for nearly a month the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) fought fiercely
against China’s neighbor and former
ally. At the end of this period, the two
countries settled into a continuing active
and deadly border dispute that lasted
a decade. Taking advantage of recently
declassified Chinese documents and an
impressive number of interviews, Dr.
Zhang has advanced significantly our
understanding of why the Chinese chose
to initiate the somewhat Orwelliansounding “counterattack in self-defense
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against Vietnam,” how the war was
conducted, and why the subsequent
conflict along the VietnameseChinese border lasted so long.
As the history of the conflict unfolds,
Deng Xiaoping becomes more and
more the central figure and key Chinese
decision maker. By the conclusion of the
book, Dr. Zhang presents a convincing
case that the war of 1979 was indeed
Deng’s war—a war into which he entered
as much to preserve and promote his
plans for economic modernization as to
affect the balance of power in the international political system, while simultaneously aiming to rehabilitate and start
the process of modernizing the PLA.
The book explains how the recent North
Vietnamese victory over the Americans
and the South Vietnamese had a surprisingly deleterious effect on Vietnam’s
previously amiable and long-term alliance with China. Flushed with victory
and boasting a hardened and wellequipped army, the Vietnamese became,
to Chinese eyes, increasingly arrogant
and unfriendly. Vietnam’s invasion of
Cambodia and its deepening friendship
with the Soviet Union led Deng to see
China’s position as potentially imperiled,
threatened by the USSR to the north
and the Vietnamese to the south. In
particular, the invasion of Cambodia
in December 1978 was viewed as proof
of Hanoi’s ambition to make Vietnam a
hegemonic power in Southeast Asia, and
added significantly to Deng’s concerns.
Deng, who already had determined that
economic and industrial modernization
was the way ahead for China, arrived
at an apparently counterintuitive
conclusion. Significant combat operations conducted against Vietnam, the
Soviet Union’s most important regional
ally, would signal to the United States
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and other Western powers that China
was a reliable partner that could be
counted on to do what was needed.
In return, the West would be more
likely to continue to support Chinese
efforts to modernize, and the perceived
Soviet threat would be reduced.
However, as Zhang explains, the
Chinese army had not fought a major
war in three decades. Its tactics were
outdated and its logistics support was
inferior, and no officer below the rank
of battalion commander was battle
tested. Furthermore, the PLA did not
enjoy a positive reputation within
China’s general population. In contrast,
the Vietnamese army had decades of
recent combat experience, large stores
of modern Soviet and captured U.S.
military equipment, and the intangible
benefits that come with victory.
A massive propaganda campaign to
improve the image of the PLA was
launched. Significant amounts of
military stores were moved into the
Guangzhou and Kunming military
districts. Army planners prepared for
a massive offensive designed to seize
several major northern Vietnamese cities and wreck two Vietnamese divisions
in the process. The whole campaign was
designed to “teach Vietnam a lesson.”
Zhang provides a detailed account of
the fighting that followed. The Chinese
executed their plan successfully, albeit
at a much higher cost than anticipated.
Zhang debunks common claims by
Vietnamese that the majority of their
combatants were local militia fighters. While it is true that several elite
Vietnamese divisions were engaged in
Cambodia, far more regular army units
fought in the north than the Vietnamese
indicated. The war was almost exclusively a ground war, although both the
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Vietnamese and Chinese air forces carried out many reconnaissance missions.
After nearly thirty days of fairly hard
fighting, Chinese forces withdrew to the
border, having achieved their geographic
objectives and inflicted significant casualties on enemy forces. The operation
had been calibrated skillfully to “punish”
Vietnam, without going so far as to bring
the Soviets into the fray. Deng then
directed the army to continue to fight
along the border until the Vietnamese
withdrew from Cambodia. It would take
a decade—and the visible decline of the
Soviet Union—but in the end
Vietnamese leaders acquiesced and
Deng got what he wanted. During this
period Vietnam’s economy suffered.
China’s southernmost provinces
also suffered, but the nation reaped
the benefits of modernization
and Western engagement.
Chinese military leaders deliberately
used the ensuing chronic border conflict
to “blood” much of their army and
local militias. The war also provided
new heroes to place in the public eye.
However, in one of the more poignant
portions of the book, Zhang describes
how China’s Vietnam experience
affected many of the participants in
much the same manner as it had their
earlier U.S. equivalents. Strategically, the
war also saw the Chinese army embrace
combined operations and a turn to modernization as a requirement for victory.
Zhang makes a convincing argument
that Deng Xiaoping calculatingly
used the Chinese military instrument
to achieve strategic, domestic, and
personal goals. His war was one of
deliberate choice. Potential Vietnamese
hegemonic ambitions were thwarted;
Vietnam would be forced to leave
Cambodia. China’s ties to the West
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were strengthened; Soviet influence
in the region was weakened.
China reaped other benefits, although
some were perhaps mixed. Vietnam
would—and still does—view China
with suspicion. Other countries in
the region now know that China did,
and could once again, wage offensive
war, if seen to be in the interest of the
state. The Chinese military, once so
abysmally behind technologically, has
transformed itself. Combined arms
operations, performed haltingly at
best in 1979, are now common.

Zhang frequently and conscientiously
reminds the reader that, although
knowledge of the Sino-Vietnamese
conflict has increased greatly, it is
important not to embrace any conclusions, even the most apparently
convincing, as definitive. This is because
some Chinese and all the Vietnamese
records have yet to be declassified. The
warning is appropriate, but should
not detract from Zhang’s analysis, nor
from a deep appreciation of his work.
RICHARD J. NORTON

OUR REVIEWERS
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the Office of Naval Intelligence, and director of the Navy Asia-Pacific advisory group. He is the
author of Russian Supply Efforts in America during the First World War.
Prior to his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 2007, Captain Jan van Tol served as special adviser in
the office of the vice president. He was a military assistant to the Secretary of Defense’s principal
adviser for net assessment from 1993 to 1996 and again from 2001 to 2003. At sea, he commanded
three warships, two of which, USS O’Brien (DD 975) and USS Essex (LHD 2), were part of the U.S.
Navy’s forward-deployed naval forces based in Japan. Captain van Tol’s analytic work has focused
mainly on long-range strategic planning, naval warfare, military innovation, and war gaming.
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-

C

ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

hief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson is a strong supporter of
reading books of consequence as a way for all members of the Navy team to
develop as leaders and citizens. He recently said, “I realize that it takes dedication to devote time to reading, but it is fundamental to growth as a naval professional.” He has directed his reading program planning team at the Naval War
College to expand the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program
(CNO-PRP) to include a larger selection of titles, and to augment the books with
other learning tools such as reading guides, videos, and related articles. Final
steps toward launching the new program are being taken now, but the general
outline of the changes is highlighted below:
• The recommended book titles will be arranged in groups that align with
the tenets of the “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority”; these are
“Strengthening Naval Power at and from the Sea”; “Achieving High-Velocity
Learning at Every Level”; “Strengthening Our Navy Team for the Future”;
and “Expanding and Strengthening Our Network of Partners.” The books
also will be cross-referenced and linked to subjects related to the four core attributes of the Navy’s professional identity: integrity, accountability, initiative,
and toughness.
• Recognizing that the Navy is a war-fighting entity that nonetheless shares
some of the characteristics of a large corporate enterprise, the books will be
categorized as primarily operational in nature or more corporate in focus.
• The new CNO-PRP will recommend books that form the basis of the Navy’s
cultural and historical legacy. These dozen books form a canon of fundamental reading that can be of value to all sailors.
• The majority of the books that will comprise the new program fall into
broad categories associated with the Design’s “lines of effort” and its “core
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attributes.” The approximately forty titles in these categories build on the
foundation the canon establishes.
• A list of history and fiction books will be identified for consideration, as well
as a group of titles of a more casual nature (a sort of informal “Navy book
club”).
• A final list of titles will identify books that will challenge the conventional
wisdom, getting readers to think from different perspectives.
The intent of the various lists and categorizations is to help sailors find books
of professional value among the millions in publication at any time. Many of the
books identified in the CNO-PRP will be available for free loan from the MWR
Digital Library.
The next article in the Reflections on Reading series will discuss specific titles,
authors, and subjects of interest. The motto of the new CNO-PRP is “Read, Write,
Win!,” and we believe that any investment in time spent reading the outstanding
books in the program will pay great dividends in enhancing your professionalism.

JOHN E. JACKSON
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